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Abstract 
A review of philosophical practice, commonly referred to as philosophical counselling, reveals an 
array of approaches with a variety of aims. These aims include problem solving, therapy, scepticism, 
self-knowledge, wisdom and virtue. I argue that the various approaches to philosophical practice can 
be understood as aspects of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom directed 
at bringing about / increasing well-being. Contrary to the view that philosophical practitioners use a 
wide variety of methods, I give evidence that most practitioners endorse a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing. In accordance with this, the philosophical practitioner applies the Socratic Method 
and adopts the position of the Socratic gadfly – a critical dialogical partner intent on getting the 
participant to access and assess her worldview. I argue that such a vision of philosophizing is 
insufficient to meet the phronetic ends of wisdom and well-being. As such, I maintain that additional 
visions of philosophizing are required.  
The central focus of this dissertation is dedicated to exploring alternative visions of philosophizing, 
with the view to developing and enriching philosophical practice. I associate philosophical practice 
with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. I identify five essential elements of a 
philosophical way of life: it promotes a transformative aspiration; the aspiration informs a 
transformative project; it provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; 
it provides transformative tools; and it constitutes a self-contained and coherent philosophical 
system. I offer these five elements as criteria to identify additional philosophies that could enrich 
and develop philosophical practice.  
I explore a selection of Western philosophies that, I argue, offer philosophical ways of life. These 
include: the Stoics, the Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I pair these on the basis 
of two criteria: shared philosophical aspiration; and divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies. 
Firstly, each chapter is orientated around a single aspiration: to ‘be happy’; ‘be good’; and ‘become 
authentic’. Secondly, in each chapter the philosophies have either ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’ 
metaphysical and ethical tendencies. This serves to highlight the richness and diversity of 
philosophies that share a philosophical aspiration. By investigating these six I make the following 
contributions: illuminate a divergent array of ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views; 
increase the scope of phronetic ends; significantly augment the pool of philosophically prescribed 
practices; expand the range of roles that the philosophical practitioner can assume; and sketch a 
tentative view of what philosophical practice could look like. 
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Isifinyezo sokuqukethwe 
Ukubuyekezwa kwendlela yokwenza ifilosofi, evame ukubizwa ngokuthi ukweluleka kwefilosofi, 
kuveza uxhaxha lwezindlela ezinezinjongo ezahlukahlukene. Lezi zinjongo zifaka ukuxazulula 
izinkinga, ukweluleka, ukungabaza, ukwazi ngokwakho, ubuhlakani kanye nobumsulwa. Iphuzu lami 
lapha lithi, izindlela ezahlukahlukene zokwenza ifilosofi zingaqondwa njengezixha zombono owodwa 
wefilosofi njengephronetic: ubuhlakani obunomthelela ngqo ekuletheni okanye ekuthuthukiseni 
inhlalakahle. Ngokuphikisana nombono wokuthi abasebenza ngefilosofi basebenzisa izindlela 
ezahlukahlukene, nginikeza ubufakazi bokuthi iningi lezazi zefilosofi livumelana nombono kaSocratic 
wokwenza ifilosofi. Ngokuhambisana nalokhu, isazi sefilosofi sisebenzisa indlela kaSocratis futhi 
samukele umbono weSocratic gadfly - ukuhlaziywa kwezingxoxo okuhloswe ngakho ukwenza 
umlingani kwingxoxo ukuba afinyelele futhi ahlole indlela akawubona ngawo umhlaba. 
Ngiqhakambisa iphuzu elithi lendlela yokwenza ifilosofi ayanele ukuphelelisa iziphetho zobuhlakani 
bempilo kanye nenhlala-kahle. Ngalokhu ngithi, imibono eyengeziwe yefilosofi iyadingeka. 
Okuzoba umgogodla walolucwaningo ukuhlonza izindlela ezakukahlukene zokwenza ifilosofi, injongo 
okungukukhulisa kanye nokucebisa indlela yokwenza ifilosofi. Indlela yokwenza ifilosofi 
ngiyimatanisa nendlela ebukwa ngayo ifilosofi njengendlela yokuphila. Zinhlanu izinto engizibalayo 
ezichaza ubunjalo befilosofi: ikhuthaza umdlandla yokuguqula; lomdlandla ukhuthaza ucwaningo 
loguquko; inikeza indlela yokwenza ifilosofi ephelele; ihlinzeka ngezikhali zoguquko; futhi inikeza 
indlela yefilosofi eqoqekile. Nginikeza lezi zinto ezinhlanu njengezindlela zokuhlonza amanye 
amafilosofi angacebisa futhi athuthukise indlela yokwenza ifilosofi. 
Ngiphenya amafilosofi athize aseNtshonalanga anikeza izindlela zokwenza ifilosofi. Lokhu kufaka 
phakathi: amaStoics, amaEpikhuru, uKant, uDewey, uKierkegaard kanye noNietzsche. Ngihlanganisa 
lokhu ngesisekelo sezinto ezimbili: ukwabiwa kwentshisekelo yefilosofi; kanye nokuhlukahlukene 
kwesilinganiso nomgomo yokuziphatha. Okokuqala, Isahluko ngasinye siqondiswe kwisifiso 
esisodwa: 'ukujabula'; 'ukuziphathe kahle'; kanye 'nobuqiniso'. Okwesibili, esahlukweni ngasinye 
amafilosofi anokuthambekela kokulinganisa nokuziphatha. Lokhu kusebenza ukugqamisa ukuceba 
nokwehlukahluka kwamafilosofi ahlanganyela isifiso sefilosofi. Ngokuphenya ngalezi eziyisithupha 
ngenza lokhu okulandelayo: kukhanyisela uhlu olunhlobonhlobo lwezimiso zokuziphatha, 
zokulinganisa nezokubuka; khuphula ubukhulu bemikhawulo ye-phronetic; kwandisa kakhulu ichibi 
lemikhuba ebekiwe yifilosofi; andise ububanzi bezindima ezingahle zithathwe yisazi sefilosofi; bese 
ubhala ngombono ongasho lutho wokuthi umkhuba wamafilosofi ungabukeka kanjani. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This dissertation will be concerned broadly with philosophical practice – the practical application of 
philosophy directed at the beliefs, values, perspectives and / or worldviews of the individual with a 
view to challenging, changing, and / or improving the way she thinks about herself and the world, 
conducts herself and comports herself1. This concise formulation conceals a complex and contested 
terrain. Philosophical practitioners promote a variety of ends. These include problem solving, 
therapy, scepticism, self-knowledge, wisdom and virtue. Dissent amongst practitioners regarding the 
ends could create the impression that the field of philosophical practice is diverse and differentiated. 
Contrary to this, I will argue that the various approaches to philosophical practice are aspects of a 
singular vision of philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom directed at bringing about / increasing 
well-being. I will then examine the means professed by philosophical practitioners. Some 
practitioners advocate methodological eclecticism – the view that the practitioner has the freedom 
to utilize any philosophical ideas and practices she deems appropriate. I argue that practitioners 
should be cautious of such an approach, as the uncritical application of philosophical traditions with 
contradictory metaphysical and ethical commitments, and their associated methods, may result in 
unhelpful logical inconsistencies in the participant2. I will argue that most practitioners endorse a 
Socratic vision of philosophizing, with respect to focus, method and role of the practitioner. While 
application of the Socratic Method avoids the concern I raise against methodological eclecticism, I 
will argue that it is insufficient to meet the phronetic ends of wisdom and well-being. In an effort to 
attend to this deficiency I will develop and enrich the vision of philosophical practice by associating it 
with the tradition of philosophy as a way of life. This will permit me to identify a selection of 
Western philosophies that philosophical practitioners have largely neglected: the Stoics, the 
Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. By investigating these six I will make the 
following contributions: illuminate a divergent array of ethical, metaphysical and epistemological 
views; increase the scope of phronetic ends; significantly augment the pool of philosophically 
                                                          
1 I employ ‘she’ when making reference to the practitioner and participant simply as a way of showing that 
these roles are not necessarily male. The reader should take ‘she’ as a convenient shorthand for ‘she or he’. 
  
2 I make use of ‘participant’ as emphasizes activity as a necessary requirement of the person meeting with the 
philosophical practitioner, while deemphasizing relations of power. While the term ‘client’ is often used, it not 
only emphasizes the commercial element of the practice, given the notion that ‘the client is always right’ it 
could place power in the hands of the participant. ‘Patient’ might be employed, though it places emphasis on a 
state of ill health, and places power in the hands of the practitioner as ‘healer’. While ‘pupil’ or ‘student’ may 
be used, I contend that these terms emphasize unequal power relations between practitioner, as teacher or 
bearer of knowledge, and participant.   
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prescribed practices; expand the range of roles that the philosophical practitioner can assume; and 
sketch a tentative view of what philosophical practice could look like. 
Philosophical practice is commonly referred to as philosophical counselling. Achenbach (1995, 1998), 
originator of contemporary philosophical practice, makes repeated reference to ‘philosophical 
counselling’ and ‘philosophical practice’. There is no evidence that Achenbach differentiates 
between the two, and it appears that many practitioners similarly treat the terms synonymously.  
The notion of philosophical counselling conveys the idea of philosophy conjoined with psychology. 
While this is conceptually useful, especially for those encountering it for the first time, such an 
association runs the risk of creating misconceptions and false expectations. While some 
practitioners, for instance Cohen (2005), have definite psychological influences, orientations and 
inclinations, it is not the case that all do. While most practitioners make no connection between 
philosophy and psychotherapy,  others, such as Achenbach (1995) and Lahav (2001a), define 
philosophical practice in negative relation to psychotherapy, respectively referring to it as an 
‘alternative’, or ‘complementary’ to psychotherapy. However, defining philosophical practice in 
reference to and as distinct from psychotherapy is problematic in several ways. Firstly, any reference 
to ‘psychotherapy’ creates the misleading impression that it is a singular entity. There are in fact 
many and varied psychotherapies. Accordingly, Raabe (2001: 102) states that it is “impossible to 
distinguish all philosophical counseling from psychotherapy by means of generalizations”. Raabe 
(2001: 85) raises a second concern: assertions of difference could inadvertently result in overlooking 
the similarities between philosophical practice and those forms of psychotherapy that use 
philosophical approaches, which “all resemble philosophical counseling when they are examined 
closely”. I disagree with Raabe on the latter point. While it is the case that some psychotherapies 
may appropriate and utilize aspects of philosophy, I regard philosophical practice to be distinctive in 
at least four ways: it is firmly grounded in philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics); it is 
orientated toward the pursuit of philosophical ends; it makes use of philosophically advocated 
means in order to realize the ends; the philosopher plays an instrumental role. In light of the above, 
and given that philosophical practice is still in early stages of development, I make use of the term 
‘philosophical practice’ as it places emphasis on the practical application of philosophy while not 
associating that practice in any way with psychology, psychological counselling or psychotherapy. 
The opening task of this dissertation will be to generate an overview of the broad domain of 
philosophical practice, providing an account of the professed aims and the practices used to attain 
them. This is far from simple as the field of practice appears to comprise of a variety of approaches 
and an array of ends. Moreover, while practitioners are clear with respect to their aims and 
particular methodological approaches, they tend to describe their work in isolation from other 
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approaches to philosophical practice and philosophy proper. Isolationist conceptualizations of this 
sort result in the development and use of unique descriptors that have the effect of making the field 
of practice appear to be more diverse than it is. 
In chapter one, I will enumerate the ends of philosophical practice, as well as highlight the dissent 
amongst practitioners with respect to those ends. This could create the impression that the field of 
philosophical practice is diverse and differentiated. One attempt to rationalize this is made by Sivil 
and Clare (2018). They develop a taxonomy of ends that identifies four variants of philosophical 
practice: instrumental-specific approaches, which are concerned with the end of problem-solving; 
instrumental-general approaches, which advocate therapy as an end; intrinsic-specific approaches, 
which are concerned with epistemic ends such as scepticism and self-knowledge; intrinsic-general 
approaches, which endorse the ends of wisdom and virtue. The taxonomy reduces the complexity of 
ends, and provides useful categories for discourse. Problematically, it posits strict divisions between 
the different variants that results in an uncharitable reading of practitioners who endorse ends from 
different variants. I will argue for a unified understanding of philosophical practice as phronetic, in 
which the manifold approaches are regarded as expressions of a single vision of philosophy as 
practical wisdom orientated to bringing about and / or increasing well-being3. It is hoped that this 
will create a clearer sense not only of what philosophical practice is about, but how the 
conceptualizations and practices of individual practitioners lie in relation to one another and to 
philosophy proper.  
Having clarified the end(s) of philosophical practice, I will turn my attention to examine the means 
advocated by philosophical practitioners. While Raabe (2001: 43) describes philosophical practice as 
comprising a “plurality of distinct methodologies” an examination of the literature will reveal that 
few methods are actually endorsed. Some practitioners, such as Marinoff and Tukiainen, endorse 
‘methodological eclecticism’ – the view that the practitioner has the freedom to utilize whatever 
ideas and methods they deem to be appropriate. I caution against such an approach. My concern is 
that the application of philosophical traditions with contradictory metaphysical and ethical 
commitments, and their associated methods, may result in logical inconsistencies in the participant.  
I will argue that most practitioners utilize a Socratic vision of philosophizing. In accordance with this 
the participant’s worldview is the primary focus. The primary task of the practitioner is to help the 
participant access, assess and modify her worldview. This is achieved through a critical dialogical 
                                                          
3 The term ‘phronetic’ is derived from Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom, and is used as a 
placeholder for a whole spectrum of ideas on this topic.   
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process akin to the Socratic Method. Such a task requires that the practitioner assume the role of 
the Socratic gadfly: interrogator, dialogical partner and teacher of critical reasoning.  
I will contend that if it is the case that philosophical practice has different ends, then it would be 
logical to assume that different means would be required to attain them. However, since I will argue 
that all these approaches are facets of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic, it would seem to 
follow that the predominance of a single method might be justified. One might also argue that since 
a Socratic vision of philosophizing is devoid of metaphysical and ethical commitments, use of it not 
only avoids the concern I raise against methodological eclecticism, it also preserves and enhances 
participant autonomy. I will argue that these justifications are insufficient to warrant the sole 
application of the Socratic Method in philosophical practice. While the Socratic Method might be 
necessary to achieve phronetic ends, I will argue that it is not sufficient. Accordingly, I will maintain 
that additional visions of philosophizing are required. 
Not all practitioners agree that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is adequate to meet phronetic 
ends. For example, Lahav (2006) advocates a Platonic vision of philosophizing. I will explore his 
suggestion and argue that his rendition of Plato is philosophically suggestive rather than contentful, 
and practically vague.  
I will then explore Aristotle’s vision of philosophizing, paying particular attention to his ethics which 
is fundamentally phronetic. I will explore his conceptions of virtue and well-being, philosophical and 
practical wisdom, and the associated methods to develop these virtues. These include: 
contemplation, deliberation, exemplification and habituation. I will then highlight the roles he might 
attribute to the philosopher. These include: the Socratic gadfly; trainer of deliberation; developer of 
sensitivities; and exemplary figure. In light of the above, an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing 
presents as a genuine possibility for philosophical practice. 
I will argue that Aristotle’s immanent vision of philosophizing stands as a genuine contrary to Plato’s 
transcendent vision. ‘Immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ represent divergent metaphysical and ethical 
tendencies in philosophy. Transcendent philosophies present a bifurcated vision of the world, such 
that there is this world, and another, higher, ideal, or ‘true’ reality. This can take a variety of shapes: 
Platonic Forms, God, the Absolute or Reason. Metaphysics informs ethics – the way we ought to live. 
Transcendent ethics requires that we relinquish some aspect of ourselves. This can manifest in 
several ways. We can, for example, relinquish desire and live according to the dictates of reason, or 
we can effect a full resignation of the self and live according to the dictates of God. Immanent 
philosophies do not bifurcate the world. The existence of the physical and human world is 
recognized. Consequently, the way we ought to live does not entail looking outward, or giving any 
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part of ourselves up. Instead, the answer to the question of how we should live lies within us and 
merely needs to be developed and cultivated. This could entail a partial cultivation of feeling and 
sensitivities, or total self-recreation.  
I am going to make a very general suggestion that philosophies can be divided into those that have 
immanent metaphysical and ethical tendencies; and those that have transcendent metaphysical and 
ethical tendencies. I acknowledge the oversimplified nature of this division as not all philosophies 
embody a single tendency. This division will perform a thematic function as a framing devise in 
subsequent chapters, permitting me to contrast divergent schemes of thought. The general nature 
of this characterization serves to highlight the richness and diversity of philosophies within a 
tradition. It could serve a secondary purpose to address the concern I raise against methodological 
eclecticism: that the indiscriminate use of philosophical ideas and methods may result in logical 
inconsistencies that could cause problems for the participant. It is hoped that partitioning 
philosophies with divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies might help to reduce incidences of 
cross-combining contrary views and their associated methods.  
Given that Western philosophy has significantly more to offer than Socrates, Plato and Aristotle the 
primary focus of this dissertation will be to identify and explore additional visions of philosophizing.  
In order to identify additional visions of philosophizing that might be relevant to philosophical 
practice I will develop the understanding of philosophical practice by associating it with the 
conception of philosophy as a way of life. Hadot (1995: 83) describes this conception of philosophy 
as “an exercise in the art of living” that teaches us a new way to live, and which “causes us to be 
more fully, and makes us better”. 
The significance of associating philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of 
life is fourfold. Firstly, it provides a richer understanding of philosophical practice. Secondly, it 
highlights the notion of commitment. A philosophical way of life is something that one adopts and 
lives. By extension, the activities promoted in philosophical practice should not be thought of as 
being restricted to the philosophical encounter but should be performed in each moment of one’s 
life. Thirdly, such an association highlights a temporal aspect of philosophical practice – that it is 
continuous and without end. Finally, and most importantly, I will extrapolate five criteria out of it by 
which additional visions of philosophizing can be identified. These are: 1. it promotes a 
transformative aspiration; 2. the aspiration informs a transformative project; 3. it provides a vision 
of philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; 4. it provides transformative tools; 5. it 
constitutes a self-contained and coherent philosophical system.  
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If it is the case that philosophical practice accords with this conception of philosophy as a way of life, 
then it is logical to assume that any philosophy that accords with such a conception might be 
relevant to philosophical practice.  
The following philosophers will be identified as offering philosophical ways of life: the Stoics, the 
Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche4. Given that very little work has been done by 
any philosophical practitioner to elucidate the theoretical and practical merits of these philosophies, 
or indeed of philosophical practice as phronetic in general, I will embark on a ‘philosophical 
excavation’ with the express intention of uncovering what each might offer to philosophical practice. 
This will be a fundamentally exegetical task, the purpose of which will be to: expose what makes 
these philosophies philosophical ways of life; detail their ethical, metaphysical and epistemic 
outlooks; examine their associated practices; and explore the roles they assign to the philosopher5.  
In each subsequent chapter the philosophies will be presented in pairs, on the basis of two criteria: 
shared philosophical aspiration; and divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies. Each chapter 
will be orientated around a single aspiration: ‘being happy’ (chapter 3), ‘being good’ (chapter 4), and 
‘becoming authentic’ (chapter 5). The division of philosophies into ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ 
will be used as framing device, intended to highlight the richness and diversity of philosophies that 
share the same philosophical aspiration.  
In chapter three I will explore the Stoics and the Epicureans. Both these Hellenistic schools of 
philosophy endorse happiness as the ultimate goal. They define happiness in terms of tranquillity 
and self-sufficiency. Despite sharing a philosophical aspiration these philosophical schools are 
metaphysically and ethically divergent from one another. The Stoics endorse a bifurcated vision of 
the world: human and the divine. They regard reason to be divine and universal, and associate the 
Good with the realization of perfect reason. Attaining happiness entails cultivating reason, living in 
accordance with nature and accepting one’s fate. I will read the Stoics as offering a transcendent 
philosophical way of life. In contrast, Epicurean metaphysics does not rest on the notion of a 
transcendent realm. They associate the Good with minimizing pain. Attaining happiness entails 
diminishing desire and taking pleasure in simple things. I will read the Epicureans as offering an 
immanent philosophical way of life.  
                                                          
4 Since these philosophies are intended to be lived I regard them as ‘living’, and as such refer to them all in the 
present tense despite the fact that all the philosophers under review are no longer alive. 
  
5 In my use of the six philosophical writers or schools I use the primary sources only insofar as this is 
appropriate for my purposes in a study of this nature. 
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In chapter four I will explore Kant and Dewey. I contend that Kant and Dewey endorse the aspiration 
to be good. Being good requires developing positive character traits, such as intellect, and living and 
acting in accordance with an ethical principle that governs the way we live with others. Despite 
sharing a philosophical aspiration these philosophers offer divergent metaphysical and ethical 
positions. Kant posits a metaphysical view that bifurcates reality into two distinct realms: the 
phenomenal and noumenal. He promotes autonomy as the highest good, which governs the 
aspiration to moral purity. This requires that we develop our intellect, and subdue our affect, govern 
our passions, and bring all our capacities and inclinations under the control of reason. Right action is 
determined by living and acting in accordance with moral law and associated duties. I will read Kant 
as offering a transcendent philosophical way of life. In contrast, Dewey endorses a naturalistic 
metaphysic that recognizes the phenomenal world as the sole plane of existence, and characterizes 
it as being in a constant state of evolution and emergence. He posits a naturalistic ethic that 
recognizes growth as the sole criterion of the Good. Right action is that which generates the best 
consequences for the general welfare. I will read Dewey as offering an immanent philosophical way 
of life. 
In chapter five I will explore the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. These philosophers 
endorse the aspiration to become authentic. This is understood as an ongoing and never ending 
process of ‘becoming who you are’. Despite endorsing the same philosophical aspiration the 
philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are metaphysically and ethically divergent. Kierkegaard 
presents a bifurcated view of reality: God as infinite, absolute, necessary and free from change; and 
material existence as finite, temporal, causal and subject to change. He identifies having a 
relationship with God as the highest Good. Becoming authentic requires that the individual 
relinquish her finitude and surrender herself to God. I will read him as offering a transcendent 
philosophical way of life. In contrast, Nietzsche endorses a naturalistic metaphysic that posits a 
vision of reality comprised of a single realm, and offers the ‘will to power’ as the underlying 
character of life. Moreover, he offers the ‘will to power’ as the objective measure of value. 
Becoming authentic is an act of self-creation that requires the individual to embrace and develop all 
facets of herself. I will read Nietzsche as offering an immanent philosophical way of life. 
Since each chapter will examine two related, though divergent, philosophies with a view to 
elucidating their relevance to phronetic philosophical practice the pathway of each chapter will be 
more or less identical. This permits me to describe that pathway in general terms. Chapters two, 
three and four will each comprise of several tasks.  
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The first task will be to ratify that the philosophy under review constitutes a philosophical way of 
life. I will do this by indicating how each philosophy satisfies the five criteria of a philosophical way of 
life, i.e. that it: promotes a transformative aspiration; endorses a transformative project aimed at 
changing and improving the individual and her way of life; provides a vision of philosophizing that is 
holistic and personally invested; provides transformative tools; and is a self-contained and coherent 
system.  
The second task will be to show the relevance of each philosophical way of life to philosophical 
practice. In particular, I will explore what each has to offer the participant with respect to the 
transformative aspiration and project. I will show that the Stoics and Epicureans endorse a 
naturalistic conception of the Good, and promote a transformative project of character 
development that entails the acquisition of virtue. I will show that Kant offers autonomy as the 
Good, and endorses a transformative project of cultivating the spirit. I will show that Dewey offers 
growth as the Good and endorses a transformative project of self and social-reconstruction. In 
addition, I will show that Kant and Dewey implicate aesthetic sensibility in the transformative 
process. I will show that Kierkegaard offers eternal happiness as the Good and advocates a 
transformative project of creating subjectivity. I will show that Nietzsche advocates strength and 
health as goods, and promotes a transformative project of self-creation. I will argue that the 
transformative visions of these philosophical ways of life are directly relevant to philosophical 
practice, as they could serve as transformative ends and means for the participant.      
I will then explicate the transformative tools associated with the each philosophical way of life. I 
regard this task as crucial, since there is a distinctive lack of phronetic methods in philosophical 
practice. Since most practitioners utilize a Socratic vision of philosophizing, the fundamental activity 
in a philosophical session is critical dialogue. Relevant concepts, beliefs, values, and principles are 
discussed, considered, and assessed for inconsistencies, contradictions, and fallacious reasoning. 
While rational critical dialogue is a central philosophical activity, an examination of the respective 
philosophies will reveal a host of practices that are not restricted to rational argumentation and 
critical dialogue. These include practices for the individual: studying philosophy, contemplating the 
moral exemplar, memorization of epitomes and principles, contemplating one’s death, developing 
aesthetic perception and aesthetic distance, silence, irony, self-vigilance, self-reflection, self-
disclosure, self-overcoming, revaluating values, loving one’s self and one’s fate; and social practices 
such as friendship, confession, conversation, and listening. I will argue that these practices are 
relevant to philosophical practice.  
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I will then elucidate the roles these philosophers ascribe to the philosopher. This is significant given 
that the primary role assumed by philosophical practitioners appears to be that of the Socratic 
gadfly. Such a role requires the practitioner to question the participant, with a view to teasing out 
her worldview, values, beliefs, and inducting the participant into the process of Socratic questioning 
so that she may apply it to herself. Once the participant has been lead to identify her worldview, the 
next step is to help her critically assess it. To this end the philosophical practitioner acts as a teacher 
of critical reasoning. Such a role demands no personal input from the practitioner and creates an 
asymmetrical relationship between philosopher and participant. An examination of the six 
philosophies will explicate a host of additional roles that are available to the philosophical 
practitioner. These include philosophically conventional roles such as educator, social critic, 
custodian of ideas; and unconventional roles such as sage, doctor of the soul, friend, moral 
exemplar, re-valuator of values, legislator, leader and moral prophet. 
I will then elucidate the metaphysics that informs each philosophical way of life. This will serve an 
intrinsic and an extrinsic purpose. Any philosophical way of life is a self-contained and coherent 
system, such that its metaphysic informs its ethics. Accordingly, explicating the metaphysic of each 
philosophical system will provide a deeper and richer understanding of the ethical way of life. In 
addition, elucidating the metaphysics of each philosophical way of life will expose divergences 
between the philosophical ways of life.  
I will then enunciate the epistemology of each philosophy. This will serve an intrinsic and an extrinsic 
purpose. Given that any philosophical way of life is a self-contained and coherent system, the 
epistemology is intimately implicated in the ethical way of life. As such, explicating it will provide a 
deeper understanding of that philosophical way of life. In addition, it will illustrate that dynamic 
tensions exists between the philosophical ways of life.  
I will conclude by identifying a range of philosophical and practical points of agreement that occur 
between the different philosophical ways of life. Philosophical points of commonality include: the 
importance of education; the centrality of community; and the non-essential nature of the self. 
Practical points of commonality include: self-examination, confession, developing the capacity to 
reason, experimentation, contemplation, catechism, the moral exemplar, aesthetic perception, 
silence.  
That the same practices are advocated by an array of philosophers might appear to call my intuition 
regarding methodological eclecticism – that the indiscriminate use of philosophical ideas and 
methods may result in logical inconsistencies that could cause problems for the participant – into 
question. I will argue that my intuition is imprecise, but not wrong.  
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Lastly, I will explore what is required of the philosophical practitioner who offers a philosophical way 
of life. To this end I will organize the full range of roles available to the philosopher into three 
categories of investment: intellectual, personal and existential. I will argue that the practitioner that 
promotes philosophy as a way of life necessarily has to assume a role that incorporates all three 
categories of investment. 
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Chapter Two 
Understanding Philosophical Practice 
The primary task of this chapter will be to gain a clear understanding of philosophical practice: what 
it is, and how it could be developed. I will explore the philosophical practice literature in order to 
explicate the professed ends and means. This will reveal that practitioners advocate a broad range of 
ends. Contrary to the view that philosophical practice is of its nature characterized by being diverse 
and differentiated, I will argue for a unified understanding of philosophical practice as phronetic, in 
which the manifold approaches are regarded as expressions of a single vision of philosophy as 
practical wisdom orientated to bringing about and / or increasing well-being. I give evidence that the 
Socratic vision of philosophizing is the preeminent method, and will argue that it is insufficient to 
attain phronetic ends. I will explore a Platonic and an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing as 
alternative visions of philosophizing for philosophical practice. I will make the case that philosophical 
practice accords with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. This will permit me to identify 
five criteria of a philosophical way of life, which can be used to identify additional philosophies that 
could enrich and develop philosophical practice. 
In section 2.1 I will show that philosophical practitioners promote a variety of ends. These include 
problem-solving (Marinoff, Boele and Cohen), therapy (Cohen and Marinoff), scepticism (Achenbach 
and Shuster), self-knowledge (Lahav, Schefczyk, Mijuskovic and Marinoff), wisdom (Achenbach, 
Lahav and Tukiainen) and virtue (Tukiainen, Tuedio and Cohen). I will also show that there is 
significant disagreement amongst philosophical practitioners regarding which of these ends are 
appropriate for philosophical practice. I will make the case for a unified understanding of 
philosophical practice that describes the different approaches as facets of a singular vision of 
philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom that brings about / increases well-being. This will provide 
a unifying frame through which we can understand how existing approaches to philosophical 
practice not only relate to the larger whole, but also to one another.  
In section 2.2 I will explore the means that practitioners promote to attain their ends. I will show 
that some practitioners endorse methodological eclecticism – the view that the practitioner has the 
freedom to utilize whatever philosophical ideas and methods she deems appropriate. I will argue 
that practitioners should be cautious of such a view. I will argue that the Socratic vision of 
philosophizing is preeminent in philosophical practice. I will argue that a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing is insufficient to attain phronetic ends, and thus maintain that alternative visions of 
philosophizing are required.  
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In section 2.3 I will explore the Platonic vision of philosophizing that Lahav advocates for 
philosophical practice. I will argue that his rendition of Plato is philosophical suggestive rather than 
contentful, and practically vague.  
In section 2.4 I will explore an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing. I will argue that Aristotle’s ethics 
is phronetic in that it is explicitly concerned with practical wisdom and the attainment of well-being. 
Moreover, he prescribes methods and assigns roles to the philosopher that could expand 
philosophical practice beyond the Socratic. I will recognize that he offers an immanent vision of 
philosophizing that positions him as a contrary to Plato’s transcendent vision.  
In section 2.5 I will develop my phronetic conception of philosophical practice by associating it with 
the conception of philosophy as a way of life. I will extrapolate five criteria of a philosophical way of 
life from Hadots’ (1995) seminal text: 1. it promotes a transformative aspiration; 2. it endorses a 
transformative project; 3. it provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally 
invested; 4. it provides practices to effect the transformation; 5. it constitutes a self-contained and 
coherent philosophical system. I will offer these criteria as means to identify additional philosophies 
that could enrich and develop phronetic philosophical practice. 
In section 2.6 I will identify six philosophical ways of life: the Stoics, the Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Unpacking these and exploring their possible contributions to 
philosophical practice will form the body of this dissertation.  
2.1 The End(s) of Philosophical Practice 
In this section I will explore the ends of philosophical practice. I will show that practitioners promote 
a wide variety of distinct ends. Some practitioners promote the end of problem-solving, while others 
promote therapy as the end of philosophical practice. I regard these approaches to have an 
instrumental orientation. Philosophical practice is instrumental when it is applied with a view to 
attaining a goal associated with satisfying some other end. These goals could include dealing with a 
problem, healing a hurt or restoring a sense of normalcy. The end is determined by the participant 
and could be a reduction in stress or achieving a sense of happiness. Goal-orientated practice of this 
sort is reasonably short lived, and is determined by client satisfaction (Raabe 2001: 50). Other 
practitioners promote a different subset of ends. Some promote scepticism as an end of 
philosophical practice, while others promote self-knowledge, and yet others promote the ends of 
wisdom and virtue. I regard these approaches as having an intrinsic orientation. Philosophical 
practice is intrinsic when the philosophical activity or pursuit is regarded as meaningful in itself, 
rather than as a means to some other end (Lahav 2001a: 7). Because intrinsic practice is not goal-
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oriented, it has no definitive end. In this respect, it can be viewed as practice that is continuous and 
without end.   
I will show that there is significant disagreement amongst the practitioners with respect to which 
ends are suitable for philosophical practice. A case in point is that practitioners who endorse intrinsic 
ends tend to regard philosophical approaches that pursue instrumental ends in a suspicious light. 
Achenbach (1995: 68), for instance, charges instrumentally orientated approaches to philosophical 
practice with misconceiving the philosophical endeavour.   
In order to make sense of the diversity of ends and supposed ‘muddled thinking’ of practitioners that 
promote more than one end, I will argue that all the approaches to philosophical practice, reviewed 
above, can be understood as facets of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic, i.e. as practical 
wisdom that brings about / increases well-being.  
Some practitioners, such as Boele, Marinoff and Cohen, promote problem-solving as an end of 
philosophical practice. According to Boele (1995) understanding, solving, overcoming or managing 
everyday problems is an objective of philosophical practice. Problems are generally understood to 
arise as a result of contradictory conceptions about how one should live, unexamined assumptions, 
overgeneralizations, unrealistic expectations, or faulty reasoning (Lahav 1995: 8). Marinoff (2002: 
85) regards philosophical intervention as well suited to deal with a wide array of problems “whose 
focus is ethics, values, meaning, purpose, moral dilemmas, resolving conflicts, coping with change, 
searching for identity, seeking fulfillment, dealing with injustice, managing adversity, or a host of 
other issues related to these”. Cohen (2005) endorses a narrower vision of philosophical practice 
that is directed at overcoming emotional and behavioural problems.   
Practitioners recognize that not all problems are amenable to philosophical correction. Marinoff 
(2002: 331) admits that philosophy “can be both necessary for addressing some problems and 
insufficient for addressing others”. In this respect the practitioner would be required to identify the 
source and nature of the problem and make the determination whether what she has to offer is 
suitable or not. Schuster (1999a: 183) recognizes that not all problems can be cured. She is of the 
opinion that sometimes it is sufficient for the participant to understand and take ownership of her 
problem. In a similar vein, Tukiainen (Web 2) maintains that irresolvable problems should be 
“tolerated and endured”.   
Not all philosophical practitioners agree that philosophy should serve practical needs. Lahav (2006: 
3), for instance, regards solving personal problems as contrary to “philosophy in the original, deep 
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sense of the word”. In contrast, Achenbach (1995: 68) claims that the point of philosophical practice 
is not to “produce solutions but rather question them all”. 
Some philosophical practitioners, such as Cohen, promote therapy as an end of philosophical 
practice. Cohen (2004) conceives of philosophical practice as “a hybrid discipline” that conjoins 
philosophy and psychology to offer “a form of counseling that uses philosophical methods and 
techniques”. Cohen’s ‘Logic-Based Therapy’ is a modified form of RET that places emphasis on the 
justification of beliefs (Raabe 2001: 70). Emotions are understood to possess cognitive components, 
and emotional problems are understood to rest on fallacious and irrational thinking “that occur(s) in 
the premises of people’s behavioural and emotional reasoning” (Cohen 2005). Marinoff (2003) 
loosely endorses the end of therapy in a book titled “Therapy for the Sane”.  
There is disagreement between the practitioners who endorse the end of therapy. Cohen (2004) 
rejects Marinoff’s notion of philosophy as a ‘therapy for the sane’ for a host of reasons. These 
include the implication that psychology is a therapy for the insane; that such an implication 
stigmatizes people seeking psychological counselling; and that it incorrectly judges the client rather 
than her patterns of thinking, behaviour and emotions. In contrast to Cohen, Marinoff explicitly 
disavows the link between philosophy and psychology (Cohen 2004).  
A fair number of philosophical practitioners are adamant that philosophical practice should not offer 
therapy. Achenbach is emphatic that philosophical practice is not, nor should be, considered a form 
of therapy (Schuster 1999a: 34). Curiously, he advocates scepticism and therapy was something the 
sceptics endorsed (Nussbaum 1994: 13). Schuster (1995: 102) claims that philosophical practice is 
the “antipode of therapy”. According to Tukiainen (2011: 52) “philosophy should not be seen as 
therapy”.  
The rejection of philosophy as offering a form of therapy rests on at least two views, relating to the 
notion of therapy and to that of philosophy. ‘Therapy’ commits us to: viewing the participant as 
unhealthy, or deviating from a norm of good health; in need of treatment with a view to curing the 
participant or returning her to ‘normality’; making a diagnosis on the basis of symptoms; and 
effecting treatment (Raabe 2001: 26). Schuster (1999a) argues if therapy is understood as a 
scientifically confirmed curative method, then philosophical practice is its conceptual contrary – a 
free and open exploration with participants that are in good health. In a similar vein, Sivil and Clare 
(2018) argue that since therapy, by definition necessarily entails a commitment to the medical 
model; and since most philosophical practitioners reject such a model (Sivil 2009); that philosophical 
practitioners should not promote their brand of practice as therapy. Lahav (2001a: 7) challenges the 
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end of therapy from another angle. He maintains that promoting therapy as an end of philosophical 
practice “betrays the distinctive nature of philosophy” by demoting it as a means to some other end.  
I disagree with Lahav. Some philosophies are explicitly orientated to instrumental ends. Ancient 
Greek philosophers conceived of philosophy as ‘therapy for the soul’; and Hellenistic philosophers, in 
particular, regarded themselves as ‘doctors of the soul’ that sought to attend to and overcome 
suffering (Nussbaum 1994: 13-47).  
More than healing hurts, ancient Greek philosophers sought to effect fundamental changes to the 
way an individual perceived and existed in the world (Hadot 1995). Contemporary practitioners 
Marinoff (2002: 84-5) and Raabe (2001: 205) attempt to justify contemporary use of the term 
‘therapy’ by invoking this historical association. They trace the etymology of the word to its Greek 
derivative therapeia which means in ‘service’ of, or to ‘attend to’. In this respect the philosophical 
practitioner is in the service of the participant, attending to her concerns, with a view to bringing 
about an improvement in her outlook and or disposition. Schuster (2004: 3) rejects this etymological 
move by pointing out that it extends the idea of therapy to any acts of service or attendance, such as 
restaurant waiters or parking attendants.  
Curiously, some of the practitioners who reject therapy as an end of philosophical practice 
acknowledge the therapeutic potential of their particular offerings. Schuster (1999a: 8), for example, 
refers to her brand of philosophical practice as “trans-therapeutic”. Others, including Boele (Raabe 
2001: 29), Lahav (1995: 16) and Tukiainen (2011: 52), similarly tout the therapeutic potential of 
philosophical practice. When practitioners make claims regarding the therapeutic potential of their 
philosophical practice they loosely rest their claim on the recognition that philosophy can 
“spontaneously … induce well-being” (Schuster 1999a: 19). For Schuster (1999a) and Boele (1995) 
well-being is achieved by clarifying misconceptions and misunderstandings. For Tukiainen (2011: 47) 
well-being is enhanced through the development of virtues. Tuedio (2003) makes a much more 
inclusive claim. Since he regards any aspiration by philosophical practitioners to “‘help’, ‘expand’ or 
‘improve’” as possessing a therapeutic orientation, he advocates the view that all modes of 
philosophical practice are therapeutic.  
Some practitioners, such as Achenbach and Schuster, maintain that the end of philosophical practice 
is to develop scepticism in the participant “concerning everything which considers itself right, 
settled, conclusive, indubitable, or in short, everything which considers itself ’true’ and which 
therefore wants to abolish further questioning ” (Achenbach 1995: 73). This helps the participant to 
avoid prefabricated patterns of thought and pre-constructed ideas, stimulate new ways of thinking 
and generate new areas of thought (Zinaich 2003).  
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One could object that the epistemic stance of the sceptic – that truth is unobtainable, and we can 
therefore know nothing (Aristocles, in Long and Sedley 1987: 1F) – could have a destabilizing effect 
on the participant. This concern is allayed by both Sceptics and philosophical practitioners alike. The 
Sceptics regard the suspension of judgment to necessarily bring about “freedom from disturbance; 
and ... pleasure” (Aristocles, in Long & Sedley 1987: 1F). Here ‘freedom’ is synonymous with freedom 
from worry about what is true, right and good; freedom from the pursuit of the practical goals that 
arise out of these judgments; and freedom from the affiliated emotions – fear, distress, grief, guilt 
and excessive joy – which tend to arise when we fail or succeed to achieve these goals (Nussbaum 
1994: 296-97). While Schuster (1999a: 5) does not run this line of thinking, she does claim that 
philosophical inquiry of this sort not only develops the intellect, but facilitates the development of 
philosophical wonder. This could make the participant’s conceptual world more interesting and 
ensure that she stays sufficiently open-minded to constantly question that which she believes to be 
true. Rather than shatter a participant’s worldview, this could help her develop a sense of clarity 
(Schuster 1999a: 39-40).  
Some practitioners, such as Lahav (1995), Schefczyk (1995), Mijuskovic (1995) and Marinoff (1999), 
endorse the pursuit of self-knowledge as the primary aim of philosophical practice. Developing self-
knowledge requires that the participant access, assess and modify her worldview6. The practitioner 
helps the participant to expose and clarify the concepts and ideas that underlie and inform her 
attitudes, beliefs, values and presuppositions (Lahav 2001a: 8). Interpreting a participant’s 
worldview can serve a descriptive function by providing concrete expression to something which 
was undisclosed or hidden. It can also serve a normative function by providing the participant an 
opportunity to explore the philosophical implications of her worldview and identify any internal 
conflicts or inconsistencies. Awareness of such conflicts and inconsistencies can help the participant 
make alterations to the way she understands the world in which she lives and her place in it. While 
interpreting one’s worldview may not necessarily lead to any concrete solutions, this is 
unproblematic as developing and enriching one’s worldview is deemed to be intrinsically valuable 
(Lahav 1995: 16).  
Lahav (2001a: 8) later rejects self-knowledge as an end for philosophical practice. He recognizes that 
philosophizing possesses the potential to transform the participant’s outlook and way of being.   
Pursuing the end of self-knowledge emphasizes, and reinforces, a preoccupation with oneself, one’s 
                                                          
6 Practitioners use different terms of reference for ‘worldview’: Lahav (1995: 4) refers to the participant’s 
“personal philosophy”; Schefczyk (1995: 76) talks of the participant’s “conceptual history”; Mijuskovic (1995: 
94) discusses the participant’s “first principles (paradigm system and network of beliefs)”; and Marinoff (1999: 
5) refers to the participant’s “set of operating principles”.  
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concerns and limited frame of understanding. The participant is not given the necessary tools or 
inspiration to transcend and explore domains that extend beyond the horizons of her worldview 
(Lahav 2006: 4).  
Some practitioners, such as Achenbach, Lahav and Tukiainen, see themselves as promoting the end 
of wisdom. Given that wisdom is “a philosophically challenging concept” (Tukiainen 2011: 47), it 
should come as no surprise that different conceptions of it are promoted by philosophical 
practitioners. Achenbach’s (1998) conception of wisdom places a premium on the sceptical way one 
relates to theoretical knowledge, to the problems that one confronts, and to oneself. The point of 
this is to challenge, develop, examine, and deepen the insights of the participant. Lahav (2001a) 
relates wisdom to spirituality, enrichment, edification, meaningfulness, and a broader and deeper 
understanding of life. This intellectual account of wisdom “opens us to the realities beyond our 
ordinary self-centred worldview” (Lahav 2006: 4). Tukiainen (2011: 48), in contrast, promotes a more 
practical account of wisdom that is concerned with “knowing how to live well”. Living well includes: 
pursuing and attaining personally fulfilling goals; having a sense of personal satisfaction; freedom 
from external influence and excessive personal evaluation; and peace of mind (Tukiainen 2011: 48-
50).  
For Tukiainen (2011: 48) the virtues are crucial to living well. Virtues can be loosely understood as 
human excellences: ideal traits that make a person good (Roberts 2017: 18). More than making a 
person good, the acquisition of virtues facilitate personal growth, and this contributes to a sense of 
personal fulfilment and well-being (Tuedio 2004: 3). Beyond benefitting the individual, the virtues 
are implicated in the “cultivation of a good society” (Tuedio (2004: 1). Tukiainen (2011: 48-50) 
provides a catalogue of virtues that includes: the cognitive virtues of self-knowledge, knowledge of 
the external world, good judgment, and openness; and the moral / existential virtues of objectivity, 
disinterestedness, flexibility, moderation, preserving physical health, and achieving pleasure. 
The virtues that Tukiainen presents are for consideration and not uncritical application. While he 
regards the virtues as timeless, he does recognize that different social contexts and situations may 
require a different set of virtues (Tukiainen 2011: 50). According to Tuedio (2004: 2), since life and 
one’s being is in a state of constant flux, different individuals would value different virtues, and at 
different times.  
It is curious that Tukiainen does not make any reference to virtue ethics, given that he offers a list of 
virtues. That virtues are a focal point of philosophical reflection for Tukiainen is sufficient to consider 
him offering a form of virtue ethic. Virtue ethics typically place emphasis on virtues, and on the 
development of moral character; is person rather than action orientated; and asks questions 
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regarding the good life, how we should live, as well as the kind of person we should be (Roberts 
2017: 18).    
 While it is evident that Lahav and Tukiainen advocate different accounts of wisdom – intellectual 
and practical respectively, common ground exists between them. I argue that Lahav’s conception of 
wisdom, which is devoid of the language of virtues, maps onto at least some of Tukiainen’s virtues. 
Tukiainen’s (2011: 48) virtue of openness entails seeing ourselves and our world in radically new 
ways, as well as entertaining novel concepts. I argue that this accords with Lahav’s (2001a: 12) vision 
of philosophical investigation as the process of opening oneself up to a wider range of meanings and 
perspectives (Lahav 2006: 4). Tukiainen (2011: 49) endorses the virtue of objectivity. This entails 
distancing oneself from one’s own narrow perspective, and seeing things from “a cosmic 
perspective”. I argue that this call for objectivity is endorsed by Lahav (2001a: 12) who advocates 
rising above our narrow self-centred worldview. Tukiainen (2011: 49) promotes the virtue of 
disinterestedness, as the “ability to experience the world as it is in itself, and not only as it is for us 
and our projects”. This requires we refrain from evaluating the world in terms of our own desires 
and motives. I argue that Lahav (2001a: 8) endorses this when he emphasizes the importance of 
going “beyond my particular opinions and desires”.  
The common ground that exist between them should not be taken as an indication that they are in 
total agreement. Tukiainen and Lahav would disagree over the worth of self-knowledge. Tukiainen 
(2011: 48) regards self-knowledge as an important part of wisdom since it enables us to identify and 
pursue personally satisfying goals independently of external influence. In contrast, Lahav (2008: 14) 
proclaims the search for self-knowledge to be antithetical to the pursuit of wisdom. A pre-
occupation with oneself and one’s limited horizon of meaning is the very thing that would prevent 
one from expanding one’s horizon of meaning and “developing a new openness towards one’s 
world”. 
There are several approaches one could take to understanding the heteronomy of ends of 
philosophical practice. One could take it at face value as a diverse and differentiated domain. 
Tillmans (2005) endorses this vision of diversity when she proclaims that there are “as many 
interpretations of what philosophical counseling is as there are philosophical counsellors”. I will 
argue that conceiving of philosophical practice as diverse and differentiated is a misconception that 
fails to illuminate the practice in ways that could contribute to its growth and development. 
Moreover, it is unproductive in that it runs the risk of making the philosophy of philosophical 
practice appear to be “in a state of dynamic disarray” (Raabe 2001: xvi).   
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A second approach would be to reduce the complexity of philosophical practice by organizing the 
ends into discrete and meaningful clusters. Sivil and Clare (2018) do this by developing a taxonomy 
of ends that contains two divisions: the first division categorizes the ends as instrumental or 
intrinsic; the second division categorizes the ends as having specific or general foci. Philosophical 
practice is specific when it has a narrow orientation of focus, i.e. it is directed toward attaining a 
singular specified end. Examples include solving a particular problem, or acquiring self-knowledge. 
Philosophical practice is general when it has a broad, more encompassing focus. For example, the 
end of wisdom may entail becoming more virtuous, which entails a host of smaller ends, such as 
becoming courageous, moderate, prudent, flexible, open, objective, etc. This system of 
categorization organizes the ends of philosophical practice into four variants: approaches that 
promote the end of problem-solving are categorized as ‘instrumental-specific’; approaches that 
endorse the end of therapy are ‘instrumental-general’; approaches that endorse the ends of 
scepticism and self-knowledge are labelled ‘intrinsic-specific’; and approaches that endorse the ends 
of wisdom and virtue are regarded as ‘intrinsic-general’. Lahav (2006: 3) endorses three different 
kinds of philosophical practice: problem solving, critical self-reasoning, and Platonic. These 
correspond with the instrumental-specific, intrinsic-specific, and intrinsic-general variants in Sivil and 
Clare’s taxonomy. He would discount therapy as a legitimate end of philosophical practice, as do Sivil 
and Clare (2018). 
The taxonomy serves several purposes. It organizes the range of ends into four variants with distinct 
orientations and foci. Not only does this rationalize the domain of ends, it provides useful category 
labels that facilitate ease of discourse. In addition, compartmentalizing practices with different ends 
could help to explain dissent amongst practitioners as healthy criticism rather than a signal of 
disarray.  
Problematically, organizing the approaches into discrete clusters results in an uncharitable 
evaluation of practitioners that cross-combine ends from different variants. Such instances include: 
Cohen and Marinoff, who endorse the ends of problem-solving (instrumental-specific) and therapy 
(instrumental-general); Achenbach, who endorses the ends of scepticism (intrinsic-specific) and 
wisdom (intrinsic-general); and Lahav, who endorses the ends of self-knowledge (intrinsic-specific) 
and wisdom (intrinsic-general). Sivil and Clare judge this to be “a reflection of ... (the particular 
practitioner’s) own muddled thinking” (2018: 135). A second objection is that the taxonomy fails to 
illuminate philosophical practice in a way that might contribute toward its growth and development. 
While I agree that developing philosophical practice is a worthwhile endeavour, since the taxonomy 
was not developed with this in mind I do not think that the second objection is warranted. 
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A third option, that I will exercise, is to look beyond the particularities and differences in an attempt 
to understand philosophical practice as unified. To this end I liken philosophical practice to a multi-
faceted jewel. I argue that all the approaches to philosophical practice can be understood as facets 
of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom that brings about / increases well-
being.  
To describe the approaches as ‘facets’ means that each approach is implicated, to some degree, in 
the phronetic whole. This is corroborated by the fact that at most practitioners endorse at least one 
phronetic aspect. Lahav, Tukiainen and Tuedio endorse wisdom as the end of philosophical practice. 
While Achenbach promotes the end of scepticism, he also endorses wisdom. Tukiainen and Tuedio 
implicate the acquisition of virtues in the attainment of wisdom. While Cohen (2005) promotes the 
end of therapy, he also endorses the acquisition of “eleven transcendent virtues”. These virtues 
include metaphysical security, courage, respect, authenticity, temperance, moral creativity, 
empowerment, empathy, good judgment, foresightness, scientificity. A host of practitioners 
recognize well-being as an outcome of their practice. These include: Boele, who promotes the end of 
problem-solving; Schuster, who promotes the end of scepticism; and Lahav, Tukiainen and Tuedio, 
who promote the ends of wisdom.  
To say that ‘each approach is implicated, to some degree, in the phronetic whole’ implies that not all 
facets are equal, i.e. they contain different degrees of the phronetic aspects (wisdom, virtue and 
well-being). I regard practitioners that promote all three phronetic aspects, such as Tukiainen who 
endorses the end of wisdom, implicates virtue in that process and recognizes that the attainment of 
virtues brings about / increases well-being, to possess a high phronetic degree. This in comparison to 
approaches that promote fewer or no phronetic ends, for example Boele who promotes the end of 
problem-solving and only recognizes the possibility of attaining well-being. This is not a judgement 
against approaches that have a low phronetic degree, merely a recognition that there are degrees of 
distance from the phronetic whole.  
Not only does this vision of philosophical practice as phronetic account for the relationship of each 
facet to the whole; it provides an understanding of the relationship between facets. Since each facet 
is implicated in the whole, and the whole contains the aspects of all facets; it is possible for one facet 
to ‘reflect’ or contain an aspect of another facet. Examples of this ‘reflection effect’ include the 
views that: solving problems results in well-being (Boele), and attaining wisdom makes life easier 
and less problematic (Lahav 2001a: 7 and Aristotle 1998:21); therapy leads to a sense of well-being, 
and the virtues are implicate in the therapeutic process (Cohen 2005); scepticism is implicated in the 
process of acquiring wisdom (Achenbach), and in the acquisition of well-being (Schuster); self-
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knowledge is regarded as one virtue, amongst others, that is required for wisdom (Tukiainen), and 
wisdom is recognised to bring about well-being (Lahav, Tukiainen and Tuedio). This ‘reflection effect’ 
also provides a charitable explanation for instances when practitioners advocate multiple ends. Such 
instances include: Cohen and Marinoff, who endorse the ends of problem-solving and therapy; 
Achenbach, who endorses the ends of scepticism and wisdom; and Lahav, who endorses the ends of 
self-knowledge and wisdom.  
One might object that imposing a unifying vision onto philosophical practice could have a 
homogenizing effect on the terrain. This objection rests on a misunderstanding, and as such is 
unfounded. I am not making a normative claim about how philosophical practice should be, nor am I 
suggesting the dissolution of existing approaches. I am merely describing a way to understand the 
practice as a single, though uncoordinated, unified whole. To this one might object that such a 
descriptive endeavour fails to make any significant contributions to the development of the field of 
practice. There are two ways to respond to this. One would be to claim that this was not the 
particular intention behind developing the unified vision, and so the objection is weak. However, 
given that I do have the intention to develop philosophical practice, such an objection should be 
taken seriously. Granted conceiving of philosophical practice as united under the phronetic rubric, in 
itself, may not advance philosophical practice beyond its current form; I do think that existing modes 
of practice might be enriched through the understanding of how they relate to the unified whole 
and each other. At the very least this might result in a decrease in dissent amongst philosophical 
practitioners regarding the appropriateness of ends. It could even lead to practitioners expanding 
their professed ends to include those articulated by other practitioners. At the very best, it might 
spur practitioners, and other interested persons, to contemplate and articulate a clearer conception 
of philosophical practice. This is something I will undertake in section 1.5.       
2.2 The Means of Philosophical Practice 
In this section I will explore the means advocated by philosophical practitioners. I will show that 
some practitioners endorse methodological eclecticism - the view that the practitioner has the 
freedom to utilize whatever philosophical ideas and methods she deems appropriate. I will argue 
that practitioners should be cautious of such a view. I will show that some practitioners deny an 
allegiance to method. I will argue that most practitioners employ a Socratic vision of philosophizing, 
with respect to focus, method, and role of the practitioner. I will argue that while a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing might be necessary to achieve phronetic ends, it is not sufficient. 
Given that philosophical practice is constituted by a range of approaches that promote distinctive 
ends, it would be reasonable to assume that there would be a diverse range of methods. Raabe 
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(2001: 43) alludes to this when he describes philosophical practice to comprise of a “plurality of 
distinct methodologies”.  Far from there being consensus, the heterogeneity of philosophical 
practice ensures that “there is general disagreement over whether there is a method at all, whether 
there is only one particular method, or whether there are a number of equally important but 
distinctly different methods” (Raabe 2001: 71). In line with the latter, Lahav (2006: 6) claims that 
“there are many appropriate methods, and  ... different ones could work better with different 
people”. Despite these characterizations an examination of philosophical practice literature reveals 
that few methods are actually endorsed.  
Some practitioners, such as Marinoff, Tukiainen and Lahav, endorse the view that the philosophical 
practitioner has the discretionary freedom to use any and all philosophical material and methods. 
Von Morstein (2001) describes Marinoff as offering methodological eclecticism. Marinoff (1999; 
2003) articulates two frameworks (PEACE; MEANS) that are intended to highlight the various 
perspectives from which practitioners can view the participant and their problems. These 
frameworks are notably devoid of reference to specific philosophical material or method. Tukiainen 
(Web 2) endorses the freedom of the practitioner “to find the historical ideas and practices that best 
suit the counsellee’s unique circumstances of life”. Lahav (2001a) would endorse methodological 
eclecticism since wisdom is acquired through an exposure to a broad range of philosophical ideas.  
It is easy to understand why a philosophical practitioner might endorse methodological eclecticism. 
If the success of the practice is determined by the end result then any method that facilitates 
reaching this end would be deemed acceptable. From a pragmatic point of view, the greater the 
range of means, the greater the chance of increasing utility. This explanation applies directly to 
Marinoff (1999: 304), who refers to himself as a “mystical pragmatist”. 
I argue that practitioners should be cautious of methodological eclecticism. While a pragmatist may 
have no problem with such an approach, provided it works, there is very little empirical evidence 
that philosophical practice actually works7. So it would be premature to make any kind of pragmatic 
justification in favour of eclecticism. A second concern is that the uncritical application of 
philosophies with contradictory metaphysical and ethical commitments, and their associated 
methods, may result in logical inconsistencies in the participant. This could cause potential problems 
for the participant that at best could result in conceptual confusion, and at worst result in crisis. I 
                                                          
7 Lavah (2001b) undertook a sixteen person study. Problematically, the size of the study was too small to 
extrapolate anything of significance, and “the research amounted to nothing more than an attitudinal survey 
rather than a rigorous test of efficacy” (Sivil & Clare 2018: 141). Knapp & Tjeltveit (2005: 563) reported that in 
2002 Marinoff claimed to be undertaking empirical research. To date he has failed to publish any findings. 
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contend that creating these sorts of inconsistencies is contrary to philosophical practice that should 
aim to uncover conflicting ideas and vales in an attempt to unify them. Tukiainen (Web 2) recognizes 
the issue, but sidesteps it by claiming that “this far I have not run into problems with logical 
incompatibility”. Lahav (2001a: 16) doesn’t recognize the issue at all. He explicitly advocates the 
application of contrary philosophical views to ensure that no one philosophical theory is taken as a 
definitive authority.  
Some practitioners deny an allegiance to method. Achenbach, for example, promotes a ‘beyond-
method’ method (Schuster 1999a: 38), for the reason that any attempt to fix philosophical practice 
to a particular method flies in the face of his sceptical epistemic commitment. Despite this, 
Achenbach does have a discernible approach. The practitioner must be free of goals and intentions 
prior to meeting the participant, and must be prepared to adapt themselves to the participant and 
her needs. The practitioner and participant must commit to engage in open and unconstrained 
conversation. The practitioner must encourage the participant to explain herself. The practitioner 
must try to enlarge the participant’s worldview, and must nurture that which is deemed appropriate 
(Raabe 2001: 57; Schuster 2004: 4). Tillmans (2005) advocates a position similar to Achenbach. She 
eschews the notion of philosophical method; sees philosophy as a direct engagement with the 
world, grounded in the wonder of everyday experiences; and promotes philosophical practice as the 
attempt “to set thought free … (by questioning) taken-for-granted assumptions, presuppositions 
about life, beliefs and values”.  
It would seem apparent from this survey that a Socratic vision of philosophizing, with respect to 
focus, method, and role of the practitioner, is the preeminent methodological approach in 
philosophical practice. Socrates sought to discover and clarify the concepts the interlocutor was 
using, and to expose hidden assumptions, contradictory values and meaning, and, or fallacious 
reasoning. To this end he adopted the role of a gadfly, a critical, bothersome, dialogical partner that 
asked questions and demanded reasons to support the interlocutor’s views, and then guided the 
interlocutor to subject those views to tests of critical examination.   
Philosophical practitioners that advocate the end of problem-solving apply a method that I regard to 
be analogous to the Socratic Method. The practitioner helps the participant resolve her own 
problems by helping her access her worldview – the concepts, beliefs, values and assumptions that 
make up her “background mindscape” (Marinoff 2002: 86). The practitioner guides the participant to 
philosophize for herself. To this end, the practitioner teaches the participant the necessary 
argumentative skills so that she can critically engage with her own worldview, examine hidden 
assumptions, identify faulty inferences, and critically appraise values and beliefs (Marinoff 2002: 82).  
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Practitioners who advocate the end of therapy similarly endorse accessing, assessing and modifying 
the participant’s worldview. According to Cohen (2004) the philosophical practitioner assists the 
participant by facilitating an examination of her belief system, her key concepts and underlying 
assumptions and inferences, with a view to clarifying vague concepts, exposing hidden or assumed 
premises, eradicating unjustified assumptions and beliefs, and resolving logical inconsistencies and 
fallacious reasoning. Cohen (1995: 122) makes particular use of formal deductive logic to analyse the 
client’s belief system; and prescribes fallacies of reason as an antidote to irrational premises that 
underlie problematic emotions (Cohen 2005). 
For practitioners who promote the end of self-knowledge philosophizing necessarily entails a critical 
encounter with the participant’s worldview. The practitioner helps the participant to expose the 
network of concepts, assumptions, beliefs and values that constitute “the philosophy of life in which 
the person is living” (Lahav 2001a: 8). The practitioner applies and imparts the necessary reasoning 
skills onto the participant so that she can engage in self-corrective reflection. The express intention 
of this is to develop, in the participant, “a richer philosophical understanding of their self and the 
world” (Lahav 2001a: 8).  
Some practitioners who promote the ends of wisdom and virtue similarly advocate a Socratic vision 
of philosophizing. Tukiainen (2011: 51) promotes self-knowledge as a virtue. Self-knowledge of the 
participant is increased by the practitioner who asks her questions and demands justifications for 
her answers. Tuedio (2004: 2) claims to apply “philosophical analysis” to the participant’s personal 
experience and identity, with the view to exposing her worldview. This serves several purposes. It 
helps the participant “test the representational validity” (Tuedio 2004: 5) of her worldview, i.e. how 
close her beliefs or values are to the truth. It helps the participant test the performative validity of 
her worldview, i.e. how close the narrative construction of the participant is to how she lives her life 
(Tuedio 2004:6). In addition, Tuedio (2004:5, 2) maintains that a Socratic encounter with oneself 
helps to establish a context for reflecting on the virtues, and that this makes us better attuned to the 
virtues. 
The above review reveals that a narrow range of means are utilized by philosophical practitioners. If 
there are different ends to philosophical practice, then surely there should be different means. 
Viewed in this light, the pre-eminence of the Socratic vision of philosophizing in philosophical 
practice, and the absence of other methods, is puzzling. However, since I argued that all these 
approaches are facets of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic, it would seem to follow that 
the predominance of a single method might be justified.  
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Use of the Socratic vision of philosophizing might be justified on another ground. One could argue 
that what makes a Socratic vision of philosophizing particularly desirable to philosophical 
practitioners is that it enhances participant autonomy. This is something philosophical practitioners 
would likely agree to be a fundamental objective of the practice (Raabe 2001: 32). Socrates’ driving 
project was to establish the truth of the claim made by the oracle of Delphi that he was the wisest 
man. As a result, he never offered (implicitly or explicitly) any position of his own, but instead 
contented himself with examining the thoughts of others. In line with this a Socratic vision of 
philosophical practice free of metaphysical and ethical assertions. One can argue that this freedom 
preserves the participant’s autonomy, as it does not impose any metaphysical or ethical views onto 
the participant. Moreover, the participant’s capacity to make informed and independent decisions is 
increased through the practice of critical self-reflection and self-examination (Raabe 2001: 52). 
Becoming more self-knowledgeable permits the participant to develop greater awareness of her 
thinking processes, beliefs, values and desires. A consequence of this is that the participant is better 
equipped to employ “conscious intentionality in her decision-making” (Raabe 2001: 33). This 
increases the participant’s control over the choices she makes. Since possessing autonomy requires 
reflection on the reasons for one’s desires and actions, and philosophical practice improves the 
participant’s capacity for critical self-reflection, it follows that philosophical practice enhances 
participant autonomy (Taylor 2002). While self-reflection and self-examination are necessary for the 
enhancement of one’s autonomy, one could argue that the philosophical practitioner should also 
dedicate substantial effort toward strengthening the participant’s “trust in the value of his or her 
own experience and reason” (Raabe 2001: 32) so that she may take responsibility not only for her 
thinking but the direction in which her life unfolds. 
While we might agree that participant autonomy is valuable, and that a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing preserves and enhances autonomy, it does not follow that a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing is the only form that does this. If there are other vision of philosophizing that 
preserve and enhance autonomy, exclusive use of a Socratic vision of philosophizing in philosophical 
practice would not be justified.   
While I concede that a Socratic vision of philosophizing might be necessary to attain phronetic ends, 
I do not regard it to be sufficient. There are two ways to argue this – from a particular, and a general 
point of view. One could argue, from a particular point of view, that the Socratic vision of 
philosophizing is phronetic in that it facilitates the acquisition of self-knowledge, and self-knowledge 
is a virtue. However, since it does not offer the full range of phronetic aspects, i.e. endorse a vision 
of practical wisdom and well-being, it is not phronetic to a high degree. Accordingly while an 
application of a Socratic vision of philosophizing might be necessary, it is not sufficient. Admittedly, 
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this argument is open to contestation based on interpretations of Socrates’ approach to philosophy. 
Embarking on a defence would be a time consuming and unnecessary exercise given that we would 
arrive at the same answer if we approached the issue from a general point of view. Let us assume 
that we have a vision of philosophizing that was phronetic to high degree, for example Tukiainen’s 
approach that promotes a vision of practical wisdom, virtue and well-being. Let us be charitable, for 
the moment, and concede that the means he prescribes to attain his particular ends are not only 
necessary, but also sufficient. Given that there are different visions of wisdom (this was confirmed 
above when reviewing the philosophical practice literature) and different views regarding which 
virtues are important, and different conceptions of well-being (this will be confirmed in subsequent 
chapters), it follows that Tukiainen’s method would be insufficient to attain the full range of those 
phronetic aspects. In light of this I maintain that additional visions of philosophizing are required. 
Not all practitioners agree that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is necessary to attain phronetic 
ends. Lahav has two issues with the application of a Socratic vision of philosophizing: focus and 
approach. The pursuit of self-knowledge focuses the participant onto her narrow concerns and 
worldview; while the pursuit of wisdom requires the participant to transcend her worldview (Lahav 
2006: 4). As such, he regards a Socratic vision of philosophizing to be antithetical to the pursuit of 
wisdom. Lahav (2006: 4) is also critical of the approach employed in a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing. He regards it to be “much too analytic and critical”. Such an approach 
overemphasizes the power of abstract reason to convince others, and mistakenly identifies the 
reasoning capacity of the participant as the primary capacity. Moreover, a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing requires the practitioner to assume a stance that is neutral and objective (Lahav 
2008: 15). In light of the above, he claims that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is inappropriate for 
philosophical practice and calls for it to be abandoned (Lahav 2008: 15). 
If a Socratic vision of philosophizing is inadequate / inappropriate for philosophical practice, then 
other visions of philosophizing are required. In wI hat follows I will enunciate Lahav’s suggestion to 
use a Platonic vision of philosophizing (section 2.3). I then explore the potential of an Aristotelian 
vision of philosophizing for philosophical practice (section 2.4).    
2.3 Platonic Vision of Philosophizing  
In this section I will Lahav’s rendition of a Platonic vision of philosophizing for philosophical practice. 
I will detail his position, and where necessary, will draw from Plato and relevant scholars to fill in 
missing detail. I find Iris Murdock’s account of Plato the most illuminating for this purpose. I will 
show that Lahav’s rendition is philosophically incomplete, in that it is devoid of the language of 
forms. As a consequence, it misses a significant opportunity to offer something distinctly 
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philosophical – moral development. In addition, I will argue that his rendition is methodologically 
vague. I will identify the role of Plato’s philosopher as translator as an additional role available to the 
philosophical practitioner.   
Lahav (2006: 5) offers Plato’s allegory of the cave as an analogy of philosophical practice. This 
permits him to illustrate that the concern of the practitioner does not lie with the needs and 
problems of the participant: the “philosopher’s goal is not to help the cave dwellers deal with their 
shadows and satisfy their current desire”. Instead, the task of the practitioner is to help the 
participant to transcend herself “to get out of the cave and get closer to the light”. Lahav does not 
elaborate on what this light is, so we turn to Plato to gain a clearer understanding. 
The light that Plato wants us to turn to are the transcendent forms – the changeless, immaterial and eternal 
“objects of intelligence but not of sight” (Plato 1955a: 306). While Murdoch (1992: 10) defines the Platonic 
forms as “archetypes: universals, general concepts as distinct from particular entities”, he also notes that the 
relation of the forms to particulars, for Plato, is “persistently problematic ... The forms are more like 
‘immanent universals’ at the start, and ‘transcendent models’ later on” (Murdoch 1977:46).  
The forms are crucial for Plato (1955: 308) since it is through contemplating the forms that truth and 
reality is illuminated. They are what the soul “attends to and feeds on” (Taylor 1989: 124). Plato 
(1955: 303) regards the form of the Good as the highest form of knowledge. Moreover, 
contemplating the form of the Good lies at the heart of his moral doctrine. The forms satisfy a 
“moral need” that “goodness is something indubitably real, unitary, and (somehow) simple” 
(Murdoch 1977: 25), and which exists beyond the sensible realm. They also stand as active moral 
ideals, “images of virtue” (Murdoch 1992: 10) that are essential to one’s moral development. Plato 
connects right order in our lives with right order in the universe, such that knowing the Good is a 
necessary and sufficient condition to make us become good.  
Knowing the Good is achieved through contemplating beauty. Beauty, celebrated in the Symposium 
and the Phaedrus, is the most accessible of forms as it is manifest in the world. More than this, it has 
the capacity to move us and to inspire us. It is something that we can desire and adore, yet cannot 
possess (Murdoch 1977: 35).  
Plato reveres beauty in nature, and not art. The beauty in nature that interests Plato is pattern and 
necessity (as found in mathematics and geometry). An encounter with necessity “leads to knowledge 
of the eternal and changeless” (Murdoch 1977: 44). Through appreciating beauty the energy of the 
soul is directed toward the Real and the Good, which is experienced as joy. This joy is transfigured 
desire. Accordingly, perceiving beauty provides us with “an immediate image of good desire, the 
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desire for goodness and the desire for truth” (Murdoch 1977: 45). This provides a means for us to 
escape from the narrow confines of our ego. Plato denies beautiful art possesses the same capacity 
as beauty in nature. He regards artists as base, egotistic, morally weak and as meddlers, and art as 
dangerous, exciting the baser emotions. As a mimesis of particulars, art endorses appearances and 
hence illusion, therein disguising and trivializing the spiritual. As a result, it is likely to lead us away 
from the forms rather than towards them. Despite this generally negative view he does acknowledge 
the artist’s inspiration and intuitive understanding as divine; and that certain non-representational, 
simple art forms, including folk art, handicraft, didactic poetry and architecture, could serve positive 
social purpose, such as creating order and discouraging crime. To achieve this, though, the arts 
would have to be censored and directed. 
Plato’s notion of contemplation is metaphorically associated with the sense of sight. It is “a power to 
see things aright” (Taylor 1989: 116); it is “looking carefully at something and holding it before the 
mind” (Murdoch 1992: 2). In order to ‘see things aright’ the soul has to undergo a process of 
conversion – reason has to rule over the appetites and desires. The soul must be purified of passions 
and selfish attachments; and the intellect must be “guided by ideas of perfection which are objects 
of love” (Murdoch 1992: 14). Love is the crucial element that elevates us beyond egoistic desires 
(Taylor 1989: 123). When in love we give the object of our love our full attention. Platonic 
contemplation requires that we love the light: that we do not simply turn our eyes toward the light, 
but the whole of our being (Murdoch 1992: 14). Loving the forms effects a change in the direction of 
our awareness and desire (Taylor 1989: 123), away from the mutable, material and temporal toward 
the Good, Truth, and Beauty.  
Despite promoting a Platonic vision of philosophizing, Lahav does not promote Plato’s doctrine of 
forms. He is silent on exactly what ideas we should entertain. Lahav appears to regard exposure to a 
wide range of ideas as sufficient to broaden the participant’s horizons and separate her from her 
narrow (particular and contextual) perspective, and therein attain wisdom. Arguably, failure to 
incorporate the forms into his vision of philosophizing is philosophically unproblematic as there are 
other instances of Platonic philosophizing that do not make knowing the forms a central element to 
the development of one’s moral life. Taylor (1989: 25-6) identifies the Stoics and Epicureans as 
expressions of the Platonic model. I argue, however, that neglecting the forms is practically 
problematic. Since knowing the Good, for Plato, is the means to become good, failure to recognize 
the forms is a missed opportunity for Lahav’s version of philosophical practice. Moral development is 
something distinctive that philosophical practice could offer, yet Lahav fails to provide any 
commentary of a moral nature.  
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Like Plato, Lahav (2006: 6) endorses contemplation as the means to attain wisdom. Problematically, 
he provides a vague conception of contemplation describing it as a way of understanding “from the 
wholeness of our being”; from “my depth understanding” (Lahav 2006: 6). Unlike Plato, Lahav 
metaphorically associates his idea of contemplation with the sense of hearing. Contemplation 
requires that we open “inside ourselves an inner space of ‘listening’” (Lahav 2006: 6).  
Lahav (2006: 6) chooses to deliberately leave “the issue of method … open” claiming that 
contemplation is “something we must personally explore and experience for ourselves”. He does 
give some indication of the methods he has used. He confesses to having “experimented with 
various meditation techniques” (Lahav 2006: 6), though says very little regarding meditation 
practice. Given that Lahav (2008: 14-5) calls for an abandoning of the conventional academic notion 
of philosophizing we can assume that he is not endorsing philosophical meditation. This is confirmed 
when he declares that contemplation is not a dialogical exercise: it is “not from the understanding 
which my thoughts verbalize” (Lahav 2006: 6); and he enjoins us to push “ordinary thoughts aside” 
(Lahav 2006: 6). This aligns with Plato, who regards words as a barrier to truth and wisdom. Truth of 
the forms does not exist in books, but rather in the immediate consciousness. This can be grasped 
only through “direct apprehension” (Murdoch 1977: 60), and through “direct acquaintance” 
(Murdoch 1977: 26). Not only is language unable to grasp the forms, it is also an impediment that 
could remove us from the moment of direct apprehension (Murdoch 1977: 60). This does not mean 
that Plato rejects discourse. Discourse is regarded as an essential element in moral training as it 
provides an insight into the nature of the Good (Long 1986: 6). Moreovr, it is only through 
“sustained and persistent discussion” (Murdoch 1977: 23) that we arrive at true understanding.  
Aligning philosophical practice with a Platonic vision of philosophizing highlights an additional role 
for the philosophical practitioner. In Plato’s allegory of the cave it is the philosopher that breaks free 
and is able to see reality for what it is. Since the others in the cave remain plunged in an illusory 
reality (Murdoch 1977: 21), it falls to the philosopher to act as a translator: an intermediary between 
the worlds of the real and the apparent. Lahav and Tuedio both make mention of this role. According 
to Tuedio (2003) the philosophical practitioner has to move between the particular lived world of 
the participant and a much more general philosophical vision in “an interweaving dance of 
translation and innovation”. Lahav (2001a: 15) mentions this role of philosophical practitioner as 
translator, with the express intention of helping the participant to “transcend her present being 
towards broader and deeper understandings and attitudes”. Curiously, he presents this in a single 
case study, and makes no attempt to generalize it. While the role of translator could be construed as 
placing the practitioner above and separate from the participant, Lahav (2001a) corrects this 
misconception by characterizing the practitioner as a philosophical companion, a fellow traveller 
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that is on her own transformative journey. This is likely to result in a more egalitarian relationship 
between practitioner and participant, in which a degree of mutual sharing would be beneficial to 
both. This is a fundamentally different dynamic to the asymmetrical Socratic relationship in which 
the practitioner maintains her distance and discloses little about herself.  
2.4 Aristotelian Vision of Philosophizing 
In this section I will investigate an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing, as presented in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. I will explore his conceptions of virtue and well-being, and pay particular 
attention to his notions of philosophical and practical wisdom, and the associated methods to 
develop these virtues. These include: contemplation, deliberation, exemplification and habituation. I 
will then highlight the roles he might attribute to the philosopher. These include: the Socratic gadfly, 
the trainer of deliberation; developer of sensitivities; and the exemplary figure.  
Aristotle’s notion of virtue is intimately interconnected with wisdom. Virtues are understood as 
human excellences, whereby action is guided in accordance with a rational principle (Aristotle 1998: 
14). There are two sorts of virtues: moral and intellectual. Moral virtues, which include temperance 
and liberality, determine a person’s character (Aristotle 1998: 27). A virtuous man is a man of good 
character who is stable, dependable and durable, and is not influenced by external variables or 
internal variable such as petty wants or fluctuating moods (Aristotle 1998: 21-22). This contrasted to 
the man who is “many-coloured and changeable” (Aristotle 1998: 21). There are two intellectual 
virtues: philosophical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis).  
Possession of the virtues is directly linked to well-being (a happy or flourishing life), as they make 
dealing with the misfortunes and hardships of life easier (Aristotle 1998: 22). The happy man is the 
man who has moral virtues – a sufficiently developed his character; and intellectual virtues – he “will 
do and contemplate what is excellent” (Aristotle 1998: 21). In this respect both philosophical and 
practical wisdom are deemed necessary to achieve well-being.  
Aristotle (1998: 145) describes philosophical wisdom as “intuitive reason combined with scientific 
knowledge … of highest objects”. These are invariable things (or first principles), such as the eternal, 
the divine, the universal, the remarkable, and the necessary. Philosophical wisdom represents the 
highest part of the rational soul. While philosophical wisdom is regarded as being intrinsically 
valuable, the highest possible way of living and “the pleasantest of virtuous activities” (Aristotle 
1998; 264), it possesses the least amount of practical value – it is neither “practical nor productive” 
(Aristotle 1998: 139). As a consequence, the man of philosophical wisdom is nothing more than “a 
spectator of the truth” (Aristotle 1998: 14).  
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Philosophical wisdom is acquired through practicing contemplation. Contemplation considers right 
reasoning – that which is true or false (Aristotle 1998: 139). Given that Aristotle’s notion of 
contemplation favours rigorous and scientific thought, there is little methodological accord between 
it and Lahav’s notions of contemplation, which demands a deeper immersion within oneself, and an 
inner stillness synonymous with a lack of active critical thought. 
Aristotle (1998: 264) regards contemplation as the highest virtue, something which is “self-
sufficient” and independent of daily life, and which offers “pleasures marvellous for their purity and 
their enduringness” (Aristotle 1998: 264) and “perfect happiness” (Aristotle 1998: 267). Despite the 
lofty position he awards to it, because it has no practical applications (Aristotle 1998: 264) he claims 
that such a way of living would be too high for man (Aristotle 1998: 265). Accordingly, he endorses 
the need for practical wisdom (Aristotle 1998: 268). 
Practical wisdom is concerned with the variable, with the contextual and changeable world within 
our grasp. More to the point, it is concerned with “the ultimate particular” (Aristotle 1998: 148) – 
the individual, his interests and desires. Unlike philosophical wisdom, practical wisdom is valued 
instrumentally “for the sake of becoming good” (Aristotle 1998: 154). It is through practical wisdom 
that we attain happiness (Aristotle 1998: 4-5). Practical wisdom is not only valued as the means to 
attain good action, but also as the means for attaining other moral virtues. In this respect, practical 
wisdom is regarded as the gateway virtue through which all other virtues are acquired (Aristotle 
1998: 158). 
Deliberation is a crucial element in the acquisition of practical wisdom. Deliberation concerns the 
attainment of human goods: “we deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done … 
(by our) own efforts” (Aristotle 1998: 55-6). We do not deliberate about the ends, or goods, as these 
are assumed, but rather with selecting the means, the manner in which to attain the ends (Aristotle 
1998: 56). Specifically, deliberation is concerned with choosing, and choice is made through 
calculation (Aristotle 1998: 138). While we deliberate on the particular and the contextual (Aristotle 
1998: 98), deliberation is not restricted to what is good and advantageous to the particular 
individual, but also takes account of “what sorts of things conduce to a good life in general” 
(Aristotle 1998: 142).  
Deliberation entails choosing the right means, for the right reason. Aristotle (1998: 16) offers 
pleasure as the rule or measure of virtue. His starting premise is that each man loves that which is 
pleasant (Aristotle 1998: 16). Since every action or desire is accompanied by pleasure and pain, and 
the virtues relate to activities, it follows that every virtue will similarly entail pleasure and pain. To 
be virtuous is “to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains” (Aristotle 1998: 33). Aristotle 
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(1998: 253) recognizes that there are different kinds of pleasure: some arising from base sources, 
others from noble sources, some undesirable, and others desirable for its own sake. Accordingly, the 
path toward virtue requires educating or cultivating the right desire – “to feel delight and pain 
rightly” (Aristotle 1998: 33).  
Right desire “must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate” (Aristotle 1998: 38). The 
intermediate, or Mean, entails choosing between excess and deficiency; not too much and not too 
little. This means to feel emotions “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards 
the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way” (Aristotle 1998: 38). Aristotle (1998: 46) 
suggests that the best way to attain the intermediate requires that one “must first depart from what 
is more contrary to it” – our own natural inclinations. In this respect, self-knowledge serves an 
essential function. Aiming at the Mean requires departing from the extremes of our own natural 
inclinations and passions. Knowing what we most naturally desire, which is pleasure, we should aim 
in the opposite direction (Aristotle 1998: 46). This is not to say that Aristotle endorses an ascetic life 
denouncing the pleasures, rather he calls for us to moderate our appetites (Aristotle 1998: 77).  
Exemplification (modelling) is a second crucial element in the acquisition of virtue, as we learn to be 
virtuous by acting as virtuous men would (Aristotle 1998: 35). The exemplar acts as a guide on which 
to model ourselves. Turning away from Aristotle for a moment, all three philosophical practitioners 
who advocate approaches that have a high phronetic degree endorse the idea of the exemplar. 
Lahav (2008: 20) states that the image of the wise person is “the ideal towards which philosophical 
practice is directed”. His ideal of the wise person is one who possesses cosmic consciousness, she 
“belongs to a bigger world ... gives voice to the many voices of reality ... is somebody through whom 
reality speaks”. Tukiainen (Web 2) describes a wise person as one who embodies the virtues: she is 
level-headed, moderate in expectation, sufficiently flexible, humble, and independent of social 
convention and opinion. A philosophical session could entail the practitioner and participant 
reflecting on how the wise person might respond in the participant’s situation (Tukiainen 2011: 51). 
Tuedio (2004: 3) makes reference to the good person, as opposed to the wise. We can determine 
whether we are living in the right way by considering how the good person would live. Determining 
what the good person would do is for each of us to decide individually, though it could be a matter 
for discussion in a session with a philosophical practitioner.  
The third crucial element in the acquisition of the virtues is right upbringing and habituation. 
Aristotle (1998: 270) regards upbringing as essential as it provides the basic moral foundation, 
without which the virtues could not be cultivated. This places a significant burden of responsibility 
onto parents; and arguably renders the philosophical practitioner impotent, since unless virtues are 
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instilled from early on, there is no way to cultivate them. Philosophical practice in this respect can 
only refine what is already there.  
Having completed an overview of Aristotle’s ethics, I will now consider the implications it has for 
philosophical practice. In particular I will explore the ways in which this Aristotelian vision of 
philosophizing might expand the role of the philosophical practitioner. Given that self-knowledge is 
crucial for Aristotle’s form of deliberation it is reasonable to expect that the philosophical 
practitioner might still assume the role of the Socratic gadfly: an objective and disinterested 
questioner, and a teacher of philosophical skills. The practitioner would guide the participant on an 
exploration of self-knowledge, with one difference – to reveal the participant’s natural tendencies, 
as opposed to clarifying and improving their worldview. Additional roles are likely to be expected. 
Aristotle (1998: 84) promoted the necessity of training / tutoring in order to develop the virtues. As 
such we might expect the philosophical practitioner to be a trainer or tutor in virtue and 
deliberation. This may entail an intellectual discussion on the virtues. But this is more than an 
intellectual task, and requires training in making the right determination – and this largely rests on 
the capacity to discriminate between feelings that are noble, advantageous and merely pleasant. 
Since Aristotle (1998: 32) claims that the natural tendencies have to be shaped through “the right 
education”; and that deliberation concerns choosing the right means for the right reasons, and this 
hangs crucially on right feeling, it might be a job for the practitioner to help the participant to 
develop her sensitivities. Problematically, Aristotle does not say how this could be achieved. Since 
habituation is a crucial means by which to develop the virtues, as it is through practice that they are 
inculcated, the practitioner might provide ongoing scenarios, imaginative or actual, over which the 
participant can deliberate. Since exemplification is a crucial means for the acquisition of virtues, the 
practitioner might stand as an exemplary figure off which the participant model themselves.  
Is it asking too much of the philosophical practitioner to be an exemplary figure? If, as practitioners, 
we are promoting philosophical practice as a means to develop character, attain practical wisdom, 
virtue and well-being, and we have been engaging in philosophy for a significantly longer period of 
time than our participant, then it would be reasonable to assume that we would be wiser, our 
characters would be somewhat more developed and we would be happier. If we are not, or are not 
prepared to admit this, then either we have little faith in philosophical practice or ourselves, or what 
we have to offer simply does not work.  
The purpose of introducing an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing was to highlight an alternative, 
and as yet, unconsidered vision of philosophizing for philosophical practice. It promotes character 
development through the acquisition of virtues; provides alternative philosophical practices; places 
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emphasis on right feeling and desire; and suggests fundamentally different roles for the practitioner. 
It is worth noting that while Tukiainen and Tuedio endorse the pursuit of virtues as the end of 
philosophical practice, neither mention virtue ethics. While there are a variety of virtue ethics8, 
Aristotle can be understood as the inspiration behind most of these within the Western tradition.  
I argue that Aristotle’s vision of philosophizing is not merely an alternative, but the logical contrary 
to Plato’s vision of philosophizing. I regard the two as representing divergent metaphysical and 
ethical tendencies. Plato offers a bifurcated vision of reality: the ‘true’ and the real, which is 
separate and independent of the illusory and apparent. Virtue is attained by transcending this world, 
and looking to the forms. In accordance with this I read him as ‘transcendent’. In contrast, Aristotle’s 
vision of reality is grounded in the material world, and virtue is contained within the agent, i.e. it is a 
set of natural properties of the moral agent. It is such that it has been dubbed as naturalistic (Carr et 
al 2017: 5). For these reasons, I read Aristotle as immanent.  
Interestingly enough, Aristotle holds a contrary view on art to Plato. He was the first philosopher to 
repudiate Plato’s position on art and, in the Poetics, extols the function of art and its value to 
achieving moral and political goals (Cooper 1997: 29). Since good art (poetry, in particular) was 
specifically concerned with conveying general statements about human nature and morality, 
Aristotle maintained that is was ‘like philosophy’ (1980: 1451b). Moreover, art provides an 
opportunity to increase understanding and arouse the emotions (1980: 1452a). This links art with 
moral development, as both understanding and emotional development are necessary to achieve 
moral goodness.     
I think an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing is a genuine possibility for philosophical practice. That 
practical wisdom and well-being are central features makes it unquestioningly phronetic. Moreover, 
it articulates a methodology and specifies roles for the practitioner. Granted, there may be issues 
with applying an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing to philosophical practice. Among these: what a 
training in deliberation and developing the sensitivities would entail; whether or not we should 
expect the philosophical practitioner to be an exemplary figure; whether an Aristotelian vision of 
philosophical practice would have public appeal; or whether it would actually work. Ideally such 
                                                          
8 These include: pre-Aristotelian varieties such as offered by Socrates and Plato; Humeian sentimentalist virtue 
ethics; MacIntyre’s anti-realist virtue ethics, inspired by the social constructivism of Hegel and Marx; Hurka’s 
perfectionist virtue ethics; Swanton’s pluralistic virtue ethics (Car et al 2017: 3-4). Beyond conventionally 
recognized virtue ethics even Kant, who is commonly regarded as a deontologist and opponent to virtue 
ethics, can be regarded as a virtue ethicist. This is because his theory, in the second part of the Metaphysics of 
Morals: The Doctrine of Virtue, “enshrines an understanding of virtue(s)” (Roberts 2017: 28), with the primary 
virtue being “steady respect for the moral law” (Roberts 2017: 28). Another unconventional virtue ethic could 
be existentialism, given that authenticity can be regarded to be a virtue (Grene 1952: 266). 
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issues and concerns would have to be addressed if one were to promote an Aristotelian vision of 
philosophical practice. But I am not doing that here.  
The task before us is to identify and explore alternative visions of philosophizing with the express 
intention of developing and enriching philosophical practice. The question – how best to proceed? 
While wisdom, virtue and well-being are directly associated with the vision of philosophy as 
phronetic, I do not think it is useful to restrict ourselves to them and use them as criteria for several 
reasons. Firstly, wisdom and virtue have not been in philosophical vogue for the longest time. 
Consequently, there are likely many more philosophies that do not make wisdom and virtue their 
central focus than those that do. An associated practical concern is that wisdom and virtue lack 
public appeal. While they may be intrinsically valuable to the philosophically minded, they likely hold 
little practical value for the man in the street. This is no small concession as participant interest and 
involvement is crucial to the ongoing existence of philosophical practice. My solution is to 
reconceptualise philosophical practice, and offer an expanded understanding of it. This could solve 
both the above problems – providing a mechanism to identify a wider range of relevant philosophies 
and make philosophical practice more appealing. In this respect, I will associate philosophical 
practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. 
2.5 Philosophy as a Way of Life 
In this section I will develop my phronetic conception of philosophical practice by associating it with 
the conception of philosophy as a way of life. I will develop five criteria of a philosophical way of life: 
it posits a transformative aspiration; the aspiration informs and directs a transformative project; it 
provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; it offers transformative 
tools; it is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system. 
I will argue that approaches in philosophical practice that have a high phronetic degree satisfy the 
first four criteria, but fail to satisfy the fifth. I will argue that if it is the case that philosophical 
practice accords with the notion of a philosophical way of life, then it is logical to assume that any 
philosophy that satisfies the five criteria offers a particular way of life, and as such is likely to be 
relevant to philosophical practice. 
Philosophy as a way of life represents an alternative conception and way of doing philosophy 
(Nehamas 1998: 2). Philosophy, as it is commonly encountered and practiced in the academy, is a 
theoretical discourse that aims at truth and knowledge for its own sake. It is scholastic and is 
concerned with the exegesis of texts. Education in philosophy typically aims at training students to 
become teachers and professors of philosophy (Dohmen 2003: 355). As a result, philosophy tends to 
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be divorced from the process of life (Hadot 1995; 21), i.e. it has few practical applications (those that 
have practical application include medical and business ethics) and little bearing on the lives of those 
who practice it (Nehamas 1998: 1). In contrast, philosophy as a way of life is praxis in which theory is 
not valued for its own sake but is in service of practice (Hadot 1995: 23). Praxis is a process that is 
broadly concerned with the issue of how we should live, and particularly concerned with achieving 
flourishing. Hadot (1995: 83) describes this conception of philosophy as “an exercise in the art of 
living” that teaches us a new way to live, and which “causes us to be more fully, and makes us 
better”.  
While philosophy as a way of life is often associated with ancient Greek philosophy, there are variety 
of versions of philosophical ways of living (Dohmen 2003: 315). These include: virtue versions that 
promote the development of one’s character; aesthetic versions that promote aesthetic modes of 
living in which aesthetic values play a prominent role; and existential versions based on the value of 
authenticity. There is accord between Dohmen’s three versions and the three pairs of philosophical 
ways of life that I will explore in this dissertation.  
I argue that there is a high degree of accord between the conception of philosophy as a way of life 
and the vision of philosophical practice as phronetic that I articulated in section 1.1. Firstly, both 
endorse the pursuit of practical wisdom, which can be broadly understood as ‘knowing how to live’. 
Secondly, both concern themselves with ‘living well’. Hadot’s notion of ‘flourishing’ is synonymous 
with Tukiainen’s ‘well-being’ and Aristotle’s ‘happiness’. There are several merits to associating 
philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. Firstly, philosophy as a way 
of life constitutes a rich philosophical tradition that could help to enrich the understanding of 
philosophical practice as phronetic. Secondly, this tradition could provide a wide pool of resources, 
in the form of specific philosophical ways of living, which can be used to develop philosophical 
practice in a myriad of ways.     
I contend that there are five essential elements of a philosophical way of life: it posits a 
transformative aspiration; it offers a transformative project; it provides a vision of philosophizing 
that is holistic and personally invested; it offers transformative tools; it is a coherent and self-
contained philosophical system. 
Firstly, a philosophical way of life is underpinned by a transformative aspiration. Hadot (1995: 265) 
identifies the goal of a philosophical way of life as wisdom. I argue that wisdom is not the only 
aspiration. If it is the case that effecting a transformation requires that we “strive after that which is 
highest” (Hadot 1995: 265), then philosophers endorse a range of aspirations. These include the 
aspirations to ‘be happy’, ‘be good’, and ‘become authentic’. 
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Secondly, a philosophical way of life is fundamentally concerned with a project of transformation 
that strives to change and improve the participant’s way of being and life. Hadot (1995: 265) 
describes this transformation as a “radical conversion” that causes the individual to “‘be’ in a 
different way”. The change is so dramatic that one’s personality is said to undergo a metamorphosis 
(Hadot 1995: 21). 
Thirdly, a philosophical way of life endorses a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally 
invested. It is holistic in that it provides an account of the whole individual in terms of thought and 
feeling. It is personally invested as the individual philosophizes in her daily life. Hadot (1995: 265, 
268) describes philosophizing as “an exercise of thought, will, and the totality of one’s being”, that is 
“a continuous act, permanent and identical with life itself”.  
Fourthly, a philosophical way of life provides a set of practices, or transformative tools, which 
permits the individual to work on herself, to change herself. These transformative tools are not 
restricted to critical rational discourse, and include: meditation (silence, listening, attention, and 
being present in the moment); intellect (memory, imagination, reading, writing, dialogue, and 
rational argumentation); practical (mastering emotions, and contemplating one’s death) (Hadot 
1995: 82).  
Fifthly, a philosophical way of life constitutes a coherent and self-contained philosophical system. 
Hadot (1995: 267) describes a philosophical way of life as a “unitary act, which consists in living logic 
physics, and ethics”, i.e. it comprises of an epistemology - an understanding of truth that provides a 
means to acquire knowledge of how to live; a metaphysics - an understanding of reality; and an 
ethical way of living.  
I argue that these five elements can be used as criteria of identification / confirmation, such that any 
philosophy that satisfies these five criteria can be said to offer a philosophical way of life. One could 
easily make the case that Plato and Aristotle offer philosophical ways of life as they satisfy the five 
criteria.   
I argue that approaches to philosophical practice that possess a high phronetic degree satisfy the 
first four criteria. Lahav and Tukiainen satisfy the first criterion: they recognize wisdom as the 
transformative aspiration. Lahav (2001a: 8) promotes wisdom as the highest Good. Lahav conceives 
of wisdom in intellectual terms: as the endless horizon of meaning. Tukiainen (2011: 48) promotes a 
practical aspiration of wisdom that crucially depends on attaining the virtues. It is through attaining 
the virtues that the participant’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours are modified (Tukiainen 2011: 5). 
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Tuedio (2004: 3) similarly implicates the acquisition of the virtues in the achievement of personal 
growth and a flourishing life. 
Lahav, Tukiainen and Tuedio satisfy the second criterion: they endorse transformative projects that 
intend to transform the individual. Lahav (2006: 5) endorses the idea that the search for wisdom 
helps the participant to transcend her current way of being; and that it transforms the participant 
“as a living person” (Lahav 2008: 15). Tukiainen (2011: 51) maintains that philosophical discussions 
concerning the virtues can help to modify our thoughts, feelings and behaviour, and that this can 
cause us “to live differently and to become a different kind of person” (Web 2). Tuedio (2003) 
describes philosophical encounters as “transformative”, as philosophy can expand the participant’s 
realm of thought.  
Lahav and Tukiainen satisfy the third criterion: they provide, to varying degrees, a holistic vision of 
philosophizing that emphasize thought, feeling and action. Lahav (2006: 5) describes philosophizing 
as something that must be done “as a whole person”, “with a particular way of thinking and emoting 
and behaving” (Lahav 2006: 6). While Tukiainen does not provide a holistic account of the individual, 
he does endorse the virtues. I argue that since the acquisition of the virtues is synonymous with the 
realization of our human nature, the quest for virtue is essentially a quest for wholeness.   
Tukiainen, Tuedio and Lahav satisfy the fourth criterion: they advocate philosophical practice as a 
means to effect transformation. I made the case that Tukiainen (2011) and Tuedio (2004) endorse a 
Socratic vision of philosophizing. This has an explicit focus on attaining self-knowledge and is 
attained through an application of the Socratic Method. Lahav (2006) endorses a Platonic vision of 
philosophizing and offers the transformative tools of contemplation and meditation.     
I argue that none of the above practitioners satisfy the fifth criterion, as they fail to offer a self-
contained and coherent philosophical system. A self-contained and coherent philosophical system 
comprises, at the very least, of an epistemology, a metaphysics and an ethics. I argued that 
Tukiainen and Tuedio endorse a Socratic vision of philosophizing. This epistemic orientated approach 
is devoid of a metaphysical view of reality and an ethical vision of the Good. Accordingly, the 
approaches offered by Tukiainen and Tuedio cannot count as offering a self-contained and coherent 
system. Lahav advocates a Platonic vision of philosophizing. While Plato offers a self-contained and 
coherent philosophical system, Lahav fails to endorse his metaphysical vision of the forms, or 
replace it with an alternative metaphysics. Ignoring Plato’s forms means that Lahav cannot endorse 
his vision of the Good. Moreover, he does not provide his own vision of the Good. It is equally 
unclear if Lahav endorses Plato’s rationalist epistemology. In light of the above I argue that Lahav’s 
approach does not offer a self-contained and coherent philosophical system.  
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I have argued that approaches to philosophical practice that possess a high phronetic degree satisfy 
the first four criteria of a philosophical way of life, and fail the fifth criterion. Since they fail to satisfy 
all five criteria they cannot be said to offer philosophical ways of life.  
2.6 Charting the Path Forward  
If it is the case that philosophical practice accords with the notion of a philosophical way of life, then 
it would be logical to assume that any philosophy that offers a way of life might be relevant to 
philosophical practice.  
There are two ways to identify a philosophical way of life: expert opinion and the application of the 
five criteria. I will apply both: I will use the judgment of other philosophers to identify philosophical 
ways of life; I will corroborate their judgment by applying the five criteria I generated in section 1.5.     
The Hellenistic schools of philosophy are widely recognized as offering philosophical ways of living. 
The Epicureans and the Stoics are two Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Tuedio (2003) acknowledges 
the significance of the Stoics and Epicureans to philosophical practice. Tukiainen (Web 2) promotes 
Hellenistic philosophical thought as essential reading material for philosophical practice. In 
particular, he mentions the Epicurean discourse on desires, the Stoic maxim of indifference to 
indifferent things, Seneca’s letters and Epictetus’s Enchiridion. In light of the above, I regard Stoicism 
and Epicureanism to be worthy of exploration.  
Schuster (1999a: 31) identifies the following philosophers as embodying the conception of 
philosophy as a way of life: Kant, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Montaigne, Rousseau, 
Goethe, Spinoza, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Foucault. Given the association between 
philosophy as a way of life and philosophical practice as phronetic, any of the above mentioned 
philosophers would be worthy of consideration. 
I will examine the following selection: the Stoics, the Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche. These have been selected, and will be presented in pairs, on the basis of two criteria: 
shared philosophical aspiration; divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies. Each chapter will be 
orientated around a single aspiration: to ‘be happy’, ‘be good’, and ‘become authentic’. The paired 
philosophies, in each chapter, will be identified as either ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’. The intention 
behind this is to highlight the richness and diversity of philosophies that share the same 
philosophical aspiration.  
In chapter three I will explore the philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans. Both these Hellenistic 
schools of philosophy endorse happiness as the ultimate goal. They define happiness in terms of 
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tranquillity and self-sufficiency. Despite sharing a philosophical aspiration these philosophical 
schools are metaphysically and ethically divergent from one another. The Stoics endorse a bifurcated 
vision of the world: human and the divine. They regard reason to be divine and universal, and 
associate the Good with the realization of perfect reason. Attaining happiness entails cultivating 
reason, living in accordance with nature and accepting one’s fate. In light of the above, I will read the 
Stoics as offering a transcendent philosophical way of life. In contrast, Epicurean metaphysics does 
not rest on the notion of a transcendent realm. They associate the Good with minimizing pain. 
Attaining happiness entails diminishing desire and taking pleasure in simple things. For these reasons 
I will read the Epicureans as offering an immanent philosophical way of life.  
In chapter four I will explore the philosophies of Kant and Dewey. I contend that Kant and Dewey 
endorse the aspiration to be good, i.e. developing positive character traits, such as intellect, and 
living and acting in accordance with an ethical principle. Despite sharing a philosophical aspiration 
these philosophers offer divergent metaphysical and ethical positions. Kant posits a metaphysical 
view that bifurcates reality into two distinct realms: the phenomenal and noumenal. He promotes 
autonomy as the highest good, which governs the aspiration to moral purity. This requires that we 
develop our intellect, and subdue our affect, govern our passions, and bring all our capacities and 
inclinations under the control of reason. Right action is determined by living and acting in 
accordance with the moral law and associated duties. In accordance with the above I will read Kant 
as offering a transcendent philosophical way of life. In contrast, Dewey endorses a naturalistic 
metaphysic that recognizes the phenomenal world as the sole plane of existence, and characterizes 
it as being in a constant state of evolution and emergence. He posits a naturalistic ethic that 
recognizes growth as the sole criterion of the Good. Right action is that which generates the best 
consequences for the general welfare. For these reasons I will read Dewey as offering an immanent 
philosophical way of life. 
In chapter five I will explore the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. These philosophers 
endorse the aspiration to become authentic. This is understood as an ongoing and never ending 
process of ‘becoming who you are’. Despite endorsing the same philosophical aspiration the 
philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are metaphysically and ethically divergent. Kierkegaard 
posits a bifurcated conception of reality: God as infinite, absolute, necessary and free from change; 
and material existence as finite, temporal, causal and subject to change. He identifies having a 
relationship with God as the highest Good. Becoming authentic requires that the individual 
relinquish her finitude and surrender herself to God. In light of the above I will read Kierkegaard as 
offering a transcendent philosophical way of life. In contrast, Nietzsche endorses a naturalistic 
metaphysic that posits a vision of reality comprised of a single realm, and offers the ‘will to power’ 
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as the fundamental character of life. Moreover, he offers the ‘will to power’ as the objective 
measure of value. Becoming authentic is an act of self-creation that requires the individual to 
embrace and develop all facets of herself. For these reasons I will read Nietzsche as offering an 
immanent philosophical way of life. 
Since each chapter will examine two related, though divergent philosophies with a view to 
elucidating their relevance to philosophical practice the pathway of each chapter will be more or less 
identical. This permits me to describe that pathway in general terms. Chapters two, three and four 
will each comprise of several tasks.  
I will ratify that the philosophy under review constitutes a philosophical way of life. I will do this by 
indicating how it satisfies the five criteria of a philosophical way of life, i.e. that it: promotes a 
transformative aspiration; endorses a transformative project aimed at changing and improving the 
individual and her way of life; provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally 
invested; provides transformative tools; and is a self-contained and coherent system. 
I will then explore what each has to offer the participant with respect to the transformative 
aspiration and project. I will show that the Stoics and Epicureans promote a naturalist conception of 
the Good and endorse a transformative project of self-cultivation and character development that 
entails the attainment of virtue. I will show that Kant endorses the transformative project of 
‘cultivating the spirit’ that is guided by a conception of the Good as autonomy. I will show that 
Dewey endorses a transformative project of self-reconstruction that is guided by a conception of the 
Good as growth. Moreover, I will argue that both Kant and Dewey implicate aesthetic sensibility in 
the transformative process. I will show that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche endorse a transformative 
project of ‘becoming’ that is guided by a conception of the Good as authenticity. I will argue that the 
transformative aspirations and projects of these philosophical ways of life are directly relevant to 
philosophical practice.      
I will then highlight the transformative tools associated with the each philosophical way of life. I 
regard this task as crucial, since there is a distinctive lack of ‘phronetic’ methods amongst 
philosophical practitoners. Since most practitioners utilize a Socratic vision of philosophizing, the 
fundamental activity in a philosophical session is critical dialogue. An examination of the respective 
philosophies will reveal a host of practices that are not restricted to rational argumentation and 
critical dialogue. These include practices for the individual: aesthetic perception, contemplation, 
memorization, silence, self-vigilance, self-reflection, self-disclosure and self-overcoming; and social 
practices such as friendship, confession, conversation, and listening. I will argue that these methods 
are relevant to philosophical practice.  
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I will then elucidate the roles these philosophers ascribe to the philosopher. This is significant given 
that the primary role assumed by the philosophical practitioner appears to be that of the Socratic 
gadfly. An examination of the six philosophies will explicate a host of additional roles that are 
available to the philosophical practitioner. These include philosophically conventional roles such as 
educator, social critic, custodian of ideas; and unconventional roles such as sage, doctor of the soul, 
friend, moral exemplar, re-valuator of values, legislator, leader, and moral prophet. 
I will then elucidate the metaphysics that informs each philosophical way of life. This will serve an 
intrinsic and an extrinsic purpose. Since a philosophical way of life is a contained and coherent 
system, its metaphysic informs its ethics. Accordingly, explicating the metaphysic of each 
philosophical system will provide a deeper and richer understanding of the ethical way of life. In 
addition, elucidating the metaphysics will highlight points of coincidence and tension between 
philosophical ways of life.  
I will then enunciate the epistemology of each philosophical way of life. This will serve an intrinsic 
and an extrinsic purpose. Given that a philosophical way of life develops out of an epistemic 
tradition, explicating it will provide a deeper understanding of that philosophical way of life. In 
addition, it will illustrate the dynamic tensions that exist between philosophical ways of life.  
It will become apparent that these philosophical ways of life are distinctly different from one 
another. Given that the express intention of this dissertation is to develop and enrich philosophical 
practice I will attempt to provide an unbiased account of each philosophical way of life, together 
with an assessment of their possible contributions and failings for philosophical practice.   
In the conclusion I will make several observations. Firstly, despite the fact that each of the 
philosophical ways of life are distinctly different from one another, I will recognize that they share a 
range of commitments. These include: education, community, the value of aesthetic perception, and 
the idea that the self can be intentionally cultivated. I will argue that these commitments might 
introduce novel dimensions to philosophical practice that could fundamentally change it. The second 
observation is that many of the practices advocated as means in the respective transformative 
projects are also shared. Shared practices include: self-examination, confession, developing one’s 
reasoning capacity, scientific inquiry, revaluation and reconstruction, contemplation, doctrinal 
instruction, the moral exemplar, aesthetic perception and stilling the mind. I will argue that 
introducing these practices into philosophical practice will significantly expand its methodological 
repertoire beyond a Socratic engagement with the participant’s worldview.        
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Lastly, I will explore what is required of the philosophical practitioner who offers a philosophical way 
of life. I will organize the full range of roles available to the philosopher into three categories of 
investment: intellectual, personal and existential. I will argue that the role that the practitioner 
adopts imposes degrees of restraint onto what she can offer and how she can offer it. Moreover, I 
will argue that the practitioner who endorses a philosophical way of life should adopt roles in all 
three categories of investment. One implication of this is that the practitioner will have to offer a 
single philosophical way of life in her philosophical practice. The choice of which philosophical way 
of life would be determined by her particular philosophical commitments. As a consequence, she will 
be unable to consult with a participant who holds contrary metaphysical and ethical views.    
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Chapter Three  
The Stoics and the Epicureans 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and enrich philosophical practice. An examination of 
philosophical practice literature revealed a domain constituted by an array of ends. Contrary to view 
that philosophical practice is diverse and differentiated, I argued for a unified vision of philosophical 
practice as phronetic: practical wisdom that brings about / increases well-being. Moreover, I argued 
that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is insufficient to attain phronetic ends. I associated my 
phronetic conception of philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life; 
and, by extension, assume that any philosophy that accords with such a conception might be 
relevant to philosophical practice. In this chapter I will explore the contributions the Stoics and the 
Epicureans might make to philosophical practice.   
The Stoics9 and Epicureans10 are Hellenistic schools of philosophy. These were not formally 
established institutions, but were constituted by collectives of like-minded philosophers, with an 
appointed leader, who met regularly, either in private or in public. Meetings consisted of tutelage in 
and presentation of the teachings of the founding father(s), and or interpretations thereof (Long & 
Sedley 1987: 5-6).  These schools of philosophy were socially and intellectually prominent for a 
period of approximately 400 years. Interest in them shifted away in the first century BCE with a 
revival in interest in Platonism and Aristotle’s technical writings (Long & Sedley 1987: xi). Curiously, 
they remain among the most neglected philosophies by the academy despite the fact that Hellenistic 
thought has had greater influence on philosophers, including Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and 
Nietzsche, than Plato and Aristotle (Nussbaum 1994: 4).  
The Stoics and Epicureans are widely recognized as offering philosophical ways of life (Long 1986: 
14; Nussbaum 1994: 348). I confirm the status of these schools as philosophical ways of life by 
arguing that they satisfy the five criteria of a philosophical way of life. I argue that they satisfy the 
first criterion as they promote the transformative aspiration to ‘be happy’ (section 3.1). I argue that 
                                                          
9 Prominent Greek Stoic philosophers include Zeno from Citium (335 – 263 BCE), Cleanthes from Assos (331 – 
232 BCE), Chrysippus (280 – 207 BCE), Diogenes of Babylon (240 – 152 BCE) and Antipater of Tarsus (second 
century BCE). Prominent Roman Stoic philosophers include Seneca (4 BCE – 65 ACE), Epictetus (55 – 15 ACE) 
and Marcus Aurelius (121 – 180 ACE). Re-interpretation by subsequent members within the school resulted in 
the transformation of Stoic thought (Long 1986: 10). Marcus Aureluis’s Meditations is the most widely known 
document on Stoicism, followed by Epictetus’s Manual (Marcus Aurelius 1961: xi).   
 
10 Prominent Epicurean proponents include Epicurus (307/6 – 270 BCE) and Philodemus (110 – 40/35 BCE). 
Since much of the original writing has been lost the interpretations of their contemporaries, often non-school 
members, is relied upon (Long 1986: 10). Such authors include Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch. 
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the Stoics and Epicureans satisfy the second criterion as they promote the transformative project of 
character development (section 3.2). I argue that they satisfy the third criterion (a vision of 
philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested) as they acknowledge the interplay between 
thought and feeling, and advocate the extirpation of the passions and unnecessary desires (section 
3.4). I argue that they satisfy the fourth criterion as they offer a range of transformative tools 
(section 3.5). I argue that they satisfy the fifth criterion as they provide self-contained and coherent 
philosophical systems. Each school offers a comprehensive system of thought in which their realist 
metaphysics (section 3.7) and empiricist epistemologies (section 3.8) underpin and inform their 
ethical views on how we should live.  
There are good reasons for pairing these particular philosophical schools: both promote happiness 
as the ultimate goal; they have a distinctive social orientation; they conceive of philosophy in 
instrumental terms, as offering therapy; and despite the commonalities, they offer divergent 
philosophical ways of life.   
Firstly, the Stoics and the Epicureans both endorse a transformative aspiration to ‘be happy’. They 
define happiness in terms of freedom from inner turmoil and external contingencies. The search for 
happiness was a direct response to the socio-political climate (the end of Greek civilization; the 
formation of territorial kingdoms; and the end of small civic communities) which resulted in a 
personal context marked by a loss of identity and a lack of moral guidance.  
Secondly, the Stoics and Epicureans have a distinctive social orientation. The ideal of community is 
central to both Epicurean and Stoic ways of life, as they implicate the importance of the community 
in achieving happiness. While both schools endorse an egalitarian ideal of community their 
application of the ideal is not synonymous. 
Thirdly, both schools promote therapy as an end of philosophy. As a result of the socio-political 
context of change, the Stoics and Epicureans elected to shift philosophy away from abstract 
speculation, toward providing a sense of security for the individual, in terms of freedom from 
disturbances of the soul. Therapeutic intervention entailed the extirpation of passions and 
unnecessary desires by rational means.    
Despite the commonalities I read the Stoics as offering a transcendent philosophical way of life as 
they endorse a transcendent ethic and metaphysic; and I read the Epicureans as offering an 
immanent philosophical way of life as they promote an immanent ethic and metaphysic.   
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The purpose of this chapter is to discover the contributions the Stoic and Epicurean philosophical 
ways of life could make to philosophical practice. I will begin by exploring their respective ethical 
ways of life, which include their transformative aspirations, projects and tools. I will then explore 
their respective metaphysics and epistemologies.   
In section 3.1 I will enunciate the Hellenistic transformative aspiration to ‘be happy’. Happiness is 
understood as tranquillity and self-sufficiency. I will show that the aspiration to be happy is 
conveyed through the vision of the Good. 
In section 3.2 I will explore the Stoic and Epicurean transformative project of character 
development, through the acquisition of the virtues – crucial elements in attaining happiness. I will 
argue that character development could serve as a bona fide end to philosophical practice.  
In section 3.3 I will explore Stoic and Epicurean notions and applications of community. I will argue 
that an orientation toward community could have significant implications for philosophical practice, 
potentially changing the way that it is practiced, as well as the content of the practice.     
In section 3.4 I will explore Hellenistic therapy. I will argue that the Hellenists provide a holistic vision 
of philosophizing since they connect belief and judgement to the formation of emotional responses. 
Since they identify troubling emotions to lie at the source of human disturbances they advocate 
extirpating the passion and unnecessary desires by rational means. I will argue that Hellenistic 
‘therapy’ might enrich philosophical practice in general, as well as existing modes of philosophical 
practice that promote therapy as an end.  
In section 3.5 I will enunciate the practices advocated by the Hellenistic schools. I will argue that 
since most of the practices are already utilized by practitioners, they offer little that is new to 
philosophical practice. 
In section 3.6 I will explore the roles the Stoics and Epicureans assign to the philosopher and pupil. 
The roles they assign to the philosopher include: the sage, teacher of critical thinking, master and 
friend. I will argue that Stoic roles are relevant to philosophical practice as they preserve and 
develop participant autonomy. I will argue that since the Epicurean roles fail to preserve and 
develop participant autonomy, they are irrelevant to philosophical practice.  
In section 3.7 I will explore the Hellenists realist metaphysics. Metaphysics is crucial to their ethical 
ways of life, as it reveals that the source of the Good can be found in nature. I will argue that the 
Stoics and Epicureans posit divergent metaphysical positions.  
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In section 3.8 I will show that the Hellenists endorse empiricist epistemologies. I will argue that the 
empiricist orientation of the Hellenists could introduce an experimental element to philosophical 
practice, expanding sessions beyond mere discussion and moving them out of the office and into the 
world.  
3.1 Transformative Aspiration: ‘be happy’   
In this section I will enunciate the Stoic and Epicurean transformative aspiration to’ be happy’. 
Happiness is understood as having a peaceful mind and being immune to external influence. I will 
show that the aspiration to be happy is conveyed through a conception of the Good. The Good is 
known by the Epicurean ‘ethical witness’; and the Stoic ‘perfect living creature’.    
The Stoics and Epicureans endorse the transformative aspiration to ‘be happy’. Happiness, also read 
as well-being, eudemonia and the good life, was a vision of a peaceful and tranquil life (Epicurus 
1975: 55; Seneca, in Long & Sedley 1987: 63 F; Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 21 W). Both schools 
associate tranquillity with self-sufficiency (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 21 B; Nussbaum 1994: 
317). Self-sufficiency loosely translates into: a life that is free from inner disturbance (Epicurus 1975: 
59), i.e. freedom from false belief and public opinion; and impervious to external events over which 
we have no control.  
Despite both endorsing self-sufficiency, they appear to assign different values to it. Self-sufficiency 
for the Stoics is synonymous with practical wisdom: “wise and virtuous thinking” (Nussbaum 1994: 
366), which effectively translates into doing philosophy. This means having knowledge of the divine 
and human (Aetius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 26 A); and brining the human mind’s good to perfection 
(Seneca, in Long & Sedly 1987: 26 G), i.e. cultivating and shaping one’s soul. Aetius (in Long & Sedley 
1987: 26 A) describes three generic virtues: physical, ethical, logical. These cohere with the three 
branches of Stoic philosophy: physics – concerned with the world and its contents; ethics – 
pertaining to human life; and logic – concerned with discourse. This makes the practice of 
philosophy synonymous with the attainment of virtue. Given that the Stoics value reason above all 
else, and that doing philosophy is nothing other than the perfection of reason, I argue that the Stoics 
would value self-sufficiency intrinsically. In contrast, the Epicureans value it instrumentally as a 
means in the service of pleasure (Diogenise of Oenoanda, in Long & Sedley 1987: 21 P), and because 
it gave birth to freedom (Epicurus 1975: 119).  
I contend that the Hellenistic aspiration to be happy is as relevant and desirable today as it was then. 
A lack of moral guidance and loss of personal identity are arguably as much an issue in the 
postmodern age as they were in the Hellenistic period. Admittedly, the Hellenistic vision of the good 
55 
 
life is almost the polar opposite of the consumerist vision of our age, which could be associated with 
the pursuit and acquisition of material goods and experiences. Far from this being a problem, it is 
likely that a radical reorientation in the participant’s vision of the good life could allow her to find 
the peace and contentment she may desire.  
The aspiration to be happy is expressed in the notion of the Good. The Stoics and Epicureans look to 
nature to discover what constitutes the Good. Epicurus identifies the “ethical witness” (Nussbaum 
1994: 108): the newborn animal, the face of innocence and “the sound judgment of nature itself” 
(Cicero, in Long & Sedley 1987: 21A). Since the ethical witness is uncontaminated by externally 
imposed beliefs, desires and opinions, it is capable of recognizing the Good. The Stoics offer a similar 
touchstone to discovering the Good in the “perfect living creature”: simple, devoid of craving and 
desire, and perfectly satisfied in the present (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 10, 1).  
The Epicurean ‘ethical witness’ illustrates that nature wants nothing but the removal of physical pain 
and mental anguish (Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 21 W). Since pain and discomfort is something 
we will always act to avoid it is understood to be the greatest bad, and pleasure the greatest good 
(Epicurus 1975: 87). This should not be taken as an extreme form of hedonism. Pleasure is not 
accumulative, such that more instances of pleasure do not translate into quantitatively more 
pleasure. Moreover, not every pleasure is regarded as a good – sometimes excessive pleasure can 
result in discomfort (Epicurus 1975: 87-9). For Epicurus (1975: 95) the purpose of pleasure is the 
removal of pain, such that when we are free from physical pain and mental disturbance there is no 
longer any need for pleasure (Epicurus, Long & Sedley 1987: 21 B). It is such that Epicurus (1975: 87) 
calls “pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life”.  
Epicurus (1975: 87) names pleasure as the measure of everything good. It is only through the 
pleasures of taste, love, hearing, and emotions on seeing beauty that we can conceive of the Good 
(Epicurus 1975: 123). He enjoins us to honour the things that give us pleasure, and to ignore those 
things which do not. Epicurus reveres simple pleasures that are contained in the moment. Such 
pleasures are regarded to have a self-sufficient structure and are impervious to interruption. To this 
end he endorses the consumption and enjoyment of simple foods (Epicurus 1975: 131), and 
proclaims that the “beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach” (Epicurus 
1975: 125).  
While Epicurus (in Long & Sedley 1987: 21 B) promotes the end of pleasure and the absence of pain 
as the means to make every choice and evaluate every action, he recognizes that while every 
pleasure is good, “not every pleasure is choiceworthy”. Similarly, while every pain is bad “not every 
pain is by nature to be avoided”. 
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The ‘ethical witness’ also guides us as to the right desire. Epicurus (1975: 133) enjoins us to 
“follow(s) nature and not vain opinion”. He who forgets nature takes on unlimited desires, and with 
them disturbances and difficulties (Epicurus 1975: 133). Epicurus (1975: 87) identifies different sorts 
of desires: natural, vain, necessary and unnecessary. Natural desires are what the ‘ethical witness’ 
would seek out. Natural desires that do not result in pain when unsatisfied are not necessary 
(Epicurus 1975: 101). While the desire for sex is natural, and procreation is necessary for ongoing 
existence, sex was not regarded as necessary for a happy life. Moreover, given that Epicurus 
recognized that the desire for sex can be corrupted when coupled with a false belief that obsesses 
on a single person, and that this could lead to disquiet of the soul, he cautioned against erotic love, 
marriage and having children (Nussbaum 1994: 144-76). Vain desires are empty and self-defeating, 
and are powered by false opinion, or the belief that possessing certain things would make us happy. 
Natural desires are few and easy to acquire, vain desires are infinite and hard to acquire (Epicurus 
1975: 99). Since vain desires cause infinite longing and threaten our security and disturb the soul, 
they should be guarded against (Epicurus 1975: 119). Knowing the difference between the desires 
allows us to make choices that ensure bodily health and freedom from disturbance. Epicurus enjoins 
us to eliminate empty desires, such as ambition, power, fame and wealth – for these cause greater 
unhappiness and anxiety than what satisfaction of them brings. On a whole, Epicurus (1975: 89) 
considers independence of desire as a great good. He enjoins us to not spoil what you have by 
desiring what you do not have. 
While the Stoics leave contemplating and discovering the Good up to each individual, they 
diametrically oppose the Epicurean notion of the Good. Marcus Aurelius (1961: 8, 10) expresses a 
general disdain for pleasure, which he regards as neither useful nor good. Moreover, he regards 
pleasure seeking as a sin (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 9, 1) and to lie at the source of human disconnect. 
In pursuing pleasures and desires, in seeking out our own advantage, we not only cut ourselves off 
from others, but also from Nature (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 34; 11, 8). Thinking we are separate 
from Nature and other men is regarded as a violence the soul does to itself (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 
2, 16).  
Not only do the Stoics regard pleasure with disdain, they do not see pain as an evil (Marcus Aurelius 
1961: 6, 33). The reason that controls nature cannot create evil, as it does not contain evil; and so it 
cannot create injury (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 1). Any sense of injury is regarded as a matter of 
faulty thinking (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 21). The harm of pain comes from our own construal 
whereby we can make it seem worse than it is (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 22). To this Marcus Aurelius 
(1961: 7, 64; 8, 28) enjoins us to not let our imagination add to the pain by judging the pain to be 
evil. 
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I argue that since the Hellenistic notions of the Good are intertwined in the transformative process, 
they could serve as directives in philosophical practice inspired by a Stoic or an Epicurean 
philosophical way of life. That the Stoics don’t provide a vision of the Good would serve to 
encourage independent critical thought in the participant. This would preserve and develop 
participant autonomy. Granted the Epicureans do advocate a vision of the Good. In the interests of 
preserving and developing autonomy the practitioner might offer the Epicurean Good as a 
touchstone off which the participant could develop her own conception.      
One could object that since the Stoics don’t provide a vision of the Good the participant could arrive 
at an Epicurean conception as a result of her own reasoning. I regard it to be highly unlikely, if not 
impossible, for the simple reason that the Stoics place greater emphasis on the whole, than on the 
parts. Accordingly, individual’s feelings and desires do not feature for the Stoics in ways that they do 
for the Epicureans.  
3.2 Transformative Project: character development   
In this section I will explore the transformative project, i.e. the manner in which happiness is 
attained: by developing one’s character, and through the acquisition of virtues. I will argue that the 
Stoics and Epicureans endorse divergent ethical stances. I will argue that character development 
could be a bona fide transformative project for philosophical practice. 
Attaining happiness requires that the individual develop her character. Stoic character development 
entails cultivating one’s capacity for reason. The Stoics recognize that man is comprised of “flesh and 
vital spirit, and the governing self” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 2, 2). The flesh (body) is regarded as the 
source of passions (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 55); the vital spirit is where fear and grief reside 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 16); the governing self is “the commanding faculty (reason)” (Sextus 
Empiricus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 53 F). Developing character requires that we disregard body and 
vital spirit and place primary emphasis on the governing self or reason. The reason that governs the 
way man lives is part of the divine spirit (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 9, 8) that controls the Universe 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 21). Since developing one’s own reason honours the divine reason that 
orders the world, the Stoics enjoin the pupil to perfect her reason.  
Epicurean character development is likened to a conversion of self (Nussbaum 1994: 123). The 
Epicureans regard self as a secondary property, contingent on beliefs, desires and values that are of 
our own determination. Not only do we choose our beliefs, desires and values, in choosing them, we 
choose ourselves. Developing one’s character thus entails re-visioning one’s beliefs, desires and 
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values. Epicurus (in Long & Sedley 1987: 20 B; C) maintains that it is the responsibility of each 
individual to develop her own character.  
Character development depends upon the acquisition of virtue. Diogenes Laertius (in Long & Sedley 
1987: 61 A) describes virtue as “a consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from 
fear or hope or anything external”. The virtues are something we should strive for, and seek to 
preserve. If we do, we are told: “you will be a changed man and will enter upon a changed life” 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 10, 8). Our capacity to change ourselves is regarded to be virtually unlimited. 
Marcus Aurelius (1961: 11, 1) proclaims that the governing self “moulds itself, makes itself whatever 
it will”. While Lucretius (in Long & Sedley 1987: 14 D) recognizes that the “original traces of each 
mind’s nature” is ineradicable, suggesting that there are constraints to how much of our character 
we could change; he maintains that these traces are so slight that reason can expel them.  
The Stoics advocate a wide range of virtues. Zeno names wisdom, moderation, justice and courage 
as virtues; and folly, intemperance, injustice, and cowardice as vices (Schofield 2003: 239). Diogenes 
Laertius (in Long & Sedley 1987: 58 A) cites an almost identical set of virtues and vices. This 
classification provides a starting point for the Stoics, to which a profusion of virtues and vices were 
later added (Schofield 2003: 240). For example, Marcus Aurelius (1961: 1, 1-17) starts his 
Meditations by offering a lengthy list of virtues that includes: even temper, nobleness of character, 
piety, education, avoidance of  idle enthusiasms, the need to reform and treat one’s character, to be 
devoid of passion yet full of affection, to not find fault with others, to give time to others, to have 
love for family, truth, justice, work, and above all the freedom of the individual, to have mastery 
over one’s self – to be consistent and unwavering, gentleness and be unshakably resolute, moderate 
care of one’s health, and act in accordance with tradition, to name a few. He later adds “right 
understanding, neighborly behavior, speech which would never lie, and a disposition welcoming all 
which comes to pass, as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from a source and fountain like itself” 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 33); and then “freedom from guile, dignity, endurance of labour, distaste 
for pleasure, contentment with your portion, need of little, kindness, freedom, plain-living, reserve 
in speech, magnanimity” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 5); wisdom, temperance, justice, and fortitude 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 12).  
Epicurus (1975: 91) does not offer lengthy lists of virtues. Instead he regards prudence to be more 
valuable than philosophy, and as the gateway virtue from which all other virtues spring. In contrast 
to the Stoics the Epicureans did not value the virtues for their own sake but for the sake of the Good 
(Epicurus 1975: 171). 
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I argue that the Stoics and Epicureans endorse divergent ethical views. I read the Epicureans as 
offering an immanent ethic since they promote pleasure as the measure of the Good. The Stoics do 
not offer an account of the Good, they merely oppose Epicurean notions of the Good. This is 
insufficient to make a judgment on the sort of ethic they offer. We can however make a 
determination on the basis of their view of character development. That they advocate perfecting 
one aspect (reason), while simultaneously negating others (the body and vital spirit), permits me 
read them as promoting a transcendent ethic.   
I claim that character development could be offered as a transformative project in philosophical 
practice. The benefits of developing one’s character is that it: “orders our life, guides our conduct, 
shows us what we should do and what we should leave undone” (Seneca Epistles XVL); makes life 
more tolerable (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 12); and improves one’s way of life (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 
2, 17). The benefits, assuming it actually works, makes character development appealing. Arguably, 
the idea that self is something that can be formed and moulded by one’s own effort is more 
practicable, and likely to have greater appeal, than the more abstract phronetic ends of wisdom and 
virtue that are promoted by some practitioners. That developing character is a distinctively 
philosophical concern permits the practitioner to promote character development as a bona fide 
philosophical offering. Curiously, none of the philosophical practitioners I have encountered even 
hint at this possibility.  
One might object that providing the participant with predetermined virtues and helping her shape 
her character fails to respect the autonomy of the individual and her capacity for self-determination. 
Perhaps this might explain why philosophical practitioners do not advocate character development.  
I have several responses to this objection. Firstly, I argue that providing the participant with a list of 
virtues does not necessarily undermine her autonomy, as she would not have to accept them. While 
the Stoics enunciated a host of virtues, they did not expect their pupil to uncritically accept them. 
Instead, she was encouraged to engage with them, and if need be determine new virtues for herself. 
This does not imply that any virtue the participant selects would be acceptable. The new virtue 
would have to be subjected to the same critical process as all the other virtues. In this respect, the 
autonomy of the participant is not only respected, its development is encouraged. Secondly, I do not 
think that practitioners avoid advocating character development because they do not want to 
prescribe virtues to the participant. It is apparent that Tukiainen presents a list of virtues, though he 
makes no reference to character development. I regard this to be problematic as it reduces the 
virtues to an intellectual topic of discussion that is devoid of a purpose. Since developing one’s 
character is the end of virtue acquisition, character development would provide that purpose. In 
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light of the above I contend that there is no good reason to not offer character development. 
Perhaps philosophical practitioners don’t offer character development as they regard it to be 
unfashionable. This seems unlikely, given that some advocate the ends of wisdom and virtue. 
Arguably, these are as out of fashion as character development.   
3.3 Community 
In this section I will explore Stoic and Epicurean commitment to community. The ideal of community 
is central to both schools of philosophy as they implicate it in the achievement of happiness. I will 
show that these schools of philosophy advocate different visions of community. I will argue that an 
orientation toward community could have a significant impact on philosophical practice.     
The Hellenistic schools of philosophy both endorse the notion of an egalitarian community that was 
open to all, regardless of gender, station, age or level of education. This made it as permissible for a 
female slave to join as it was for an educated male of good standing. Accordingly, they had to ensure 
that their teachings could be understood by almost anyone (Long 1986: 12-3). While both schools 
promote the notion of an egalitarian community, their application of the ideal is not synonymous.  
The Epicureans place emphasis on their own philosophical community (Long & Sedley 1987: 3-4). 
Pupils were encouraged to consort with like-minded people. By way of ensuring this, the Epicureans 
lived in ‘the Garden’: a cloistered apolitical environment committed to preserving and promoting 
friendship and solidarity (Nussbaum 1994: 120). Social withdrawl was advocated, and social and 
political involvement was discouraged (Long & Sedley 1987: 3-4; Epicurus 1975: 115). Members of 
school were expected to leave their occupations and families, donate their wealth to the school, and 
commit their lives to the community.  
In contrast to the Epicureans, the Stoics did not isolate themselves. Moreover, they more or less 
accept the existing social-political order. Marcus Aurelius (1961: 2, 16) proclaims that it is the end of 
reasonable creatures “to obey the rules and ordinances” of state. They did not, however, advocate 
total acceptance as they encouraged criticism of conventions, values and beliefs. Because the Stoics 
recognize and respect the dignity of all human beings, they promote the importance of a just society 
of people bound together by mutual respect (Nussbaum 1994: 319; 354). In light of this, they 
encourage active social involvement (Marcus Aurelius 1961: xiii). One such act entails the education 
of humanity, i.e. training people to become fully developed humans (Hadot 1995: 270). This included 
cultivating perception, compassion and responsiveness toward other people, as well as fostering 
rationality. Stoic commitment to education can be attributed to their pantheistic notion that the 
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reason that organizes the Universe is in all things (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 9). We honour the divine 
in us by perfecting our reason and by helping others to perfect their reason.  
I argue that the Hellenistic orientation toward community could have significant implications for 
philosophical practice. Firstly, it might alter the way philosophy is practiced, shifting it away from a 
model that appears to have a narrow focus on the individual, which manifests in one-on-one session, 
toward group sessions. Exactly how this sort of philosophical community could be facilitated and 
maintained remains to be seen. The internet certainly provides a means for like-minded people to 
share their experiences, as well as support and encourage one another outside of regular meetings. 
Secondly, it might alter, or at least add to, what is offered, i.e. the activities of the practice. Inspired 
by the Stoics, the practice of developing one’s character might entail an active involvement in 
political, educative or charity organizations and events. This has the potential to cultivate and 
develop the participant’s sense of social responsibility, perhaps even her altruistic tendencies, 
through participating in projects that uplift and improve the lives of others.  
One could object that it would be expecting too much of the participant to separate herself from her 
‘natural’ community in order to join an Epicurean style community. I reply that it is a misconception 
to assume that the Epicurean community is intimately implicated in, and necessarily required by, 
their philosophy. According to Sharples (1996: 7) it is possible to live in accordance with Epicurean 
philosophy and principles without living in an Epicurean community.  
One could object that since some philosophers advocate the use of philosophical cafés (Schuster 
1999b), and that these can be understood as ‘communities of inquiry’, that the notion of community 
is not foreign to philosophical practice.  
I reply these notions of community are different. A ‘community of inquiry’ can be understood to 
comprise of a group of people orientated toward empirical and intellectual inquiry. Since a 
‘community of inquiry’ is porous attendance changes from session to session, and as a result, the 
character and the content of each meeting is different (Schuster 1999b). Moreover, given that group 
members would likely have diverse and disparate beliefs, values and opinions, such a gathering, 
while intellectually stimulating, is likely to result in antagonisms that would thwart rather than foster 
tranquillity. In contrast, the sort of philosophical community I envisage would comprise of a 
determinate group of people united by a common transformative goal, shared interests, attitudes 
and values, with mutual care and respect for their fellow members and for humanity in general. This 
sort of arrangement is likely to result in, and increase, a sense of solidarity and harmony. That 
members of such a community would be committed to the transformation of all makes the 
community an integral element in the transformative process.  
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3.4 Therapy  
In this section I will explore Hellenistic therapy. I argue that the Stoics and Epicureans offer a holistic 
vision of philosophizing as they acknowledge an interplay between thought and emotion. Emotions 
in ancient Greek thought were regarded as having a cognitive element in that they “embody ways of 
interpreting the world” (Nussbaum 1994: 369). It was generally understood that a close and intimate 
connection existed between emotions and beliefs. This connection is variously understood: some 
(Plato, Epicurus, Aristotle, Zeno) regarded belief as being necessary for an emotion to occur; for 
some (Aristotle) a belief is regarded as a constituting element of an emotion; and others (possibly 
Epicurus, Zeno) hold that belief is sufficient for emotion. While the Stoics are placed within this 
tradition, Chrysippus departs from it by claiming that a belief or judgment is identical to the emotion 
(Nussbaum 1994: 371-4). I will explore what they have to say regarding the relationship between 
beliefs and desires, judgements and passions. Since they identify emotions to lie as the source of 
discomfort, and this prevents the attainment of happiness, they advocate the extirpation of passions 
and unnecessary and unnatural desires. I will argue that the therapeutic dimension of Stoic and 
Epicurean philosophy is relevant to philosophical practice.   
The Hellenistic philosophers overtly align philosophy with the act of healing. Epicurus (in Long & 
Sedley 1987: 25 C) announces: “Empty is the word of that philosopher by whom no affliction of men 
is cured”. Cicero (in Nussbaum 1994: 14) refers to philosophy as “a medical art for the soul”. Aligning 
philosophy with the art of medicine offers more than a metaphor. I argue that these schools follow a 
distinctive pattern of therapeutic investigation: a diagnosis of disease; a norm of health (typified by a 
general and open-ended conception of flourishing or well-being); and treatment through the 
application of rational argumentation.  
Both schools regard suffering, in terms of a disquiet in the soul, as an indication of disease. The 
suffering that concerns these schools includes fear of death, unsatisfied desire, unrequited love, pity 
over another’s suffering, frustration over failure, gluttony, arrogance, anger and aggression. For the 
Epicureans boundless desire, which cannot be satisfied, is the cause of suffering. Such desires 
include fame, money, and erotic love. The Epicureans identify false belief to lie at the heart of desire 
(Nussbaum 1994: 113). For the Stoics suffering arises as a result of misconstrued appearances, a 
failure to see the external world, as well as our own experiences and actions, correctly. This is 
caused by ignorance, false belief and lazy thinking. Misconceptions lead to the development of 
passions. Passion refers to an unhealthy state of mind, these include pleasure, fear, appetite and 
distress, which result in attempts to avoid pain (Diogenes Laertius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 57 A). 
Passions develop when a false value judgment is linked to an impulse. Impulse, understood as the 
63 
 
conversion of a value judgment into action, necessarily includes the use of reason. A passion is a 
‘perversion of reason’ since the value of an object or action is misconstrued (Long & Sedley 1987: 
420). For example, distress, which is both physical and mental, is felt due to the belief that evil is 
present; then there is an additional belief that it is correct to feel distress in the presence of evil. 
While the initial response is involuntary and natural, it is the incorrect attachment of the value that 
perpetuates the passion. This allows it to gather a force of its own, making it difficult to control, and 
results in excessive behaviour of pursuance or avoidance (Epictetus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 56 C). In 
light of this, the Stoics regard passions as ‘ailments’ (Galen, in Long & Sedley 1987: 65 L). 
Because emotions have a cognitive element the suffering they cause can be eradicated by rational 
means. Since the Epicureans regard desire to lie at the source of suffering, the solution requires a 
revision in one’s desires and values. Given that belief is understood to be the necessary condition of 
desire, disturbances of the soul are removed by removing the false belief. Correcting false belief 
dissolves disturbing emotions such as anger, arrogance, anxiety, fear and gluttony. Since the Stoics 
recognize a connection between faulty judgment and passion, we cure ourselves of the passions by 
removing the fault of judgement. The Epicureans did not strive to root out every desire, only those 
desires and associated false belief that prevented the attainment of a flourishing life were regarded 
as disease (Nussbaum 1994: 195). The Stoics did not deny all feeling. They recognized that there are 
good feelings, such as joy and wishing (Sharples 1996: 70). Both Epicureans and Stoics advocate the 
use of reason to remove false beliefs and faulty judgments (Sharples 1996: 69). Since false beliefs 
and judgments are so ingrained in conventional culture they can never be permanently put to rest. 
Consequently, the removal of false beliefs and judgements, and consequent emotions, needs to be 
continually countered with repeated applications of rational argumentation. I will examine the 
application of rational argumentation in section 2.5. 
I argue that incorporating a therapeutic dimension focused on understanding and ameliorating 
suffering would significantly develop philosophical practice. Having an intrinsic as well as an 
instrumental orientation would expand the range of application of philosophical practice. Given that 
many people are seeking solace from some form of hurt, an increased range of application would 
benefit the participant.   
One might object that philosophical practice should not be orientated toward instrumental ends. 
Lahav (2001a: 7) argues that offering therapy in philosophical practice “betrays the distinctive nature 
of philosophy”, which is necessarily, and exclusively, intrinsic in orientation.  
I regard this sort of a ‘purist’ view of philosophy to be a misconception. Philosophy is not an idea, 
but an activity. Accordingly, we can only say what it is by looking at manifestations of it. Granted, 
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philosophy is predominantly intrinsic in orientation, and yet not exclusively so. The Stoics and 
Epicureans offer two instances where an instrumental orientation is emphasized. Dewey, who will 
be explored in chapter 3, provides another.  
Admittedly, therapy is already offered as an end of philosophical practice by at least one 
philosophical practitioner. In this respect one could argue that the appropriation of Hellenistic 
therapy into philosophical practice would not add anything new to it.  
I reply that just because therapy is currently offered in philosophical practice does not mean that it 
cannot be improved. It is entirely possible that the Hellenistic way of life might contribute something 
new to philosophical practice that advocates therapy as an end, thereby facilitating its further 
development. It is also apparent that very few practitioners offer therapy as an end to philosophical 
practice. Incorporating a Hellenistic way of life into philosophical practice could increase the number 
of practitioners who might advocate and offer an instrumental orientation.     
3.5 Transformative Tools  
In this section I will enunciate the practices these schools advocate that permit individuals to work 
on themselves and develop their characters. I organize these into solitary and social practices. 
Solitary practices include: studying philosophy, developing the skills of rational argumentation, self-
examination, the moral exemplar, taking pleasure in small things, and memorization of epitomes 
and principles. Social practices, carried out between individuals, include: confession, conversation 
and listening.   
Both schools advocate studying philosophy. Epicurus (1975: 83) promotes the study of philosophy as 
a means “to secure the health of one’s soul”, as it is through the love of ‘true philosophy’ that 
bothersome desires are eradicated (Epicurus 1975: 137). I argue that by ‘true philosophy’ Epicurus 
was referring to his own particular system of thought, since Timocrates, a former disciple, claimed 
that Epicurus was philosophically ignorant, and disrespectful of many of the Greek philosophers 
(Epicurus 1975: 145-7). In addition, Epicurus was of the opinion that the pupil simply needed an 
uncritical grasp of the fundamental presuppositions of his philosophy in order to benefit from it. 
Accordingly, he would likely have endorsed the study of his philosophy alone. While the Stoics also 
encourage their pupils to read their philosophical system, they also enjoin their pupils to read other 
philosophers. Reading other philosopher’s search for and discoveries in wisdom gives one: a 
profound understanding and appreciation of the entire philosophical enterprise; it enriches one’s 
outlook; and provides a source of encouragement for one’s own endeavours (Nussbaum 1994: 336).  
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Both schools advocate the use of rational argumentation as the cure for suffering. While desires and 
passions may be irrational, since they are cognitive they are deemed to be eliminable. Epicurus 
(1975: 59) maintains that through sober reasoning one could identify and eradicate “irrational belief 
and groundless imaginings” that lead to inner disturbances. If this did not work, Epicurus would 
prescribe “purgative arguments” (Nussbaum 1994: 125) to evacuate deeply entrenched beliefs and 
values. This would entail strong disapproval for the pupil’s beliefs and conduct, accompanied by 
reasons for the disapproval. The Stoics maintain that an application of reason is sufficient to cure the 
passions. While our initial involuntary response cannot be overcome by reason, it can be weakened 
through habit and practice. It is the second impulse that arises from a fault of judgment that can be 
removed by reason (Sharples 1996: 69). To this the Stoics advocate the application of ‘practical 
arguments’ to remove social conventions, diseases of prejudice, and bad conduct. This entails 
suspending habitual impulses and responses; identifying misconceptions; considering alternative 
options; and selecting the best option with a view to developing a logically consistent and coherent 
vision of the world (Nussbaum 1994: 334). In the case of both Epicureans and Stoics there is no 
single cure, no single method. Each case has to be treated on its own merits. Because we have 
different experiences and are moved in different ways, the doctor of the soul has to ‘feel the pulse’ 
of the patient in order to gauge what words would be most appropriate for them, and when best to 
administer them (Nussbaum 1994: 335). 
The Stoics advocate developing reason for more than therapeutic ends. Given their metaphysical 
view that the universe is pervaded and governed by reason, acting in accordance with nature is the 
same as acting according to reason. Since man’s nature is defined by reason, and reason alone can 
honour the reason within, the Stoics enjoin the pupil to perfect her reason. By improving our reason 
we “become good” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 17). Perfecting reason is possible since man and God 
possess the same nature. The difference between them is twofold. Firstly, God is immortal and man 
is not. Secondly, God is perfectly virtuous by nature, while man by practice (Seneca, in Long & Sedley 
1987:  60 H). In this respect it is assumed that virtue can be taught (Diogenes Laertius, in Long & 
Sedley 1987: 61 K).  
Self-examination is advocated by both schools, though to different ends. The Epicureans advocate an 
epistemic application of self-examination so that the pupil could access and assess her worldview, 
with a view to eradicating false beliefs that underlie desire. In contrast, the Stoics endorse a 
normative application of self-examination (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 10, 37). The pupil is required to 
think about the person she wants to be and the life she wants to live. In particular she is to enquire 
about her purpose in life (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 11). Purpose in life is central to the Stoic way of 
life. Since all things are designed with a purpose nothing should be undertaken without purpose 
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(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 2). Man’s purpose, informed by Stoic metaphysics, is twofold: he must 
revere his governing self and make himself acceptable to himself (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 16); and 
he must develop social connections and order so as to live harmoniously with others and in 
accordance with universal Nature (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 16).  
Both schools endorse use of the moral exemplar. The Epicurean ‘ethical witness’ and the Stoic 
‘perfect living creature’ are instantiations that permit us to discover the Good. More than this, they 
are existential exemplars, i.e. they provide a vision of how to live. Since the good and ill of 
reasonable creatures lies in their acting, Marcus Aurelius (1961: 9, 16, 29) instructs us to act 
according to Nature. In addition, Marcus Aurelius (1961: 6, 48) instructs that we seek out and 
identify virtuous people in our lives. Doing this will help to keep the virtues ready to hand. 
A particularly Epicurean practice is the enjoyment of pleasurable things. Epicurus (1975: 89) instructs 
us to take delight in the things we have. In particular, he advocates taking delight in simple things 
such as modest meals. Enjoying food is a bodily pleasure that is temporally restricted to the present. 
We are also told to enjoy pleasures of the mind. These are not temporally restricted, i.e. we can 
enjoy these pleasures in the present, contemplate past pleasures, and anticipate future pleasures 
(Long 1986: 67-8). Epicurus (1975: 83) advocates that we practice “grateful recollection” of our past 
rather than worry about an uncertain future. Remembering past happiness can dispel physical pain 
(Diogenes Laertius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 24 D).  
Both schools advocate repetition and memorization. Epicurus prescribes the repetition and 
memorization of the fundamentals of his philosophy as an essential practice. Repetition and 
memorization firmly roots the teachings into the depth of one’s soul (Nussbaum 1994: 132-3). 
Similarly, the Stoics advocate the memorization of their doctrines (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 21). 
Doctrines are “principles of thought, concerned both with Universal Nature and with man’s 
individual constitution” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 11, 5). Repetition and memorization helps to keep 
the doctrines ‘ready at hand’. Stoic doctrines include the ‘extirpation of the passions’; the ‘doctrine 
of independence’; and the ‘doctrine of divine providence’. While the Stoics present their doctrines 
as fixed and determinate, they do not insist that they be uncritically accepted. In accordance with 
their epistemic position, the pupil is encouraged to submit the doctrines to “scientific investigation” 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 10, 9); and that should something higher than the identified virtue be 
discovered that they should be adopted (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 3, 6). Given the central significance 
of the doctrines to the Stoic way of life I will elucidate each of them.   
The ‘extirpation of the passions’ is the principle by which the governing self takes control and rids 
itself of the passions. This doctrine reminds us that: since suffering is a matter of individual judgment 
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we are solely responsible for that suffering (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 11, 11); and that it is within our 
power to heal ourselves (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 9, 32). Since evil (and hurt) reside in the judgment of 
it, and not in the world itself (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 39), we are enjoined to not judge things to be 
evil. To this end, we are told to be indifferent to indifferent things (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 11, 16). 
The ‘doctrine of independence’ reminds us of that which is in our control – our thoughts, attitudes, 
responses and initiatives – and that which is beyond our control. Things that are beyond our control 
are indifferent. Indifferent things include: all things that affect the body; all activities that are not our 
own; all loss (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 36); past and future activities (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 32); 
“life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation … and their opposites, death, disease, 
pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty” (Diogenes Laertius Long & Sedley 1987: 58 A). Indifferent things 
affect all without discrimination and are neither right or wrong, good nor bad (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 
2, 11). We are reminded to pursue only those things that are within our power (Marcus Aurelius 
1961: 6, 32): our governing self.  
It is critical that the governing self be self-determined (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 2) in the sense that 
nothing must touch, turn or move it, but itself (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 19). This applies to internal 
and external internal forces. With respect to internal forces, the governing self is to rule over the 
other aspects of our constitution, to ensure that we are not swayed by our impulses and passions 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 3, 4). With respect to external forces, we are told to not look to other men 
for guidance, but must guide ourselves (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 55). It is possible to retain one’s 
freedom and act according to the dictates of another provided this is a matter of choice, and not 
coercion or force (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 16). Recognizing that we cannot always choose 
situations and circumstances, we are told: to meet obstacles with resignation and good-temper 
(Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 32); to be content with our present situation, and love the lot for which 
we were destined (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 57).  
The particular practice the Stoics prescribe here is withdrawal: to retreat into the quietness and 
privacy one’s own mind. This makes the governing self “invincible” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 48). On 
retreat the pupil should contemplate possible scenarios in advance (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 2, 1). This 
will prepare her to respond in the most appropriate way and will make her unshakeable in any 
eventuality (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 61). While this is merely an exercise of the imagination, it 
holds much power “for the soul is dyed by its imaginations. Dye it then in a succession of 
imaginations” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 5, 16). Moderation is crucial, and the pupil is instructed to rid 
herself of unnecessary imagination (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 29; 9, 7). In so doing, we keep 
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ourselves simple (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 26), and in simplicity discover tranquillity (Marcus 
Aurelius 1961: 4, 24; 7, 28).  
The ‘doctrine of divine providence’ reminds the pupil of the nature of the Whole and mankind’s 
relationship to it: the Universe is a singular entity with “one being and one soul” (Marcus Aurelius 
1961: 4, 40). This doctrine reminds the pupil of her purpose. Since all things are ‘woven together’, 
we are part of the whole (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 38), the pupil should be working toward a single 
end (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 6, 42) – “the Commonwealth” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 11, 21), i.e. that 
which contributes to the “general benefit and harmony” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 5). She should 
even be willing to sacrifice her life for that greater purpose (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 48). The 
doctrine of divine providence reminds the pupil that acceptance is the appropriate response to life. 
She is to accept what befalls her as a matter of fate (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 4, 26), for they occur as a 
result of a larger design, something that “is to the advantage of the Whole” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 
6, 45). To this end the pupil is required to love and welcome her fate.  
The Hellenistic schools advocate a range of social practices. The Epicureans advocate the practice of 
confession, since they recognize that self-examination could be impeded by a lack of transparency 
and unconsciously held beliefs. Confession entails the articulation of the truth, as well as the 
affirmation that one believes in the truth that is articulated, a process in which truth and truth teller 
are intricately connected. Truth-telling provides the teacher full access to the pupil’s inner most 
thoughts, dreams and desires. Much like in the modern therapeutic session, the Epicurean practice 
of the confession occurs in an asymmetrical relationship between the master and pupil.     
The Stoics endorse the practice of conversation. While they were proficient readers of philosophy, 
like Plato, they regarded philosophical text as inferior to conversation. While one can have an 
intellectual conversation with a virtual stranger, Nussbaum (1994: 337) regards Stoic conversation, 
in particular, as something that occurs between friends who have an intimate knowledge of one 
another. This is where the practice of truth-telling comes in to play, though unlike the Epicurean 
application, this would occur in an egalitarian relationship of symmetry.   
An associated skill that is necessary to have an authentic conversation is listening. Marcus Aurelius 
(1961: 6, 53) describes listening as being attentive to what the other speaker is saying; that the 
listener be “in the mind of the speaker”. This requires stilling one’s own thoughts when another is 
speaking. A silent mind will allow the listener’s mind to “gain an entrance into what is occurring and 
who is producing it” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 30). Listening is not a one-sided affair, but is to be 
practiced by all parties in the interaction – both philosopher and pupil (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 61).  
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I argue that many of the practices advocated by the Stoics and Epicureans are already utilized by 
philosophical practitioners. These include: studying philosophy, rational argumentation, self-
knowledge, the moral exemplar, conversation and listening. Practices the Hellenists advocate that 
are not evidenced in philosophical practice literature include enjoying simple pleasures, 
memorization and repetition, and confession. All these practices would likely be relevant to 
philosophical practice that was directed at the goal of character development.   
One might object that both schools endorsing the same practices undermines the argument that 
these schools offer divergent philosophical ways of life. One response to this is that not all the 
practices are shared, and those that are shared have distinct differences. For example while both 
Stoics and Epicureans endorse the practice of self-examination, the Stoics apply it to normative 
ends, while the Epicureans for epistemic purposes. One might argue that these differences are not 
significant enough to offer a defence to the objection. To this I reply that the divergence argument 
was made on the basis of philosophical differences (metaphysical and ethical) and not 
methodological ones. If anything shared methods between divergent philosophical ways of life is an 
affirmation of their application potential. In no way should this be taken as a statement of their 
contemporary efficacy. This is something that would have to be tested and corroborated in practice. 
3.6 Roles of the Philosopher and Pupil 
In this section I will explore the roles the Stoics and Epicureans assign to the philosopher and pupil. 
The role assigned to the philosopher include the sage, teacher of critical thinking and friend. These 
roles have application potential in philosophical practice. In particular, I will argue that the role of 
philosopher as friend is an appropriate relationship to have between practitioner and participant.   
The Stoics and Epicureans share a vision of the philosopher as sage. The sage has the capacity to 
access a “cosmic perspective” (Hadot 1995: 226): to see the “totality of the cosmos” (Hadot 1995: 
226), the infinite, from within the finite (Hadot 1995: 58). Since everyday living results in us 
transforming and reducing the world into useful objects that exist purely to serve us, we fail to see 
the world as it is (Hadot 1995: 258). The world qua world can only be accessed once the mind had 
been freed from egocentricity and its temporal concerns (Hadot 1995: 259). To this end the sage had 
to free herself from public opinion (Long & Sedley 1987: 456), and experience “a rupture with ... 
everyday life” (Hadot 1995: 56).  
I contend that this cosmic perspective is endorsed by some philosophical practitioners. Lahav (2008: 
13) describes it as “a certain broad attitude to life”; and Tukiainen (2011: 49) as a “disinterested 
perception of life and the universe”. 
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It is questionable whether practitioner and participant alike would find the role of the sage 
desirable. Being exempt from ordinary opinion and separated from ordinary life might provide the 
philosopher insights and freedom, it could also have an alienating effect on her if she was perceived 
and treated by others as an outsider. Moreover, while assuming such a stance might give the 
philosophical practitioner good insights into the participant’s outlook and life, such insights could be 
too stark and cutting for the participant, making the encounter have an unsettling or destabilizing 
effect. Admittedly this would be unproblematic for practitioners such as Achenbach and Schuster. 
It is questionable whether such a role is achievable. While the image of the sage stood as an 
exemplar to philosophers, a “living, concrete model” (Hadot 1995: 147) to aspire towards, it is 
unlikely the philosopher would ever become one. Hadot (1995: 57) regards the sage to be an almost 
inaccessible “transcendent ideal”, which if attained was not only “rare” but momentary and 
“fleeting”.  
Aside from this point of convergence, the Hellenistic schools assign divergent roles to the 
philosopher and pupil. The Stoic philosopher is tasked with training the pupil to become her own 
doctor and teacher. To this end the philosopher would have to guide the pupil through a process of 
self-examination with a view to helping her access beliefs and values, as well as fears and habits. In 
this respect the philosopher would need intimate knowledge of the pupil’s constitution and outlook, 
as well as her history and situation (Nussbaum 1994: 330-3). In addition, the philosopher would have 
to show the pupil how to identify misconceptions, passions and false beliefs, as well as eradicate 
them. The philosopher would have to be a proficient, sensitive and persistent arguer so that her 
therapeutic arguments would move and change the soul of the pupil. By extension, the Stoics 
require the pupil to adopt an active life committed to the pursuit of truth (Nussbaum 1994: 353). 
Because they regard each person to be born with the capacity to reason, each person is deemed to 
be her own authority, and is responsible for refining and developing her capacity to reason and 
determining what is right for her. To this end the pupil is expected to think things through for 
herself. She is required to be an autonomous, critical thinker (Nussbaum 1994: 341).  
Since philosophical practitioners would likely agree that preserving and developing autonomy is an 
essential feature of philosophical practice, I argue that the roles the Stoics assign to practitioner and 
pupil are appropriate to philosophical practice. However, since Stoic roles are encapsulated in a 
Socratic vision of philosophizing, and are already evident in philosophical practice, they offer nothing 
new.  
In contrast, to the Stoic philosopher, the Epicurean master was assertive, aggressive, dominant and 
authoritative. She was dogmatic in her outlook, highly critical of what others had to say and had no 
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trouble publically humiliating her pupils (Nussbaum 1994: 125). By extension, the Epicurean pupil 
was required to be passive to the degree that she relinquish her autonomy and critical thought. 
Epicurus maintained that the pupil could receive the benefit of his philosophy by merely applying the 
results of philosophical inquiry, rather than inquiry itself. Accordingly, the pupil was required to 
exercise total acceptance of Epicurean’s teachings, and she was expected to be devoted and 
obedient to her master (Nussbaum 1994: 130).  
Since these roles do not encourage or support the development of autonomy in the participant I 
argue that they are not applicable to philosophical practice. Since these roles are not underwritten 
by the Epicurean philosophical system, our rejection of them does not require that we reject the 
Epicurean way of life or the contributions an Epicurean way of life might make to philosophical 
practice.  
Both schools recognize the value of friendship. Epicurus (1975: 101) proclaims friendship to be the 
greatest possession of the blessed life, and the greatest thing that wisdom can bestow (Long & 
Sedley 1987: 22 E). In addition, he places friendship alongside wisdom as a pursuit worthy of the 
noble soul (Epicurus 1975: 119). Cicero (in Long & Sedley 1987: 22 O) regards friendship as a duty of 
the philosopher (in Long & Sedley 1987: 22 O). He describes friendship as a genuinely altruistic 
relationship in which we rejoice as much in their pleasures as we do our own, and the same as for 
sorrow. 
I argue that friendship is an appropriate relationship for philosophical practice. Tuedio (2003) 
recognizes the importance of empathetic bonds between practitioner and participant, and so would 
endorse relationships of friendship. If a goal of philosophical practice is the attainment of well-being, 
and we can agree that community is an essential feature for attaining well-being, and that we find 
friendship in community, then surely friendship is an aspect by which well-being is attained. 
Friendship presupposes a relationship of empathy, care and support. This is most likely to occur in a 
relationship of equals. In accordance with this, I argue that the Stoic teacher / pupil relationship, 
that is symmetrical and anti-authoritarian, at the very least permits the possibility of friendship. In 
contrast, I argue that the Epicurean master and pupil could not enter into a genuine friendship. Since 
their relationship is fundamentally asymmetrical and authoritarian (Nussbaum 1994: 32 9), it 
presents more as a relationship between parent and child rather than between equals.  
3.7 Metaphysics: realist 
Since a philosophical way of life is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system, a genuine 
understanding and appreciation of that way of life demands that we understand its metaphysics. In 
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this section I will explore the realist metaphysics of the Stoics and Epicureans, which developed in 
direct response to their idealist predecessors. Wallace (1880) regards Plato and Aristotle as 
representing varying forms and degrees of idealism in the sense that they place thought and idea at 
the centre of ‘true existence’. They attempted to discover the plan and meaning of the world, seeing 
“everything in nature and in humanity as the realization of an idea, as a stage in the unfolding of a 
ruling principle” (Wallace 1880: 3). For Plato, the founding principle is the ‘idea of the Good’; for 
Aristotle, it is ‘intelligent Nature’ (Wallace 1880: 3). The Hellenists reject many of the metaphysical 
concepts central to Plato and Aristotle (Long 1986: 19). In particular, they deny the foundations of 
the Platonic and Aristotelian world-picture (Long 1986; 40). In rejecting the idea that universals have 
an independent existence, they reject the Platonic forms; and in rejecting final causes, they 
renounce Aristotelian teleology (Long 1986: 20). Despite both offering realist metaphysics I will 
argue that these schools posit divergent views: the Stoics advocate a transcendent view of the 
universe that is characterized by change; while the Epicureans promote an immanent view of a fixed 
and unchanging universe.  
Epicurus (in Long & Sedley 1987: 5 A) promotes an atomistic view of the world that is solely 
constituted by bodies and void. Since bodies are made up of atomic compounds, which are 
permanent and unalterable (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 8 A), the world is considered to be 
fixed and unchanging (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 4 A). Void, which exists between and within 
bodies, makes movement and growth possible (Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 6 A). Atoms move 
continuously (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 11 A) and in a random manner (Lucretius, in Long & 
Sedley 1987: 11 H) referred to as ‘atomic swerve’. This accounts for the diversity of matter in nature 
(Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 11 H), and allows for unpredictability in an otherwise causally 
deterministic universe. It also accounts for free will (Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 20 F), which 
ensures that the “necessity of fate is avoided” (Cicero, in Long & Sedley 1987: 20 E). It is 
questionable whether introducing atomic swerve provides a reliable account for responsible choice. 
Since atomic swerves account for deviations at an atomic level, and these movements are random, it 
would seem that a case can be for arbitrary behaviour rather than freely chosen behaviour.  
Since all that exists are bodies and void, there is no third substance (Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 
1987: 7 A). Accordingly, secondary properties, such as mind, personal identity and soul, are deemed 
to be parasitic on matter; and the existence of the Gods are denied, or at least their involvement in 
any and all natural events (Long 1986: 41). Denying the existence of the Gods is a crucial step as 
Epicurus (1975: 53) attributes the primary cause of mental disturbances to irrational beliefs in the 
Gods and an afterlife of eternal damnation. In place of a world governed by intelligent design and 
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intension, the Epicureans see the world as the product of random and accidental atomic collisions 
(Long & Sedley 1987: 6).  
The Stoics present a similar, though more complex, metaphysic that incorporates Epicurean ‘bodies 
and void’. Bodies are finite (Stobaeus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 49 A) and are the only things that can 
act or be acted upon (Sextus Empiricus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 45B). Bodies are composed out of, 
and dissolve back into, the elements: fire, water, air and earth (Stobaeus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 47 
A). Void is the incorporeal and infinite (Galen, in Long & Sedley 1987: 49 E). All bodies are governed 
by two fundamental principles (Diogenes Laertius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 44 B): a passive principle 
(matter) which is inert and formless; and an active principle (universal reason), which is “divine and 
everlasting” (Sextus Empiricus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 44 C) and “governs the Universe” (Marcus 
Aurelius 1961: 4, 46). Since matter is continuous, and universal reason causes things to be what they 
are, all things are instances of combinations of active and passive principles (Sharples 1996: 46). The 
range of possible combinations is unlimited, such that the fundamental nature of the Universe is 
change (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 8, 6).  
The Stoics recognize God as the ultimate active principle. God is the creative force (Aetius, in Long & 
Sedley 1987: 46 A), “immortal and rational ... but not anthropomorphic” (Diogenes Laertius, in Long 
& Sedley 1987: 54 A). The Stoics present a pantheistic conception of God in all things: there is “one 
God through all, one substance and one law, one common Reason of all intelligent creatures and 
one truth” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 7, 9). It is such that Marcus Aurelius enjoins us to think of the 
Universe as a one creature with one soul (1961: 4, 40). In accordance with this, the human soul is 
absorbed back into God when we die, and as such there is no life after death. Since God is the world 
and universal reason, all things that happen are ordained (Cicero, in Long & Sedley 1987: 54 C). It is 
such that the Stoics considered the universe to be “ordered by divine providence” (Marcus Aurelius 
1961: xiii).  
While the Stoics and Epicureans endorse a realist metaphysic, I argue that they hold divergent 
metaphysical views. The Epicureans endorse an atomistic view of the world as fixed and unchanging. 
They dismiss the idea of a transcendent being, or at least deny God’s involvement in the world. They 
do not provide an account of intelligence, and understand life to be random and deterministic. In 
light of the above I read Epicurean metaphysics as immanent. In contrast, the Stoics regard the 
nature of the universe to be change. They endorse a pantheistic view in that they and see God 
(reason) as the organizing principle in all things. This permits them to understand all things and 
events as being ordered by divine providence. In light of this I read Stoic metaphysics as 
transcendent.  
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In light of the above, and given that metaphysics informs ethics, it follows as a matter of necessity 
that the Epicureans offer an immanent ethic and the Stoics offer a transcendent ethic. This 
corroborates my argument in section 2.2. Since Epicureans offer an immanent ethic and metaphysic 
I contend that they offer an immanent philosophical way of life. Since the Stoics offer a transcendent 
ethic and metaphysic they can be understood to offer a transcendent philosophical way of life.  
If it is the case that a philosophical way of life is a self-contained and coherent system, then surely its 
application would depend upon the acceptance of all its parts. One might object that Stoic and 
Epicurean metaphysics are so far from contemporary views that neither would be accepted; and by 
extension, their philosophical ways of life are inapplicable.  
There are number of ways to respond to this concern. Firstly, since metaphysic informs the ethical 
way of life the participant is required to understand the metaphysic, not believe every aspect of it. 
While Epicurus required his pupil to uncritically accept his fundamental philosophical 
presuppositions, this was not the case with the Stoics, who encouraged the pupil to critically engage 
with their teachings, rather than simply accept them. Secondly, granted that Hellenistic metaphysics 
may not have wholesale accord with contemporary metaphysical views does not mean that they 
would not be accepted by all. Given that I am not endorsing any one particular philosophical way of 
life, but instead exploring a range of possibilities, that some may accept the Hellenistic metaphysics 
would make them applicable. Thirdly, I could defend the project and avoid the application concern 
altogether. My primary interest is with seeing what these philosophical ways of life have to offer 
philosophical practice, not the participant. In particular, I am interested in how they might to change 
the face of philosophical practice. In this respect the concern for relevance can be abstracted from 
the concern of application.  
3.8 Epistemology: empiricism 
Since a philosophical way of life is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system, its 
epistemology is intimately implicated in that way of life. Accordingly, understanding and 
appreciation of that way of life demands that we understand its epistemic stance. In this section I 
will show that the Stoics and Epicureans endorse empiricist epistemologies, such that knowledge of 
the world is obtained through the senses. The Stoic’s and Epicurean’s empiricist epistemology 
developed in direct opposition to “the kind of logical analysis characteristic of Platonic and 
Aristotelian methodology” (Long 1986: 19). I will argue that an empiricist orientation might 
introduce an experimental element to philosophical practice that might change how and where it is 
practiced. 
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Knowledge of the world is gained through the senses. The Stoics regard the impressions (sense 
experience) as the criteria for truth (Diogenes Laertius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 39 A; Aetius, in Long 
& Sedley 1987: 39 B). The Epicureans admit three criteria of truth: sensations (sense experience), 
preconceptions (concepts associated with objects) and feelings (the experience of being acted on, 
and the experience of pleasure and pain) (Long & Sedley 1987: 89-90).  
Both schools regard knowledge from the senses to be infallible. Given that sensory information is 
perceived directly, independently of reason or memory, such information is commensurate with the 
object of source (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 15 A). Since nothing can refute a sensation – 
neither the other senses, nor reason, nor another sensation (Diogenes Laertius, in Long & Sedley 
1987: 16 B) – sensation is perfectly reliable (Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 16 A). 
Despite asserting the reliability of the senses, they recognize the possibility of error. While all 
impressions are true, judgements that we make of impressions can vary (Epicurus, in Long & Sedley 
1987: 15 A). Errors of knowledge do not lie in the senses or in the sense organs, but in the mind that 
misperceives (Sextus Empiricus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 16 E). This illustrates that the senses are not 
the sole source of knowledge. The Stoics recognize that mind played an important role. Impressions 
depend not only on the senses and the object that is perceived, but also on the mind that assents 
through reason (Sextus Empiricus, in Long & Sedley 1987: 40 L). While the Epicureans recognize 
reason, they did not regard it as a separate faculty, but instead to be a “the product of the senses” 
(Lucretius, in Long & Sedley 1987: 16 A).  
That knowledge is derived primarily from the senses implies that truths are to be discovered 
experientially, rather than by rational reflection, or by studying books (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 2, 2-3). 
We are instructed to explore the nature of the world, and to methodologically test each thing by 
scientific method and by logic (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 3, 11; 8, 13). Since approaching knowledge in 
this way was deemed to produce an elevated mind and “greatness of mind” (Marcus Aurelius 1961: 
10, 11; 3, 11) I argue that an application of Hellenistic epistemology is a tool of self-cultivation, and is 
thus directly implicated in character development.   
I argue that an empiricist orientation might introduce an experimental element to philosophical 
practice that might change how and where it is practiced. Participants wouldn’t simply discuss ideas, 
they would be encouraged to experiment with those ideas in practice, to see which stood up to 
rigorous testing. Not only would this shift the content of discussions, away from the abstract and 
general toward the particular and practicable; it might change the context in which philosophical 
practice occurs, shifting it out of the office and into the world.  
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One might object that Hellenistic epistemology is informed by concepts and ideas that are not only 
outdated but are incorrect. For example, Epicurus’ (in Long & Sedley 1987: 15 A) account of how 
impressions are formed: that atoms stream in “continuous flow from the surface of bodies ... (at) 
unsurpassed speed” to the senses.  
While it may be the case that some of their ideas and explanations might be at odds with 
contemporary views, I do not regard this as an impediment as an application of their empiricism 
does not rest on these particular incorrect views. Moreover, I regard their empirical orientation that 
encourages experimentation to be well suited to our age that regards science as a reputable source 
of knowledge.  
3.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored the contributions the Stoics and Epicureans might make to philosophical 
practice. I argued that they offer philosophical ways of life. Since a philosophical way of life is a self-
contained and coherent system, explicating the primary parts (ethics, metaphysics and 
epistemology) provides a rich understanding of their respective philosophical systems.   
I argued that the ethical ways of life offered by these philosophical schools are practically relevant to 
philosophical practice. I argued that the Hellenistic transformative aspiration to be happy could 
serve as a directive in philosophical practice that was orientated toward a Hellenistic philosophical 
way of life. I argued that character development could be a bona fide transformative project in 
philosophical practice. 
I argued that the Hellenistic practices would likely be relevant to philosophical practice that was 
directed at the goal of character development. I acknowledged that many of the practices advocated 
by the Stoics and Epicureans are already utilized by philosophical practitioners. These include: 
studying philosophy, rational argumentation, self-knowledge, the moral exemplar, conversation and 
listening. Practices the Hellenists advocate that are not evidenced in philosophical practice literature 
include enjoying simple pleasures, memorization and repetition, and confession.  
I argued that the roles the Stoics assign to practitioner and pupil are appropriate to philosophical 
practice as they encourage the development of autonomy. However, I acknowledged that since Stoic 
roles are encapsulated in a Socratic vision of philosophizing, and are already evident in philosophical 
practice, they offer nothing new. I argued that Epicurean roles are not applicable to philosophical 
practice as they do not encourage or support the development of autonomy in the participant. 
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I argued that friendship is an appropriate relationship for the practitioner and participant. I argued 
that friendship is most likely to occur in a symmetrical and anti-authoritarian relationship. The 
personal commitment necessary for a friendship requires personal input, the sharing of feelings and 
experiences. This is a fundamentally different stance to that of the Socratic gadfly, which values 
reason and objectivity and merely requires an intellectual investment from the practitioner. 
I contend that Hellenistic metaphysics is intellectually relevant to philosophical practice. I argued 
that understanding Stoic and Epicurean metaphysics is integral to their respective philosophical ways 
of life, as their ethical ways of life are underpinned and informed by their metaphysical outlooks. 
Since understanding does not require belief, I argued that it is not necessary for the practitioner and 
participant to wholeheartedly accept Hellenistic metaphysics in order to live and benefit from their 
respective philosophical ways of life.   
Philosophical practice that is informed by Hellenistic philosophy is likely to make contributions that 
could change the face of philosophical practice. I argued that the epistemic position of the Stoics and 
Epicureans, which has a distinctive empiricist orientation, would likely introduce an experimental 
element to philosophical practice that might change how and where it is practiced.  
I argued that the Hellenistic orientation toward community could have significant implications for 
philosophical practice. It might alter the way philosophy is practiced, shifting it away from a model 
that appears to have a narrow focus on the individual, which manifests in one-on-one session, 
toward group sessions.  
I argued that incorporating a therapeutic dimension focused on understanding and ameliorating 
suffering would significantly develop philosophical practice. Having an intrinsic as well as an 
instrumental orientation would expand the range of application of philosophical practice. 
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Chapter Four 
Kant and Dewey 
The intention of this dissertation is to contribute to the development of philosophical practice. An 
examination of the philosophical practice literature revealed a domain constituted by an array of 
approaches that posit a diversity of ends and surprisingly few means. I argued that all the 
approaches to philosophical practice can be understood as facets of a singular vision of philosophy 
as phronetic: practical wisdom that brings about / increases well-being. I argued that a Socratic 
vision of philosophizing is the predominant means in philosophical practice and that it is insufficient 
to attain phronetic ends. I associated philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a 
way of life; and, by extension, assume that any philosophy that accords with such a conception could 
be relevant to philosophical practice. In this chapter I will explore the contributions Kant and Dewey 
might make to philosophical practice.   
While neither Kant nor Dewey are typically read as offering a philosophical way of life, I argue that 
these philosophers conceive of their work in this way. Kant (1996: 509) draws a distinction between 
a professional philosopher, as an intellectual expert, and a practical philosopher who lives in 
accordance with his moral dictates; and he endorses practical philosophy – that we exercise “moral 
wisdom” (Kant 1991: 45). Wisdom entails harmonizing our will with our final end as moral beings 
(Kant 1996: 562). Dewey describes his mode of philosophizing as “an experimental philosophy of 
life” (Dewey 2004: 125). I argue that they offer philosophical ways of life as they satisfy the five 
criteria of a philosophical way of life. I argue that Kant and Dewey satisfy the first criterion as they 
would advocate the aspiration to ‘be good’ (section 4.1). I argue that they satisfy the second 
criterion as Kant endorses the transformative project of cultivating the spirit, while Dewey endorses 
the transformative project of self-reconstruction (section 4.2). I argue that they satisfy the third 
criterion (a holistic vision of philosophizing) as they recognize the cognitive and non-cognitive 
dimensions of the individual. While Kant endorses that reason should rule over inclinations and 
desires, he also maintains that we should develop moral feelings (section 4.2). Dewey recognizes the 
intellectual and bodily dimensions of experience (section 4.7). Moreover, his ‘method of inquiry’, 
which appears to be a predominantly intellectual activity (section 4.5), contains an essential pre-
reflective dimension (section 4.9). I argue that they satisfy the fourth criterion as they provide 
transformative tools (section 4.5). I argue that they satisfy the fifth criterion as they offer self-
contained and coherent philosophical systems. Kant’s transformative project of cultivating the spirit 
and his transformative aspiration are underwritten by a transcendent metaphysic (section 4.7) and 
an idealist epistemology (section 4.8). Dewey’s transformative project of self-reconstruction and 
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moral criterion of growth are underwritten by a naturalistic metaphysic (section 4.7); and his 
‘method of inquiry’ is informed by his pragmatic epistemology (section 4.8). Schuster (1999a: 31) 
corroborates my claim by recognizing that Kant and Dewey embody the conception of philosophy as 
a way of life. 
There are good reasons for pairing these philosophers: Kant and Dewey share the aspiration to ‘be 
good’; they implicate education in the transformative process; their respective philosophical ways of 
life have a strong social orientation; their philosophical ways of life have an aesthetic-epistemic 
element; yet despite these commonalities, they offer divergent philosophical ways of life.  
Firstly, Kant and Dewey share the transformative aspiration to ‘be good’. I read ‘being good’ in terms 
of living in accordance with the intellect, and acting in accordance with an ethical principle. Both 
promote the development of the intellect as a necessary component of the transformative process, 
and both endorse living in accordance with an ethical principle. Since Kant places moral law and 
acting in accordance with duty at the centre of his philosophical way of life, he is widely recognized 
as a deontologist. Since Dewey considers outcomes that positively affect the general welfare as 
morally significant (Dewey 1922: 44) he can be regarded as a consequentialist. 
Secondly, Kant and Dewey implicate education in the transformative process. Kant’s project of 
transformation requires that the individual act in accordance with duty. The duty to beneficence 
requires that we remove obstacles from the path of others so that they may embark on their own 
transformative process. One way to achieve this is that we educate others so that they may realize 
themselves as freely chosen ends. Dewey promotes education as a necessary component of 
transforming the self and society. 
Thirdly, both philosophers implicate social engagement in their transformative projects. Kant’s duty 
to beneficence could mean contributing a portion of our salaries to socially orientated charities. 
Dewey’s transformative project is intimately connected to social-reconstruction. Since self is a social 
product, we have to actively reconstruct society to bring about a transformation of self. This is likely 
to manifest in active political involvement.  
Fourthly, both develop aesthetics as central components of their philosophies. I argue that these 
have an epistemic application in their philosophical ways of life, i.e. aesthetic perception provides a 
way of knowing how to live. For Kant aesthetic perception provides the means to develop moral 
feeling, which inspires us to hold duty sacred and act in accordance with the moral law. Dewey’s 
‘aesthetic experience’ providing an account of a unified, problem-free experience. Moreover, 
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aesthetic experience is implicated in his problem-solving process, and hence is central to the 
reconstructive process.   
Despite the common ground I argue that Kant provides a transcendent philosophical way of life as I 
read his ethic and metaphysic as transcendent. In contrast I argue that Dewey offers an immanent 
philosophical way of life as I read his ethic and metaphysic as immanent.   
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the particular contributions Kant and Dewey could make to 
philosophical practice. I will begin by exploring the ethical ways of life they offer, which include their 
transformative aspirations, projects and practices. I will then explore their respective metaphysics 
and epistemologies.   
In section 4.1 I will argue that Kant and Dewey share the transformative aspiration to be good. Both 
philosophers place significant emphasis on developing the intellect. Moreover, both endorse living in 
accordance with ethical principles. Kant promotes autonomy as the highest good and advocates 
living in accordance with moral law. Dewey promotes growth as the sole moral criterion. I will argue 
that these aspirations could serve as moral directives to philosophical practice that adopts these 
philosophical ways of life. 
In section 4.2 I will explore the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey. Kant advocates 
cultivating the spirit, and Dewey advocates self-reconstruction. I will argue that these transformative 
projects could be relevant to philosophical practice. 
In section 4.3 I will explore the element of social development associated with the philosophies of 
Kant and Dewey. I will argue that this element could introduce a novel active political element into 
philosophical practice. 
In section 4.4 I will show that education is a necessary component of Kant’s and Dewey’s 
transformative projects. I will argue that this notion of education could fundamentally change the 
practice of philosophical practice. 
In section 4.5 I will explore the transformative tools advocated by Kant and Dewey. I will argue that 
since Kant’s practices, which include catechism, the moral exemplar, critical reasoning and 
contemplation, are documented in philosophical practice literature, he offers nothing new to 
philosophical practice. I will argue that Dewey’s ‘method of inquiry’ offers a new mode of practice 
that could change philosophical practice. 
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In section 4.6 I will explore the range of roles associated with the philosophies of Kant and Dewey. I 
will argue that many of these role, which include: teacher, Socratic gadfly, social critic, custodian and 
disseminator of ideas, meaning maker, are conventional philosophical roles, and as such offer 
nothing new to philosophical practice. I will argue that Kant’s ‘friend’, and Dewey’s ‘moral prophet’ 
are new roles available to the philosophical practitioner.  
In section 4.7 I will detail the transcendent metaphysics of Kant and the naturalistic metaphysic of 
Dewey. I will argue that since their metaphysical stances are intimately implicated in their respective 
transformative agendas, explicating them will be integral to understanding their philosophical ways 
of life.  
In section 4.8 I will outline the idealist epistemology of Kant, which underpins his transcendent 
metaphysics. I will outline the pragmatist epistemology of Dewey that informs his method of inquiry.  
In section 4.9 I will explore the aesthetics of Kant and Dewey. This aesthetic dimension is significant 
as it introduces aesthetic modalities into their philosophical ways of life. I will argue that the 
aesthetics of Kant and Dewey might interject a novel pre-conceptual, non-discursive element into 
philosophical practice.      
4.1 Transformative Aspiration: ‘be good’  
In this section I argue that Kant and Dewey share the aspiration to ‘be good’. This entails living in 
accordance with the intellect and acting in accordance with an ethical principle. I will show that Kant 
regards autonomy as the Good. This is the capacity to determine how one should live by reason 
alone. In accordance with this he offers the moral law in the form of the Categorical Imperative. I will 
show that Dewey promotes growth as the Good. Growth occurs when the individual acquires a 
greater number of intellectual and emotional capacities and abilities, which permits her to have 
more positive and meaningful experiences; and when people have a greater number of shared 
experiences, which improves the general welfare by increasing social unity.    
Kant regards the realization of autonomy as the Good (Guyer 2006: 353). He refers to autonomy as 
the “ultimate wisdom” (Kant 1996: 562), when our will is harmonized with our final end as moral 
beings. He also refers to autonomy as a “regulative … principle of speculative reason” (Kant 1996: 
376). Autonomy is the capacity to set our own unconditioned, yet, necessary ends (Kant 2000: 302). 
Our moral capacity is a matter of necessity – it is an inescapable feature of the structure of our mind. 
We possess the capacity to create moral laws through pure reason alone, independent of particular 
ends and personal interests and desires. While Kant is critical of using pure reason (contemplation 
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independent of the sensible world) to derive theoretical knowledge, he recognizes that it has the 
capacity “to be of itself practical” (Kant 1991: 42). The purpose of the human mind (reason) is 
therefore satisfied, in the practical sense, by generating moral determinations. Not only are we able 
to determine what is right and wrong, we are able to willingly place ourselves under obligation (Kant 
1996: 543). Since this is something we can either choose to commit to it, or not to commit to it, we 
are good or evil through choice (Guyer 2006: 226). In choosing to place ourselves under moral 
obligation we free ourselves from the domination of inclination and desire. This give us a special 
dignity or unconditional value (Kant 1996: 269-70).  
Through understanding alone we are able to conceive of practical principles, or the moral law (Kant 
1996: 376). Moral law is presented in the form of a general maxim, or Categorical Imperative (CI). 
There are several formulations of the CI. These include the ‘Formula of Universal Law’, the ‘Formula 
of Humanity as an End in Itself’, and the ‘Formula of Autonomy. Since I restrict expression of the 
formulations to those presented in the Metaphysics of Morals, I do not mention the ‘Formula of the 
Law of Nature’ and the ‘Formula of the Kingdom of Ends’. This is unproblematic as all formulations 
can be derived from the ‘Formula of Autonomy’ (Guyer 2006: 191). The ‘Formula of Universal Law’ 
claims that which we will should be willed as a universal law (Kant 1996: 73). Moral law must be 
unconditionally valid for all rational beings such that any rational being would choose to act in 
accordance with it. The ‘Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself’ recognises that humans have the 
capacity to form their own intentions and create their own ends (Kant 1996: 86). At the heart of this 
maxim lies respect for free choice and free action of all, permitting everyone to choose their own 
particular ends, without interference of others, and to preserve their capacity to choose. The 
‘Formula of Autonomy’ recognizes each rational being as capable of being a law unto itself, to 
determine universal laws independently of its own or another’s inclinations, expressed through 
maxims it freely determines, and which could be freely accepted by everyone else (Kant 1996: 82).   
I argue that Kant’s notion of autonomy and the moral law might be relevant to philosophical practice 
that endorses a Kantian philosophical way of life. One may object that prescribing Kant’s moral laws 
to the participant would undermine his own philosophical position – that reason is sufficient to 
determine how we should live. Surely if we endorsed Kant’s philosophical position we would 
encourage the participant to develop her own moral laws. Kant might respond that since his moral 
laws are what any rational agent would conceive, the participant would arrive at them, provided she 
was perfectly rational. In this respect, he might suggest that the participant determine the moral law 
for her herself, under the guidance of the practitioner. Such an exercise would simultaneously 
respect participant autonomy and encourage its development.    
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Dewey offers growth as the Good. Growth is synonymous with: an “ever-enduring process of 
perfecting, maturing, refining” (Dewey 1920: 177); improvement, progress and “the continuous 
reconstruction of experience” (Dewey 1920: 184). Growth is the purpose of life, and the ultimate 
end of human activity. It is growth that permits us to transform our situations, and through 
encountering and addressing problems, we grow. Accordingly, to embody and attain growth is to 
have a fulfilling life (Campbell 1995: 135-6).  
Dewey (1920: 177) identifies growth as the sole criterion of moral worth. Life is experienced as a 
series of problems. The intellect (in terms of deliberation) plays the pivotal role in resolving 
problems. It is through deliberation that we can test each possible option in the imagination to 
determine which course of action would best resolve the problem. The course of action that elicits 
the most growth (with respect to the person I am re-creating and the world I am re-making) would 
be the best course of action.  
Growth can be understood to occur at two levels. Internal growth occurs when the individual 
acquires new capacities and dispositions. These could include the enhancement of knowledge, an 
increase in one’s intellectual and emotional dispositions, and an increase in sensitivity or 
appreciative capacity (Kanne 1988: 1220). The acquisition of new capacities and dispositions 
improves one’s ability to overcome problems and have meaningful interactions. External growth 
occurs when the individual falls back into step with the rhythm of the world and a sense of harmony 
and flow is restored. It also occurs when there is an increased capacity for people to share 
experiences. Shared experiences contribute to increased meaning between people, which leads to a 
greater sense of unity. 
I argue that growth might be relevant to philosophical practice that is inspired by Dewey’s 
philosophical way of life. One might object that Dewey’s conception of growth is vague and as such 
is an inadequate transformative aspiration. I offer two responses to this. Firstly, I contend that even 
if Dewey’s notion of the Good might be devoid of content, this does not render it unsuitable. Fahey 
(2002) explains that the Good cannot be objectified as it is “the pre-reflective background” to 
choices that we make. He forges a link between practical deliberation and one’s character: the Good 
guides practical deliberation (i.e. we choose that which improves meaning and our interactions with 
the world); it is also a product, or expression of one’s character. In this respect the Good is not 
separate from one’s attitudes, desires and judgements. Since the Good encompasses one’s entire 
character, it possesses a motivational force. Secondly, I challenge the claim that Dewey’s notion of 
the Good is vague. Greater clarity on the Good will be achieved in the sections that discuss Dewey’s 
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notion of self-reconstruction (section 3.2), social-reconstruction (section 3.3), and his metaphysics 
(section 3.7).    
4.2 Transformative Projects: cultivating one’s spirit; self-reconstruction  
In this section I will explore the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey. Kant promotes the 
project of cultivating one’s spirit. This entails developing our intellect (reason), while controlling our 
inclinations and subduing our affect and passions. Dewey (1920: 176) promotes the project of self-
reconstruction. This entails the realization of personal potential by harnessing our capacities and 
dispositions, with the view to making ourselves better. Both philosophers recognize that personal 
improvement is an ongoing and continuous process (Kant 1996: 515; Dewey 1920: 176). 
Kant (1996: 17) advocates that each of us cultivate our own spirit. This means using one’s own 
reason to direct oneself. To this end we have to develop free and independent thought that is 
purified of error (Kant 1996: 20). Such errors include misconception, faulty reasoning, external 
authority, and narrow self-interest. These errors arise as a result of poor judgement (Guyer 2006: 
165). It is our task to guard against such misunderstandings, misapplications and misuses (Kant 1964: 
531-2). More than this, cultivating one’s spirit is an aspiration to moral purity. This requires that we 
develop our capacity for pure reason, subdue our affect, govern our passions, and bring all our 
capacities and inclinations under the control of reason (Kant 1996: 536).  
Kant’s aspiration to moral purity is underwritten by his teleological view of nature (and man) 
according to which everything has a proper purpose (Guyer 2006: 156). His teleology rests on the 
recognition that nature is the product of intelligent and purposive design, and that the purpose of 
individual organisms and nature as a whole, are as ‘natural ends’ (Kant 2000: 241), causes and 
effects of themselves (Kant 2000: 242). Kant’s teleology is grounded in a regulative principle that 
provides a vision, but not knowledge, of nature as a system with human moral development as its 
ultimate purpose, or ‘final end’ (Kant 2000: 294).  
Kant regards freedom (from errors of judgment, affect and inclinations) as the “highest degree of 
life” (1997: 125). Kant defines affect as feeling or emotion, something reasonably easily controlled as 
it subsides quickly (1996: 535), “a momentary, sparkling phenomenon that leaves one exhausted” 
(1996: 536). He describes passion as “a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination” (1996: 
535). We attain freedom by adhering to duty.  
Duties are moral ends we ought to choose (Kant 1996: 520). Since we are the authors of the moral 
law, duty is nothing other than the self-constraint of choice (Kant 1996: 377, 461, 512, 534). Since 
85 
 
we are only obligated to do what is within our power onw could argue, in accordance with Silber 
(1959), that Kant’s duties represent an immanent principle. This is an instance that challenges the 
neat division of philosophies into either transcendent or immanent.   
Kant identifies two broad categories of duty: duties of virtue and duties of right. Duties of right are 
duties concerned with preserving and promoting political or ‘outer’ freedoms – such as freedom of 
action, freedom of speech and ownership of private property. These are coercively enforced though 
the organs of state by threat of punishment (Kant 1991; 46). These constitute “a subset of perfect 
duties to others” (Guyer 2006: 247). Since ‘duties of right’ fall under the purview of an ideal political 
system, they lie beyond the scope of this body of work. Duties of virtue are specific duties intended 
to preserve human freedom and promote the realization of freely chosen ends. While Kant (1996: 
533-4) claims that, objectively, there is one virtue: moral strength of will, he analyses duties of virtue 
into two kinds: perfect and imperfect.  
Perfect duties seek to preserve bodily and mental faculties necessary for the exercise of freedom. 
Perfect duties to our self ensure our self-preservation – that we conform with natural ends (Kant 
1996: 544). To this end we ought to avoid: bodily excesses (Kant 1996: 550-1), self-defilement (Kant 
1996: 548-9), lying (Kant 1996: 552-3), the pursuit of material gain for its own sake (Kant 1996: 555), 
and taking our own life. We have a duty to preserve the perfection of our natures (Kant 1996: 545). 
This requires that we cultivate: our natural powers of spirit (developed through reason, and used to 
develop a priori principles); mind (the power of understanding, memory, imagination and taste); and 
body (physical capacity so that we may have ease and agility of movement) so that we may achieve 
ends of our own devising (Kant 1996: 565). We have a duty to cultivate our conscience, “the inner 
judge of all free actions” (Kant 1996: 561). This is crucial, for while we all have a conscience, and 
always hear it, it is possible that we do not heed it (Kant 1996: 560). Perfect duties to others ensure 
that we respect them as ends in themselves. Such duties include: not making false promises, not 
being arrogant, defaming or ridiculing others (Kant 1996: 581-3). Failure to fulfil our perfect duties is 
regarded as a vice (Kant 1996: 581). 
Imperfect duties promote the exercise of freedom. We have a duty to cultivate “one’s own 
perfection” (Kant 1996: 517), i.e. that we make ourselves more perfect than nature made us (Kant 
1996: 545). To this end we are required to develop self-knowledge. Kant (1996: 562) regard this as 
“the beginning of all human wisdom” (Kant 1996: 562). Developing self-knowledge entails 
scrutinizing our intentions, that we may discover “proof of a good heart” (Kant 1996: 562-3). 
Developing and increasing our moral perfection requires that we purify our disposition to duty (Kant 
1996: 566), such that moral law becomes the sole incentive for action, i.e. we ought to act “in 
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conformity with duty but also from duty” (Kant 1996: 566). To this end Kant commands us to “be 
holy” (Kant 1996: 566), and “be perfect” (Kant 1996: 566). Since these commands can never be 
attained, the pursuit of moral perfection is a continuous and never ending process (Kant 1996: 566). 
Cultivating perfection also entails that we cultivate moral feeling. While Kant (1996: 510) claims that 
no moral principle should ever be based on feeling, he recognizes that moral feeling is a useful 
endowment (Kant 1996: 528). Given that feelings are “natural predispositions of the mind” (Kant 
1996: 528) that we all possess, we do not have a duty to acquire them. We do however have a duty 
to develop and cultivate moral feeling. 
Imperfect duties to others are ‘duties of love’. Since love is a feeling, we cannot have a duty to love 
(Kant 1996: 530). Given that the ‘duties of love’ are maxims governing action not feeling, our duty to 
act should not be contingent on we feel about other people. Imperfect duties to others include the 
duties of beneficence, gratitude and sympathy (Kant 1996: 571-6).  
The duty of beneficence requires us to do good to others, regardless of our feelings for them (Kant 
1996: 530), and without thought of reward (Kant 1996: 572). While we do not need to love others in 
order to help them, in helping them we will come to love them (Kant 1996: 531). We do good to 
others by respecting and promoting their freely chosen ends, and removing any obstacles that may 
impede their moral progress. This may require that we sacrifice a portion of our welfare for the sake 
of another’s happiness (Kant 1996: 524), or it may include educating them. It does not, however, 
entail helping them attain their own moral perfection. This is a task each individual has to realize on 
her own (Kant 1996: 516-9).  
The duty of gratitude requires that we feel respect for, and be appreciative of, those who help us 
(Kant 1996: 573). This can include those who currently help us and our predecessors, as they too are 
our teachers (Kant 1996: 574). The intensity of gratitude should be proportionate to the degree of 
benefit to us and the sacrifice made by our benefactor (Kant 1996: 574).  
The duty of sympathy requires that we share in another’s feelings (Kant 1996: 575). This is a duty to 
humanity, and as such is not restricted to our kin, or even those we know. Associated with the duty 
to sympathy is the duty to friendship. “Friendship … is the union of two persons through equal 
mutual love and respect … this is an ideal of each participating and sharing sympathetically in the 
other’s well-being” (Kant 1996: 584-5). More than this friendship entails a relationship of total trust 
so that each can offer a full disclosure of judgements, thought and feelings without fear of 
condemnation (Kant 1996: 586). While friendships are mutually beneficial, and result in happiness, 
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they are not valued for the ends they bring about, but as an expression of the duty to beneficence 
(Kant 1996: 586).  
I argue that there is a high degree of accord between Kant’s transformative project of cultivating 
one’s spirit and Stoic character development. They both endorse perfecting oneself. Both recognize 
reason as that which separates us from the animals, and accordingly, both advocate living according 
to the dictates of reason. While this entails a distancing ourselves from our animalistic tendencies 
(bodily inclinations and petty desires), neither Kant nor the Stoics dismiss feeling outright. The Stoics 
recognize the value of feelings, such as joy and wishing, while Kant endorses the development of 
moral feelings, such as gratitude and sympathy.  
Dewey promotes a transformative project of self-reconstruction. Self-reconstruction is the 
realization of one’s personal potential in the form of increasing our capacities and dispositions. 
Reconstruction is intimately connected to wisdom: “knowledge operating in the direction of powers 
to the better living of life” (Dewey 1910: 52). Reconstruction is an endless recursive process whereby 
we work on ourselves to improve ourselves, to make ourselves better (Dewey 1920: 176).  
Self-reconstruction is premised on the notion that self is a social product. We are fundamentally 
social beings. Not only do we find ourselves in a world of other beings such as ourselves, we are only 
fully human when in relationship with other humans (Dewey 1888: 158). It is only in a social context 
that we encounter meaning. In this respect meaning is socially relative. All of our values, beliefs and 
even our sense of fulfilment are socially derived (Campbell 1995: 25). Given that meaning is relative, 
there is no “fundamental, correct, and unchanging proper meaning” (Campbell 1995: 154). Given 
that we are social beings, and that meaning arises in a social context, it is no surprise that Dewey 
regards meaning to constitute the greater part of the human experience (Alexander 2016: 62).  
More than social beings, we are social product as our minds and selves are emergent phenomena 
that arise though the development of socially constructed meaning (Garrison 1998: 123). Through 
language we can imagine potential modes of action and we can identify ourselves with those actions 
(Dewey 1929a: 170). We think about issues that arise in conversation, and we tend to adopt the 
positions, values, beliefs and expressions of others. In this respect we are a “function of social 
interactions” (Dewey 1929a: vi). Self is also a product of social institutions that not only provide the 
“means and agencies of human welfare and progress” but also the “means of creating individuals” 
(Dewey 1920: 194). Social institutions are similarly social products as they arise as a result of social 
living (Dewey 1922: 329; Dewey & Tufts 1908: 69). 
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The idea of that we are social products implies that we have inherent adaptive capacities. In this 
respect, improving oneself should be directly tied to improving one’s social conditions. While this is 
the case, Dewey recognizes that we are more than social products.    
We are creatures of habit (Dewey 1922: 85-6). Habit does not apply restrictively to behaviour, but 
includes beliefs, values and other mental states, including emotions (Garrison 1998: 124). Habit is so 
fundamental to who we are that Dewey proclaims that “we are the habit” (Dewey 1922: 24) , i.e. 
habit constitutes the self.  
Habits are purposive. They are an “economizing force” (Dewey 1894: 19) that permit us to perform a 
range of simple and complex activities unconsciously. One might be inclined to think that habits not 
only make activity happen fluidly, but that they free our minds up for higher order thinking. And yet 
even higher order thinking is habitual. This includes “perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, 
judging, conceiving and reasoning” (Dewey 1922: 177). These habits are instruments that we use to 
acquire knowledge, and do not themselves constitute knowledge since “habit does not, of itself 
know” (Dewey 1922: 124). 
Habits have a dark side. They “possess us” and “control us” (Dewey 2004: 33) such that we tend to 
not always think, feel and act in the most reasonable ways. Instead we appear to operate according 
to “a policy of drift” (Dewey 1944: 276). We fixate on the ways we have learned to think, feel and 
behave, and fail to generate new meanings (Dewey 1958: 272). This interrupts the flow of 
experience, and presents itself as disharmony. There is a disconnect between what we think and 
what we see, what we want and what we get (Dewey 1958: 35). When this occurs, life becomes 
problematic. ‘Problem’ refers to a situation in which our standard habitual responses are inadequate 
for the realization of desired ends. Problematically, habits persist provided that they are minimally 
functional, or until “the environment obstinately rejects it” (Dewey 1922: 125). Given that many of 
the habits we have are unconsciously acquired in our social context (Dewey 1922: 58), and that habit 
resists the impetus for change (Dewey 1935: 49), we tend to be prisoners of our social and 
intellectual milieu. 
Intellectual habits include compartmentalization. We abstract and divide the world in ways that not 
only separates us from the world, but also creates divisions in and between action, thought and 
feeling. Compartmentalization “brings about separation of that mode of activity commonly called 
practice from insight, of imagination from executive doing, of significant purpose from work, of 
emotion from thought and doing” (Dewey 1958: 20-1). While these are intellectual abstractions we 
assume that this is the way that the world is. Perceptual habits include recognition. Perception 
needs time to develop, and must go beyond the labeling of purpose, desire, need, beyond previously 
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formed schemes (Dewey 1958: 53). Recognition arrests our perception by making us see and use 
things in predetermined ways, and as a consequence we fail to explore new ways of seeing things, 
thinking, valuing, feeling and doing. 
Self-reconstruction requires that we modify or change habits. In order to do this we have to become 
aware of the habit and what it accomplishes, and we need to judge the success that accomplishment 
(Dewey 1922: 20; 2004: 33). Such judgement is made in accordance with the criterion of growth 
(section 3.2). Secondly, we must harness our capacities and dispositions.   
Virtues are dispositions that increase the “value of one’s experiences and give him the ability to 
secure good experiences and avert bad ones” (Frankena 1965: 158). A range of dispositions are 
highlighted: intellectual, emotional and aesthetic. According to Frankena (1965: 169) Dewey 
advocates the following intellectual dispositions: objectivity, impartiality, willingness to learn from 
experience, cooperation and an orientation to the future. Garrison (1998: 125-6) regards the 
following intellectual dispositions – reflection, contemplation, self and social criticism – as necessary 
for inquiry. Emotional dispositions include sympathy and benevolence. Dewey regards intellectual 
and emotional dispositions to be important for moral conduct (Dewey & Tufts 1908). In addition, he 
endorses the aesthetic dispositions of taste and appreciation as important as they can “reveal a 
depth and range of meaning in experiences which otherwise might be mediocre and trivial” (Dewey 
2004: 257). To this list, Frankena (1965: 152) adds the disposition of faith: as devotion to an ideal 
end; in the method of inquiry to realize this ideal; and as an attitude that we take toward life that 
manifests as a willingness to break old habits and create new ones.  
I argue that Kant and Dewey offer divergent ethical projects. For Kant, cultivating one’s spirit is 
synonymous with perfecting ourselves. This entails developing one aspect (reason) and denying 
others (inclination and feeling). Kant recognizes that moral perfection is an ideal that we have to 
continually approximate, though will never reach because inclination will always tempt us and moral 
principles will never provide for every situation (Kant 1996: 516). In light of the above, I read Kant as 
offering a transcendent ethic. Admittedly, Kant’s moral philosophy has an immanent aspect. Just as 
we are the source of the laws of nature, which are determined by human cognition, so we are the 
source of the moral law, which is determined by reason and concept, independently of the empirical 
world. Because the moral law comes from reason, and this is something we are born with, moral law 
does not depend upon special learning or knowledge, or the capacity to access a transcendent 
realm. Dewey posits a naturalistic vision of man as socially immersed and emergent, and a creature 
of habit. Self-reconstruction requires that we improve ourselves by changing habits and harness our 
capacities and dispositions. I read Dewey as offering an immanent ethic.  
90 
 
I argue that the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey, under the banner of ‘personal 
improvement’, could be relevant to philosophical practice. Personal improvement, i.e. cultivating 
one’s self and reconstructing one’s self, would likely have greater currency, in terms of public 
appeal, than the archaic and intrinsic ends of wisdom, virtue and self-knowledge that some 
practitioners promote. Moreover, personal improvement might carry less stigma, and hence more 
appeal, than the more negatively associated instrumental ends of problem-solving and therapy that 
some practitioners promote.  
One might object that these other ends (problem-solving, therapy, scepticism, self-knowledge, virtue 
and wisdom) have a place in philosophical practice. I agree. In accordance with the unified vision of 
philosophical practice all of these approaches are part of the larger phronetic whole. As such, 
acknowledging the potential merit of personal improvement as an end to philosophical practice 
should in no way be taken as a dismissal of the other approaches to philosophical practice. In fact, 
the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey actually endorse at least some of the ends advocated 
by existing philosophical practitioners: both Kant and Dewey endorse wisdom and the acquisition of 
virtues; Kant endorses the pursuit of self-knowledge; while problem-solving is a primary concern for 
Dewey.      
4.3 Social Engagement  
In this section I will explore the social element that is implicated in the philosophies of Kant and 
Dewey. Both philosophers advocate social engagement in the attainment of their respective 
transformative projects. I will argue that their social orientation could introduce a novel political 
element into philosophical practice. 
It is a matter of duty for Kant that we help others to realize themselves as freely chosen ends. While 
cultivating one’s spirit is a task the individual takes upon herself, and cannot be done by another, the 
duty to beneficence requires that we remove obstacles so that others may achieve their freely 
chosen ends. This could manifest in several ways. It might entail donating to charity, or participating 
in social development schemes to uplift the poor, such as food schemes so that the most affected 
have their most basic needs taken care of, thereby freeing them up to pursue higher ends such as 
freedom. Alternatively, it might entail active political involvement to bring about the necessary 
changes in laws so that all citizens have equal access to resources and opportunities.  
Dewey’s notion of self-reconstruction is intimately connected to social-reconstruction. Since self is a 
social product, we have to actively reconstruct society to bring about a transformation of self. Social-
reconstruction is the realization of social potential in the form of general welfare and an improved 
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community life (Dewey & Tufts 1908: 353). Social-reconstruction can be understood as cooperative 
inquiry directed at addressing problems of living. This entails envisaging the consequences of 
existing conditions, seeking out more preferable consequences, and attempting to bring them about 
(Dewey 1931a: 133-4).  
There are two levels of social-reconstruction: intellectual and institutional. Intellectual 
reconstruction requires us to rethink ideas that inform social practice, such as reconsidering the 
notion of democracy. Institutional reconstruction is the collective attempt to evaluate and enact 
ideas of how we should live. It rests on the recognition of governmental impotence and an optimistic 
vision that citizens can deliberately and intelligently effect and manage social change (Dewey, in 
Campbell: 1995: 146).  
Social-reconstruction requires citizen involvement. To this end Dewey encourages fostering a “spirit 
of service” (Dewey 1966: 29): a readjusted mental attitude and an enlarged and sympathetic vision, 
a willingness and capacity to identify with interests of others and the world (Dewey 1966: 61). While 
humans are naturally inclined to serve (Dewey 1909: 8), this impulse will diminish if it is not 
encouraged (Campbell 1995: 115). In accordance with this it is likely he would encourage 
participation in a wide range of social development and political projects.   
I argue that the element of social engagement that is inherent to the philosophies of Kant and 
Dewey could introduce an active political dimension into philosophical practice that has, to the best 
of my knowledge, not been vocalized or practiced. Exactly what this would entail and how it might 
manifest in philosophical practice remains to be seen. The practitioner might encourage the 
participant to actively involve herself in social development schemes. Alternatively, the philosophical 
practitioner might direct all her own efforts toward developing society by supporting socially 
orientated charities, participating in community outreach programmes or joining and actively 
participating in a political movement that is orientated toward effecting social change and / or 
uplifting the general welfare.  
One might object that the latter suggestion would fundamentally change the nature of philosophical 
practice, i.e. shift the focus of practice away from the individual to society; shift the method away 
from intellectual discourse towards hands on activities; move the space in which practice occurs out 
of the office and into the world. I agree with the effects, but not the judgement. I do not see how 
these changes are bad or problematic. One might add to the original objection that such changes 
take the philosophy out of philosophical practice, i.e. one becomes a social activist rather than a 
philosophical practitioner. To this I reply that one might still be regarded as a philosophical 
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practitioner provided that one was living a philosophical way of life, and was encouraging others to 
do likewise, i.e. if one adopted a simultaneous role as educator.          
4.4 Education  
In this section I will show that educating others is a necessary component of Kant and Dewey’s 
transformative projects. For Kant, educating others is a manifestation of the imperfect duty of 
beneficence. Dewey advocates education as a necessary component in reconstructing self and 
society. I will argue that this educative element is relevant to philosophical practice. 
Education is implicated in Kant’s project of cultivating the spirit. Since it is easier to become an 
autonomous individual in a society of similar such individuals, the collective pursuit of moral 
perfection is recommended (Kant 1996). While we cannot help another to attain her own moral 
perfection, we do have a duty of beneficence to remove obstacles that would impede this. Since 
cultivating one’s spirit is contingent on a developed capacity for pure reason, and assuming that this 
is something that can be improved through education, it follows that we have a duty to educate 
others. More than developing reason Frankena (1965: 84-92) maintains that a Kantian inspired 
education should foster a range of dispositions. These include: nurture – self-care to ensure proper 
health and growth, and discourage the acquisition of any and all habits; discipline – the capacity for 
‘self-mastery’, the rule of free-will over animal urges and the disposition to correct bad behaviours 
and to rule; culture – development of the skills of the senses and imagination, memory and 
attention, understanding and judgment, aesthetic taste, appreciation and creation, and speculative 
thought; prudence - the capacity to use our skills in a manner to ensure our happiness (this is 
identical to Aristotle’s practical wisdom); and morality – the dispositions of freedom and autonomy 
so that we may choose rightly. 
Education is an integral component of Dewey’s project of reconstruction. It is directly implicated in 
self-reconstruction. Education reveals to the individual “the full stature of his possibility” (Dewey 
1920: 186) by improving his capacity to think, observe and judge (Campbell 1995: 169). Self-
reconstruction requires that we harness dispositions. Since dispositions are necessarily acquired 
through experience (Frankena 1965: 168), it is the task of the educator to modify the environment 
or stimuli in order to bring about “the formation of desirable intellectual and emotional dispositions” 
(Dewey 2004: 195). Education is also an essential component of social-reconstruction, as it better 
equips the individual to fulfil her role as a citizen by making her better able to criticise existing and 
proposed values. Education, in this respect, entails cultivating the value and practice of: scepticism, 
suspending judgement, demanding evidence, clear observation, open discussion and critical inquiry 
(Dewey, in Campbell 1995: 216).  
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I contend that this educative element is relevant to philosophical practice. Many philosophical 
practitioners might proclaim that a large part of what they offer to the participant is an education, 
be it in: self-knowledge, critical thinking, evaluating beliefs and values, scepticism. While this is likely 
the case, the distinctive contribution that Kant and Dewey might make is that they would not restrict 
education to the single participant but would advocate educating society in general. In this respect 
practitioners might offer outreach educative programmes at community centres so that they may 
educate large numbers of people.  
One might object that such a suggestion is impracticable. Many of those who could benefit from 
such an education might not be able to afford, or be willing to pay for it. In response to this, such 
teaching could be offered pro bono. This is something tenured philosophy academics and even post-
graduate students might be willing to offer as a service to the community. This would ensure that 
many people could receive the benefits of an education inspired by these philosophical ways of life.  
4.5 Transformative Tools 
In this section I will explore the practices Kant and Dewey advocate as means to their respective 
transformative projects. Kant suggests a range of practices that aim to increase our capacity to 
understand, think and act in accordance with moral law. These include: catechism, the moral 
exemplar, critical reasoning and contemplation. Dewey offers a single ‘method of inquiry’ as a 
means to solve problems, control and guide interactions, and restructure environmental conditions.  
The most basic form of training that Kant suggests is catechism. According to Kant (1996: 591-2) 
virtue is not innate, but is something that is acquired through systematic training. He regards 
catechism as the most basic mechanism for teaching virtue. This is nothing more than instruction in 
the moral doctrine and maxims. The pupil is exposed to the various duties and all they are required 
to do is memorize the teachings. This form of training is intended for the initiate or ‘beginning pupil’, 
or for the less mature pupil not versed in the moral system or in the ways of philosophy.  
A second form of training is the moral exemplar: a figure of “exemplary conduct” (Kant 1996: 593), 
purity of will and devotion to duty. It is through the moral exemplar that the dignity of duty is 
promoted, as opposed to the advantages and disadvantages that follow from acting in accordance 
with duty. Exposure to the moral exemplar is a basic form of education that operates on the premise 
of mimicry: that we learn through observation (Kant 1996: 593).  
While these basic forms of instruction might be useful to train the initiate, in both instances the 
pupil is treated as a passive recipient of information. While catechism provides the pupil access to 
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the basic principles and duties of action, such instruction does not in itself generate the autonomy 
that Kant so highly values. While exposure to the exemplar provides an instance where the moral 
law is enacted, proof that it is possible to act in conformity with the moral law, since “it is a 
mechanism of sense rather than a principle of thought” (Kant 1996: 593) it has the potential to 
create an inclination and mode of behaviour that is independent of a moral maxim. While this might 
appear to undermine the notion of autonomy, it does not. Firstly, the moral exemplar is offered as a 
source of inspiration to the participant, rather than a model to be emulated. Secondly, the moral 
exemplar can serve as a touchstone of reflection for the participant. In this respect it can help 
develop autonomy.   
A central requirement of Kant’s moral philosophy is that the pupil engage in independent thought.  
To this end Kant offers dialogue which permits the teaching and learning of moral principles through 
a Socratic process of questioning and answering. The philosopher adopts the position of the midwife 
and questions the pupil’s reasons and guides her thought process so that she may develop the 
required moral concepts. This is a reciprocal process intended to cultivate reasoning in the mature 
student and to help her to develop her own ideas (Kant 1996: 592). It also serves the ends of 
developing philosophical reflection which leads to self-knowledge.   
Kant (1996: 527) mentions contemplation as a means “to enhance the moral incentive”. 
Contemplation is the very activity that Kant undertakes in the Groundwork, in which he sought to 
discover the foundations of morality (Hunter 2002: 912). This entails contemplating “the dignity of 
the pure rational law in us” (Kant 1996: 527) “from the universal concept of a rational being as such” 
(Kant 1996: 65). Metaphysical contemplation not only gives us access to the moral law, it purifies the 
soul by developing man’s capacity to reason (Hunter 2002: 920).  
Kant cautions against over-emphasizing metaphysical contemplation. While the teacher of 
philosophy must be a pupil of metaphysics (Kant 1996: 510) they must not place too much emphasis 
on metaphysical training or the use of scholastic terms, otherwise they will merely train the pupil of 
morality to be a philosopher (Kant 1996: 510). It is such that Kant proclaims that training in 
moralizing requires more than training in pure philosophy. It is something that has to be cultivated 
through exercise and effort (Kant 1996: 591). 
I maintain that the above transformative tools offer nothing new to philosophical practice since all 
are documented in the philosophical practice literature. There is one additional practice he does 
advocate that would be a new addition to philosophical practice: aesthetic perception. This will be 
explored in section 3.9.   
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Dewey offers a single ‘method of inquiry’ as a means to emancipate us from outdated customs and 
habits (Dewey 1916: 440), and to control and guide our interactions and restructure environmental 
conditions, with the express view to making life more reasonable and increasing its value (Dewey 
1931b: 31-3). Dewey defines ‘inquiry’ as the transformation of an indeterminate situation into a 
determinate situation, such that individual elements of the original situation become unified into a 
cohesive whole (Dewey 1938: 104-5).  
Inquiry has a particular pattern (Dewey 1938: 101). In the first phase there is no problem. Activity 
proceeds in a habitual fashion. Then something goes awry. Things do not work as they should, 
activity is arrested, indeterminacy sets in, and we are unsure how to proceed. The second phase 
requires that we define the parameters of the problematic situation. This is an initial necessary step 
in transforming an indeterminate situation into a determinate one. While the impulse is to act, to 
reduce doubt and re-establish certainty, Dewey (1929b: 217) warns us against this and enjoins us to 
make “a productive use of doubt by converting it into operations of definite inquiry”. While we draw 
on experience to understand the possible breakdowns causing the problem, we are to suspend 
judgment on what we think the actual cause is. The third phase requires us to make observations 
and investigations into the problematic situation, i.e. the collection of facts and consideration of 
implications and alternative solutions. This is a “speculative stage” (Dewey 1909: 11) in which we 
work to formulate a series of hypotheses. The fourth phase is one of reasoning, in which we 
undertake a mental evaluation of the hypotheses and select the one deemed most appropriate. It 
could also entail an intellectual process of verification, which may lead to a modification of the 
hypothesis (Campbell 1995: 50). The last phase is the experimental testing of the hypothesis, leading 
to a resolution or “unified experience” (Dewey 1910: 82). Fluidity of activity provides evidence that 
the problem has been diminished and the situation has been restructured. 
I argue that Dewey’s ‘method of inquiry’ is relevant to philosophical practice as it offers a new mode 
of practice. It represents a shift away from a narrow Socratic search for self-knowledge that is 
concerned with accessing and assessing the beliefs and values of the individual, and is instead 
concerned with reconstructing social values – adopting more or less intelligent and relevant customs 
and escaping calcifying ones (Dewey 1922: 81), reformulating social beliefs and desires (Dewey 1922: 
323), and discovering and fostering good social behaviour (Campbell 1995: 110). Moreover, it 
represents a shift away from disengaged philosophical contemplation that strives to grasp truths 
intellectually and in isolation from the world, and instead promotes a hands on (scientific) approach 
to solving problems that creates and confirms, or rejects, hypotheses through experimentation and 
experience. This pragmatic element would likely take philosophical practice out of the office and into 
the world, thereby changing what happens in philosophical practice.  
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One might object that it is too risky to advocate such an experimental approach to solve the 
problems of the individual participant as there are no guarantee of success. Not only would a failure 
to solve the participant’s problem be a failure to ameliorate her suffering, failure to meet her 
expectations might even increase her suffering. There are a number of responses to this objection. 
Firstly, Dewey is specifically concerned with problems of a social and political nature, as opposed to 
problems of the individual. This is not to say that his method couldn’t be applied to individual cases, 
however, doing so would be at odds with his understanding of the interconnectedness of the 
individual with her environment. In accordance with this, Dewey would contend that problems are 
only resolved through reconstructing society. Secondly, Dewey (1929b: 24) recognizes that there is 
no certainty in practical activity, and that all action entails “peril, the risk of misadventure, 
frustration, failure”. Given that each situation is unique and no solution is transferable, there are no 
assurances that we will find solutions to our problems. Dewey (2004: 128) openly acknowledges this 
and refers to his offering as “a hit-and-miss philosophy”. This potential lack of success in no way 
undermines his method, which encourages scepticism, protracts doubt and aims to “protect the 
mind against itself” (Dewey 1920: 36), thereby interrupting our natural tendency to want to settle a 
situation too quickly, to cut inquiry prematurely short (Dewey 1966: 147-9). Thirdly, Dewey would 
not offer his method as a means to ameliorate suffering as he recognizes that suffering is an 
inescapable part of life, and necessary for growth (see section 3.7).    
4.6 Role of the Philosopher  
In this section I will explore the range of roles associated with the philosophies of Kant and Dewey. 
Since neither advocate a philosophical way of life, neither actually assign roles to the philosopher. It 
is however possible to infer roles they might attribute to the philosopher. I argue that both might 
assign the role of teacher and friend to the philosopher. In addition to these, Kant might advocate 
that the philosopher adopt the role of the Socratic gadfly and the moral exemplar; while Dewey 
might advocate the roles of social critic, custodian and disseminator of ideas, maker of meaning and 
moral prophet.  
I contend that Kant and Dewey might assign the role of teacher to the philosopher. Given that Kant 
advocates catechism as a means by which to acquire virtue, he would likely advocate that the 
philosopher adopt the role of teacher in order to provide instruction in moral doctrine and maxims. 
Admittedly, the pupil could simply read and remember Kant’s moral doctrine and maxims. In this 
respect the teacher would not be a crucial role for the philosopher.  
I argue that Dewey might assign the role of teacher to the philosopher. Given the central role of 
education in social-reconstruction, the teacher plays an important function. It is the task of the 
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teacher to train the student to become a cooperative and active ‘problem solver’. Given that 
learning arises from doing, the philosopher would select problem solving activities, and would help 
the student to develop an intelligent and coherent understanding of the facts. The philosopher 
might make alternative environments of contact available so that solutions can be tested (Frankena 
1965: 178). The philosopher would assist the student with her responses, and possibly make 
suggestions, but would refrain from giving solutions (Frankena 1965: 175).  
I maintain that Kant and Dewey would ascribe the role of friend to the philosopher. Since Kant 
maintains that we have a duty to friendship, it follows with necessity that the practitioner should 
form a relationship of friendship with the participant. This ideal egalitarian relationship is based on 
mutual love, respect, sympathetic participation, reciprocity, tolerance, open and honest disclosure 
(Kant 1996: 584-5). I argue that this sort of relationship is fundamentally different to the relationship 
between the practitioner as Socratic gadfly and participant. Since the sole focus of the practitioner, 
as gadfly, is to get the participant to examine and evaluate her worldview, such a role does not 
require any personal input from the practitioner. Accordingly, I regard Socratic relationship to be 
asymmetrical and impersonal. 
I argue that Dewey might advocate the role of friend to the philosopher as there are elements of 
friendship – sympathy and reciprocity – in Dewey’s teacher-student relationship. Firstly, the teacher 
must have a ‘sympathetic attitude’ and enter into the learning experience with the student 
(Frankena 1965: 177). Secondly, the process of learning is reciprocal in that the teacher must be 
prepared to become the student, and the student becomes the teacher.  
I contend that Kant would advocate that the philosopher adopt the role of the Socratic gadfly, as he 
regards self-knowledge to be an essential part of one’s moral development. The philosopher, as a 
Socratic gadfly, would help the participant to access and assess her worldview.  
Given that Kant offers the exploration and consideration of the moral exemplar as a practice, the 
philosopher might assume the role of the moral exemplar. One might argue that this would not be 
necessary as the philosopher could simply engage the pupil in ongoing discussions that may include 
developing an understanding of the constituting aspects of such an individual, to identifying possible 
candidates in the world, to discussing how the moral exemplar would respond in certain situations. 
While this is a possibility, given that Kant (1991: 45) endorses that we exercise “moral wisdom”, he 
would advocate that the philosopher apply her philosophy to her daily life, and make duty the 
incentive to her action (Kant 1996: 509). To this end the philosopher would be actively cultivating 
her own autonomy, and adhering to the duties she has derived. Given that the philosophical 
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practitioner, by virtue of length of practice, would further along the path of cultivating her spirit than 
her participant, it seems possible that she could fill the role of moral exemplar.     
Dewey might assign the role of social critic to the philosopher. The social critic engages with and 
interrogates the beliefs, values, knowledge and actions of society. Her task could involve uncovering 
and evaluating cultural assumptions; and training and encouraging her student to do likewise.  
Dewey would likely assign the philosopher the role of custodian and disseminator of a wide range of 
rich and seemingly disparate ideas, with a view to “enlarging as well as rectifying the meanings with 
which they are charged” (Dewey 1929a: 410). The philosopher, in virtue of her training, would be 
well suited to this role.   
Dewey might also assign the philosopher the role of meaning-maker. Self and social-reconstruction 
requires the proposal of new conceptions, meanings and points of view. This is crucial as solutions 
can only be found when we can see the conditions that give rise to the problem in a new light. While 
this is a job the philosopher is likely to do particularly well, as a result of her training, Dewey does 
not restrict this role to professional philosophers (Campbell 1995: 150).  
A final role Dewey might assign to the philosopher is that of the “moral prophet” (Dewey & Tufts 
1932: 380). The moral prophet does not moralize. Moral judgements, of sin and righteousness, 
blame and approbation, prevent us from seeing the full picture, because it makes us think we know 
the solution antecedent to exploring and understanding the problem (Dewey 1938: 495). The moral 
prophet is instrumental in the reconstruction of society, i.e. it depends upon her deliberate 
intervention (Dewey 1929a: 218). She is a visionary and non-conformist. She is free from the 
standards of the prevailing order (Dewey 1929a: 218), socially sensitive to the needs and problems 
of others (Dewey 1920: 147-8), and places the welfare of all above her own personal advantage 
(Dewey & Tufts 1932:252). While the professional philosopher may be a likely candidate, such a 
position is not restricted to intellectual experts or professionals.  
I argue that many of the roles associated with Kant and Dewey, such as educator, Socratic gadfly, 
social critic and custodian of ideas, are conventional roles adopted by the academic philosopher, as 
well as the philosophical practitioner. Given that the philosophies of Kant and Dewey are intellectual 
and contemplative (Hunter 2002: 916; Frankena 1965: 148), their conventional offerings, with 
respect to practices and roles, should come as no surprise. I contend that the role of philosopher as 
friend and ‘moral prophet’ are unconventional roles for the academic philosopher, and present as 
new roles for the philosophical practitioner.   
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One might object that the role of the moral prophet, like the Hellenistic sage, is controversial in at 
least two respects. Firstly, since this is an existential rather than a professional role, it might be 
asking too much of the practitioner to embody it. Secondly, one might question how beneficial this 
role would be to the individual participant. I agree that the role of the moral prophet places a high 
demand on the philosopher, and I am of the opinion that it is a role very few might be suitable for, 
let alone willing to take on; however, since I am merely exploring possible roles available to the 
practitioner rather than prescribing roles I do not think the first part of the objection holds much 
weight. With respect to the second part of the objection, it must be remembered that the moral 
prophet is a social visionary. In this respect it is unlikely that she would direct her efforts at the 
individual participant.  
4.7 Metaphysics: transcendent; naturalist  
Since a philosophical way of life is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system, it is 
imperative that we understand its metaphysical stance. In this section I will explore the metaphysics 
of Kant and Dewey. Kant posits a metaphysical view that reality is independent of the content of 
man’s beliefs. Since we can never see the world separately from our perceptual standpoint, we 
cannot access reality. He regards man to possess a dual nature: sensible (determinate) and 
intelligent (indeterminate). Dewey posits a naturalistic metaphysic that understands existence 
through an inseparable combination of nature and experience. Nature is characterized by change, 
growth, process, evolution and emergence. Experience is understood as the manifestation of 
interactions between the individual and the environment. The metaphysics of both Kant and Dewey 
inform their respective ethical ways of life (transformative aspirations and projects).     
Kant posits a metaphysical view that bifurcates reality into two distinct realms: the phenomenal and 
noumenal. This echoes Plato’s distinction between appearance (illusion) and reality (forms). While 
Kant claims that we can never know noumena (the thing-in-itself) in a positive, or determinate 
sense, he recognizes that it possesses value as a point of contrast to phenomena – a way to refer to 
the thing-in-itself independently of its representation – and as a way to highlight the limitations of 
actual knowledge (Guyer 2006: 130).  
While Kant claims that we cannot know the super-sensible realm he endorses things such as free 
will, the immortal soul and God (Guyer 2006: 138). He regards these as necessary postulates (Kant 
2000: 316) that give teeth to the moral ideal, i.e. we have to believe in the existence of God to 
ensure the realization of the highest good (Kant 1996: 240). While he regards God as a necessary 
element for morality, he promotes reason as the source of moral law and value.  
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Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena permits him to view humans as possessing a 
dual nature: sensible – governed by feeling and inclination, and determinate; and intelligent – 
possessing reason and freedom, and indeterminate (Kant 1996: 543-4). The phenomenal world is the 
world of nature, strictly deterministic in that it is governed by the principle of causality, such that 
every event is necessarily governed by prior events. This applies equally to ourselves. My actions are 
causally determined by my psychology – inclinations and desires, by my past experiences and by my 
particular circumstances. The idea of the noumenal world permits us to entertain the idea that 
objects of thought can exist independently of the forms of intuition that structure the way the world 
appears. For example, freedom, which is crucial to morality, is regarded as “a pure rational concept” 
(Kant 1996: 376). The idea of freedom permits us to conceive of man as indeterminate: practically 
free, in that we are not necessitated to act according to internal and / or external variables. Instead, 
we can select alternative courses of action, and different paths and projects for ourselves. It is such 
that Kant regards freedom as “the highest degree of life” (1997: 125).  
Dewey’s (1929a: 54) metaphysic is concerned with “a detection and description of the generic traits 
of existence”. Understanding existence requires an understanding of ‘nature’ and ‘experience’ as 
they are part of an integrated system. Not only is experience had in nature, but it is through 
experience that we grasp nature (Dewey 1929a: 2a).  
Nature is understood to be in a state of “dynamic flux” (Dewey 1929a: 58), characterized by change, 
growth, process, evolution and emergence (Campbell 1995:28). Dewey does not separate humans 
from nature, but conceives of the individual as continuous with her environment (Dewey 2004: 1-2): 
she exists in, and because of that environment (Dewey 1958: 13). Given that humans are a part of 
nature, human existence is similarly characterised by change, growth, process and emergence. 
Experience is defined as the manifestation of interactions between the individual and the 
environment. While knowing is regarded as a mode of experiencing, experience is not restrictively 
cognitive. Bodily movement forms a significant part of our experience (Alexander 2016: 64). 
Accordingly, ‘experience’ incorporates content (what we value, the meaning we ascribe) as well as 
process (how we act). But it is more than this. Since we exist in a state of dynamic interaction with 
the environment, not only do we act, but we are acted on in ways that affect and change us. It is this 
interaction with, and penetration of nature, that constitutes experience (Dewey 1929a: iii).    
Every experience has a common pattern: doing and undergoing (Dewey 1958: 43). These constitute 
the necessary conditions of experience, such that without them there would be no experience. 
Doing refers to the action we effect onto the environment. The individual is an active force (Dewey 
1958: 246) that is poised and ready to act (Dewey 1958: 212). Undergoing refers to the 
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consequences of our doings and / or the natural forces that act on us (Dewey 1958: 212). We change 
the world through our actions, and are similarly changed though our interactions with the external 
world. This pattern of experience is a continuous “everlastingly renewed process” (Dewey 1958: 
104). It is as rhythmic as breathing, punctuated by intervals where one phase ends and the next 
begins (Dewey 1958: 56). In this respect, doing and undergoing are “reciprocally, cumulatively, and 
continuously instrumental to each other” (Dewey 1958: 50).  
The pattern of doing and undergoing provides the opportunity for growth. Life “consists of phases in 
which the organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison 
with it” (Dewey 1958: 14). The individual ‘falls out of step’ with her environment when doing and 
undergoing are in tension, or interfere with one another. This occurs when ways of thinking and 
acting no longer provide the desired outcomes. The individual ‘recovers’ when she re-establishes 
balance with her environment. This happens when ways of thinking and acting are once again 
successful in attaining ascribed goals, and doing and undergoing reinforce one another. This permits 
experience to run its full course and things are perceived as ‘belonging together’ (Dewey 1958: 50). 
As a result of being in and out of step with life, we experience life as fluctuating between thriving 
and suffering. Suffering is not regarded as being bad as struggle and conflict bring about change. 
Exactly how we change depends upon how we react and respond to the environment (Dewey 1958: 
246). 
Change occurs within the individual when the tension between ingoing and outgoing ‘breaths’ are 
harmonized, when the recovery is not a return to the prior state but is instead “enriched by the state 
of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed” (Dewey 1958: 14). We develop 
new ways of thinking and acting that accord with changes in the environment. When this happens a 
form of “equilibrium is reached” (Dewey 1958: 14). It is a moving equilibrium as the world is never 
finished, never settled. This ensures new opportunities for change and fulfilment (Dewey 1958: 17). 
This process is synonymous with growth. 
I argue that Kant and Dewey offer divergent metaphysics. Kant proposes a metaphysic that 
recognizes the phenomenal world and the noumenal world. This permits him to view man as 
possessing a dual nature: sensible (determinate) and intelligent (indeterminate). It is this vision of 
man as determinate and indeterminate that underpins his transcendent ethic. Moreover, while Kant 
maintains that we cannot claim to know God, he does regard belief in God and the soul as a 
necessary moral postulates. Accordingly, I read him as offering a transcendent metaphysic. Dewey 
endorses a naturalistic metaphysic that understands existence as a combination of nature and 
experience. He recognizes the natural world as the sole plane of existence, characterized as being in 
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a constant state of evolution and emergence. He understands experience as the individual 
interacting with, and being acted on by, the environment. I read Dewey as offering an immanent 
metaphysic. Given that I read Kant as offering a transcendent ethic and metaphysic, I argue that he 
offers a transcendent philosophical way of life. Given that I read Dewey as offering an immanent 
ethic and metaphysic, I argue that he offers an immanent philosophical way of life.    
I argue that the metaphysics of Kant and Dewey are relevant to philosophical practice. Not only does 
understanding their metaphysics contribute to the general understanding of their respective 
philosophical systems, since their metaphysical stances are intimately implicated in their respective 
transformative agendas, explicating them is integral to understanding their respective philosophical 
ways of life. In particular, Kant’s ideal of cultivating the spirit and his norm of autonomy are directly 
derived from his transcendent metaphysics; and Dewey’s ideal of reconstruction and his norm of 
growth are informed by his naturalistic metaphysic. I argue that an intimate understanding of the 
philosophical system is essential to the practitioner who advocates the philosophical way of life. 
Such an understanding will ensure that the practitioner does not misconstrue and misrepresent the 
philosophy. Ensuring that philosophical integrity is maintained will ensure that the participant 
receives the full benefit of that way of life.  
4.8 Epistemologies: idealism; pragmatism  
Since a philosophical way of life is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system, its 
epistemology is intimately implicated in that way of life. Accordingly, fully understanding that way of 
life demands that we understand its epistemic stance. In this section I will outline the epistemologies 
of Kant and Dewey11. Kant develops his idealist epistemology by rejecting some aspects of 
rationalism and empiricism, and conjoining others. In this respect knowledge of the world is an 
amalgam of sense and pure forms of cognition. Dewey endorses a pragmatic epistemology that 
regards concepts and theories as useful instruments, and measures their worth in terms of their 
explanatory or predictive efficacy.    
Kant developed his idealist epistemology, which is orientated toward analysing the origins and 
conditions of knowledge, in response to rationalism and empiricism. Rationalists, such as Plato, posit 
that truth can only be obtained through understanding (intuition and deduction). Since some 
knowledge is accessed a priori we have the capacity to discover universal, necessarily valid claims to 
                                                          
11 Dewey opposes the term ‘epistemology’ since traditional epistemologies tend to posit dichotomies, which 
Dewey denies (Dewey 1929a: 358); and they tend to have narrow philosophical concerns regarding questions 
of knowledge and truth. He prefers ‘theory of inquiry’ since he is more concerned with questions of meaning 
than truth. 
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truth about the essence of things (Kant 1964: 667). Empiricists, such as the Epicureans and the 
Stoics, posit that truth is discovered through the senses. While the empiricists recognize that 
knowledge is a result of ideas (impressions, representations or copies, concepts, propositions and 
relations), they regard these to have their source in the sensations. Since the empiricists deny an a 
priori account of knowledge, they maintain that we cannot know the nature of reality (Kant 1964: 
667). 
Kant forms his idealist epistemology by rejecting some aspects of rationalism and empiricism. He 
rejects the rationalists claim that we can have knowledge of a mind-independent world. The limit to 
understanding is the limit of sensibility (Kant 1964: 264). He rejects the empiricist claim that the 
mind contributes minimally to the discovery of knowledge. Knowledge requires both sensation and 
thought (Kant 1964: 258-9): “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind” (Kant 1964: 93).   
According to Kant (1964: 41) all knowledge is mediated by our cognitive capacities. While the world 
presents itself directly to our consciousness through our senses (Kant 1996: 269), what we ‘see’, 
understand, or can claim to know is mediated by the faculties of mind which impose order on the 
world (Kant 1964: 58). The mind possesses cognitive capacities – a priori intuitions (immediate 
representations) of space and time, as well as concepts of understanding, such as substance, 
quantity, causality – that make us experience the world in particular ways (Hogan 2010: 26). These 
cognitive capacities are ‘pure’ forms of cognition in that they are devoid of content and independent 
of actually forming our perceptions (Kant 1964: 70). Given that these cognitive forms are part of the 
structure of our mind, they are forms which are imposed onto the realm of our experience. 
Accordingly, knowledge is mind-dependent (Guyer 2006: 129).  
Kant’s position is referred to as ‘epistemological idealism’. It is moderate in the sense that he 
recognizes that things-in-themselves exist independently of our representations, and not necessarily 
in accordance with those representations. Accordingly, he denies that we can have knowledge of the 
thing-in-itself. Given that sensibility is a necessary condition of knowledge, the use of pure reason 
without the constraints of sensibility leads to metaphysical illusions (Guyer 2006: 126-7). In light of 
this, there are limits to what we can know, i.e. we cannot claim to possess knowledge of super-
sensible things such as God, the soul, or the Platonic forms, through the use of pure reason. Kant 
(1964: 311-2) describes the Platonic forms as “a striking example of a supposedly visionary 
perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker”. 
Kant’s epistemology is an integral component of his philosophical way of life as it underpins and 
informs his view that man possesses a dual nature, and by extension his ethics, that man’s true 
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dignity lies in living in accordance with reason. As such, I argue that a philosophical practitioner that 
endorses a Kantian philosophical way of life should have a clear understanding of his epistemology.    
Dewey was influenced by the absolute idealism of Hegel. Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ is a variant of 
‘metaphysical idealism’, which arose out of Kant’s ‘epistemological idealism’. According to 
metaphysical idealism, all that exists are minds and ideas. Reality is mind-dependant in the sense 
that a mental state, either mind, reason or spirit, is regarded as the ultimate foundation of reality. 
Other variants of metaphysical idealism include Fichte (subjective idealism) and Schelling (objective 
idealism). These philosophers were opposed to dualism that posits a division between mind and 
matter, and instead viewed reality as a unified whole. Evidence of this influence is discernible in 
Dewey’s rejection of strict dichotomies – between theory and practice, man and nature, nature and 
experience, mind and body, fact and value, art and science (Dewey 1929a: 358) – and the 
importance he places on having a unified experience.  
Despite the epistemic continuity between these two philosophers, Dewey opposes Kant’s notion of 
‘pure forms of cognition’ (Dewey 1958: 31). There are no innate ideas, no predetermined ways of 
looking at the world. Dewey (1902: 219) regards mind as emergent, nothing more than an embodied 
adaptive instrument: “an organ of service for the control of the environment in relation to the ends 
of the life process”. All reflective thought – thinking that is deliberate, controlled, orderly and goal-
orientated – arises in direct response to problems, such that there would not be thinking if there 
were no problems (Dewey 1929a: 65).  
Recognition that life is experienced as a series of problems lead Dewey to endorse 
‘instrumentalism’: a methodological view that regards concepts and theories as useful instruments, 
and measures their worth in terms of their explanatory or predictive efficacy12. In accordance with 
this, the meaning of truth takes on a pragmatic conception of “warranted assertibility” (Dewey 1938: 
7): a thing is true provided its application permits us to attain our goals, i.e. if it resolves a 
                                                          
12 Dewey was strongly influenced by the critical and cooperative methods of Peirce (1839 – 1914) and the 
moral, social, educative interests of James (1842 – 1910). At the core of pragmatism (for Peirce and James) lies 
the ‘pragmatic maxim’: “our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects” (Peirce 1878: sec 2). According 
to this, our conception of an object is nothing more than the practical consequences or effects the object has 
on our experience or reasonable action. Peirce developed the pragmatic maxim to clarify and enrich concepts 
that are used in scientific reasoning (such as probability, truth and reality), and to reveal all the information 
necessary to empirically test a theory. James (1907: 29) adopted and popularised Pierce’s principle. “To attain 
perfect clearness in our thought of an object ... we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical 
kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare”. 
James utilized this principle as a method for clarifying metaphysical hypotheses and for settling interminable 
metaphysical disputes such as the one between free will and determinism. The principle clarifies conceptual 
ambiguities by showing that unless there are practical differences between the competing concepts, the 
dispute is frivolous.  
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problematic situation13. This process is guided by his conception of the Good as growth, which 
ensures that “prejudice, arbitrariness, hatred, and invidiousness” are necessarily excluded as they 
are socially divisive (Kanne 1988: 1220). 
Thought that does not pass into action and positively reconstruct the world in which we live is 
deemed to be worthless (Dewey 1929b: 133). Accordingly, Dewey is opposed to the idea of 
academic philosophy, i.e. studying the problems of the philosophers. He maintains that philosophers 
should study life experience by philosophical means (Dewey 1929a: 37). To this end Dewey endorses 
a scientific method to deal with real world problems. In section 3.5 I argued that Dewey’s ‘method of 
inquiry’ is practically relevant to philosophical practice. In light of the above, it is apparent that 
Dewey would discount any philosophical discourse that did not bring about social change. I contend 
that this reiterates the radical nature of Dewey’s philosophical way of life.     
4.9 Aesthetics 
In this section I will show that both philosophers develop aesthetics14 as crucial dimensions of their 
respective philosophies. Kant offers aesthetic judgement as a solution to two problems associated 
                                                          
13 Truth is also understood as a process and never certain since reality is always in the making (Campbell 1005: 
19). 
 
14 Because of the novely of using art in philosophical practice I give this summary background to aesthetics. 
Aesthetics as a branch of philosophy began in 18th century in the context of German idealism. German 
philosophers began to question the epistemological and practical value of art and make inquiries into the 
nature of the works of art and of beauty, resulting in the systematic and independent philosophical discipline 
of aesthetics. Hammermeister (2002: x) characterizes aesthetics as a predominantly Germanic event. Primary 
Germanic thinkers include Baumgarten, Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Cassirer, Lukács, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Adorno. Not only did aesthetics arise in Germany, but it was highly 
resilient to outside influence. While aesthetics has been taken up as an area of inquiry by thinkers in other 
parts of the world and at later points in time, including Dewey, Sartre, Ricoeur and Suzuki, since it is grounded 
in the German tradition, the works of these contributors cannot be fully understood and appreciated without a 
knowledge of the foundations of the tradition. Prior to the German aesthetic tradition philosophers had, for 
the most part, distanced themselves from art. Disdain for, and lack of interest in art can be traced back to 
ancient Greek philosophers. Parmenides was suspicious of the reliability of the sensuous world, and Plato was 
sceptical about the role of art, in particular, to provide insights to our world or a transcendent truth. The 
Republic is the first sustained philosophical discussion on Art. Plato’s rejection of art stems from the fact that it 
is a representation of the apparent, and as such unable to access the truth of the real. Since art is unable to 
grasp the real (Plato 1955a: 598b) it is largely unintelligent and trivial (Plato 1955a: 603b). Moreover, Plato was 
of the view that art, in particular the works of Homer and other tragedians of the day, harms the mind (Plato 
1955a: 595b) in that it panders to non-rational aspects of human nature and, in so doing, reduces our capacity 
to reason (Plato 1955a: 605b). In addition, since artists do not know the Good but merely represent the 
ignorance of the audience (Plato 1955a: 602b), art does not contribute to moral development (Plato 1955a: 
600d). While Plato rejects art, he regards beauty in nature as perfect and eternal. Since the experience of 
beauty can provide access to the realm of transcendent Forms, Plato did not entirely dismiss art and 
maintained that it could serve a political purpose. Representations of beauty and goodness of character in the 
arts could contribute towards the creation of healthy environments in which the guardians were to be raised 
(Plato 1955a: 401c). 
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with the cultivation of spirit: as a bridge between theoretical and practical reason; and as a means to 
develop moral capacity. Dewey’s ‘aesthetic experience’ completes his metaphysics by providing an 
account of a unified experience; and is intimately implicated in his method of inquiry, and hence is 
central to the reconstructive process. In light of the above, I argue that that their respective 
aesthetics have an epistemic application in their philosophical ways of life, i.e. they provide ways of 
knowing how to live. 
Kant offers aesthetics as a solution to two problems directly related to cultivating one’s spirit, which 
requires that we bring all our capacities and inclinations under the control of reason (Kant 1996: 
536). The first problem is that reason has two independent faculties that provide different forms of 
legislation (Kant 2000: 62): theoretical reason is concerned with prescribing laws in accordance with 
nature; practical reason is concerned with prescribing laws according to freedom (Kant 2000: 59). 
This creates an incalculable gulf between us as sensible self-interested beings, and as rational, free 
and selfless beings. The second problem is that while cultivating one’s spirit requires reason to rule 
over feeling and inclination, Kant recognizes that reason alone is insufficient to ensure that we act in 
accordance with duty. Something other than reason is required to move the soul (Kant 1996: 596). 
Moral feeling produces exaltation in our soul that inspires us to hold duty sacred and to act on it, 
contrary to our own desired ends (Kant 1996: 596). Moral feeing is described as the subjective 
capacity to feel pleasure or displeasure with respect to whether our actions conform with, or are 
contrary to, the moral law (Kant 1996: 528). It is not a predisposition to know good or evil (Kant 
1996: 529), but rather “a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical 
reason” (Kant 1996: 529). In this respect, moral obligation depends upon moral feeling (Kant 1996: 
528). Since we naturally possess moral feeling, we are not obligated to have it. We are, however, 
obligated to cultivate and strengthen it (Kant 1996: 529). 
Kant’s aesthetics15 provides a solution to both these problems. If becoming an autonomous agent 
capable of moral self-legislation requires bridging the gap between understanding and knowing, 
bringing accord between what we want to do and what we ought to do, then aesthetic judgment is 
the bridge. Moreover, aesthetic judgement helps attune us to moral feeling.  
Aesthetic judgment is a form of reflective judgment rather than a determining judgment. The latter 
applies existing concepts to objects, the former seeks to discover concepts (Guyer 2006: 308). 
                                                          
15 Kant’s Critique of Judgment provides “the most influential and original treatment of the newly founded 
philosophical discipline of aesthetics” (Hammermeister 2002: 25). The Critique of Judgement has two main 
parts: the critique of the aesthetic power of judgments, which refers to the judgments we make regarding 
beauty and the sublime in nature and art; and the critique of the teleological power of judgment, which refers 
to our judgments of systematic organization of things in nature (Guyer 2006: 307). 
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Aesthetic judgement is non-cognitive (Kant 2000: 89), possess neither a theoretical nor a practical 
orientation, and is purely contemplative (Kant 2000: 95).  
Kant identifies two aesthetic elements: beauty and the sublime. There are two types of beauty. 
Adherent beauty is dependent upon a concept that defines its perfection. Such beauty is reliant 
upon our interest in the object, and its capacity to satisfy its purpose. Free beauty is free of concept 
(Kant 2000: 104), interest we may have in the object, or its utility value. Since it serves no purpose 
other than itself, it is independently beautiful (Kant 2000: 114-5). Free beauty is the aesthetically 
significant type.   
Despite proclaiming that free beauty is independently beautiful, Kant maintains that there is no 
objective property that makes a thing beautiful – instead beauty exists only in reference to the 
subject. Beauty is nothing other than a subjective experience (Kant 2000: 89) felt in the form of 
aesthetic pleasure. This is the qualifying property of beauty – we cannot proclaim something to be 
beautiful if it does not affect us in an aesthetically significant way (Kant 2000: 95).  
While the experience of beauty is subjective, beauty “pleases universally” (Kant 2000: 104. It is not 
feeling based on personal desire, but instead must please independently of all interest, i.e. it is 
dependent on an objective state of mind. What we find beautiful, we do so because of the delight it 
produces in us; and yet because beauty is mind-dependent, i.e. the mind imposes order and design 
onto the perceived object, the pleasure that arises in an aesthetic experience, as a result of our 
ordinary powers of cognition, is something we all experience. Accordingly, beauty possess 
‘subjective universal validity’.   
The sublime refers to the sheer magnitude and power of natural objects and forces that 
simultaneously threaten our existence, causing feelings of vulnerability and fear, and exceed our 
comprehension, causing awe and wonder. The sublime does not exist within objects (Kant 2000: 
128), but instead it refers to subjective states – feelings of pleasure and pain – that arise when we 
encounter the sublime.  
Kant recognizes two forms of sublime experience. The ‘mathematical sublime’ involves a free play 
between imagination and theoretical reason in response to scales of infinite magnitudes. These 
provide a simultaneous experience of our own limitations, and a sense of the infinite (Guyer 2006: 
321-2). The ‘dynamical sublime’ involves a free play between imagination and practical reason in 
response to objects that are powerful and threatening (Guyer 2006: 322).  
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The sublime provides two important experiences. Through the realization that the threat is not 
imminent, we discover that transcendent freedom exists independently of, and is immune to, 
natural forces (Hammermeister 2002: 34). This permits us to turn anxiety into pleasure. It also 
permits us to see our own concerns as trivial (Kant 2000: 145). This provides us with an experience 
of the capacity of our practical reason to not only override self-interested resistance and natural 
inclinations, but also to honour that which is contrary to our interest (Kant 2000: 154). This has a 
moral dimension: it allows us to set our petty interests aside and align our sense of freedom with the 
moral law (Guyer 2006: 322).   
Aesthetic judgments are morally significant in three ways: they provide access to moral concepts, 
such as autonomy and the moral good; they help develop moral judgment; and attune us to moral 
feeling. 
Experiencing beauty prepares us for morality by presenting moral ideas to us in novel and satisfying 
ways (Guyer 2006: 324). For example, the external free expression of the human form provides a 
sensuous expression of the moral idea of autonomy – the inner value of man’s moral character (Kant 
2000: 119). In addition, works of art can give us access to the noumenal realm, to ideals that lie 
beyond space and time (Rodriguez 2012: 35), i.e. beauty can stand “as the symbol of the morally 
good” (Kant 2000: 225).  
Aesthetic judgments help develop moral judgement. The form of aesthetic judgment is analogous to 
the form of a moral judgment. Both moral and aesthetic judgments are autonomous. Both arise as a 
result of the free play of the imagination. The experience of beauty that arises as a result of the free 
play of the imagination with understanding, provides us with a feeling of freedom. This experience is 
symbolic of moral freedom – the freedom of the will to determine itself in accordance with the 
moral law (Guyer 2006: 326). Both are self-legislating in that they provide the law unto themselves 
(Kant 2000: 229). Finally, given the subjective universality of the aesthetic experience, they can both 
be regarded as valid for everyone (Kant 2000: 228).  
Aesthetic experience can attune us with moral feeling, such as joyful obedience (Frankena 1965: 
125). The experience of beauty provides a feeling of pleasure that is independent of immediate 
cognition or any practical purpose. This prepares the way for moral conduct in that it helps us to 
appreciate the moral law in and by itself, i.e. to see the shining light of pure morality; as well as to 
love it outside of our own interest or intended utility (Kant 1996: 564). This permits us fulfil our 
duties with an “ever-cheerful heart” (Kant 1996: 597). The exact relationship between beauty and 
moral feeling remains an open question: whether perceiving beauty creates moral feeling, or 
whether it reflects a predisposition to an existing feeling. On the one hand Kant maintains that 
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taking an interest in the beauty in nature is reflective of a mind that is favourable to moral feeling 
(Kant 2000: 178). Further on he claims that developing moral ideas and feeling is the only mode of 
instruction to lay the foundations of good taste (Kant 2000: 229). 
Given that the capacity to experience beauty and the sublime is integral to becoming moral, and by 
extension the aspiration to ‘be good’, having an aesthetic experience is an additional practice Kant 
would advocate. Since the ability to have an aesthetic experience is non-cognitive, it requires 
something other than conceptual and theoretical engagement.  
The notion of free play is central to having an aesthetic experience (Kant 2000: 102-3). Free play 
refers to the unification or harmony between the faculties of imagination (sensation and intuition) 
and understanding (abstract and conceptual). Such an experience is free from conscious 
determination, i.e. seeing the world as it is presented, uncorrupted by meaning, purpose or desire 
(Kant 2000: 102). This is encapsulated by two of Kant’s moments of aesthetic judgment – 
disinterestedness, and purposiveness without purpose. To look at something free of interest or 
desire, concept and end, requires us to look at the object as a pure phenomenon and not as an 
existent entity. Even the act of observing must be without aim, i.e. we look at the object as if for the 
first time. This entails passively receiving the contents of the senses instead of actively trying to 
organize them. This process is not to be rushed. “We linger over the consideration of the beautiful 
because this consideration strengthens and reproduces itself … (when) the mind is passive” (Kant 
2000: 107). It is this free play of the imagination which produces aesthetic pleasure and the freedom 
from reason that makes it autonomous.  
I contend that having an aesthetic experience would be a significantly new addition to philosophical 
practice. Exactly what this would entail is open to conjecture. It may entail looking at beautiful works 
of art, listening to selected pieces of music, or even dancing. It is also an open question as to how 
beautiful objects would be selected. The practitioner might select beautiful objects for the 
participant to practice her aesthetic perception on, or the practitioner and pupil could make such a 
selection together, or the participant could make the selection. The crucial thing is that aesthetic 
perception is something that has to be practiced and experienced, and that the practitioner and 
participant don’t get wholly side-tracked into having a discussion on what is beautiful.  
While Dewey develops his aesthetics late in his career, Gauss (1960: 127) regards it as “the master 
key which unlocks the doors that communicate with the different parts of his system”. I will show 
that Dewey’s aesthetics completes his metaphysical notion of ‘experience’ by providing an account 
of a unified experience, and what is entailed in having such an experience. I will explore Dewey’s 
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account of art which is regarded as the most complete manifestation of ‘an experience’. I will show 
that having ‘an experience’ is implicated in his method of inquiry.  
If problems arise when experience is interrupted and thus inchoate, then the ideal experience, one 
which is problem free, is a unified experience. A unified experience is referred to as ‘an experience’.  
‘An experience’ has the following general conditions (Dewey 1958: 137): it possesses internal 
integrity; runs its full course; is meaningful; and is inherently valuable (Campbell 1995: 71-2).  
Internal integrity refers to the unification of doing and undergoing, a harmonious rhythm of in and 
out breaths that give the experience pattern and structure (Gauss 1960: 128). Each part of the 
experience flows seamlessly from one thing to the next (Dewey 1958: 36). While the experience has 
continuity, there are also “pauses, places of rest … (that) punctuate and define the quality of 
movement” (Dewey 1958: 36).  
An experience runs its course to completion when it achieves “successful consummation” (Campbell 
1995: 72). Every unified experience reaches an end once the active energies “have done their proper 
work” (Dewey 1958: 41). When this occurs the rhythmic breaths, the doing and undergoing that 
drive the experience, become integrated and interconnected (Alexander 2016: 65).  
A growing sense of meaning is attained with the consummation of an experience. An experience is 
“an incipient sign situation” (Gauss 1960: 129): it is pregnant with possibility. An experience entails 
an intensification of meaning, which is perceptual and pre-conceptual, and is felt as accomplishment 
(Alexander 2016: 65).  
The creation of new meaning is intrinsically valuable. New meaning is a source of happiness or 
fulfilment. Happiness “comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavour to wrest 
from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning” (Einstein et al 1931: 
27). While such experiences are the source of happiness, they are inherently valuable in that they 
are enjoyed for their own sake and not for the happiness they bring (Gauss 1960: 129). 
Any experience can be ‘an experience’ provided it embodies these ‘general conditions’. Gauss (1960: 
128) offers the following as examples: a ‘completed passage of thought’; ‘good moral conduct’; ‘a 
surgical operation’; ‘the Paris meal’; and ‘that storm at sea’.  
Art is regarded as the most complete manifestation of ‘an experience’ (Gauss 1960: 130). Dewey 
does not restrict ‘art’ to conventional conceptualizations. He regards art as intelligent conduct: “the 
mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession” (Dewey 
1929a: 358). That he draws little distinction between fine art and other of the useful arts (Dewey 
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1929a: 363) permits him to include scientific inquiry, democratic living, social planning or any 
intelligent action into the realm of ‘art’ (Gauss 1960: 132). Dewey describes art multifariously as: the 
interplay of energies, intent, a mode of communication, and a means of transformation.  
There is a natural rhythm, an interplay of energies that is “prefigured in the very process of living” 
(Dewey 1958: 24). This “universal scheme of existence” (Dewey 1958: 150) is evident in the transfer 
from day to night, and in the movement of the tides and through the seasons. This natural rhythm is 
inherent in art (Dewey 1958: 150). Dewey (1958: 169) describes rhythm in art as: “rationality among 
qualities” – it is aesthetic recurrence, the variation in repetition that allows for equivalence not 
identity, novelty within expectation, and suspense; and as relationship – the balance between 
elements and energies. Great art occurs when “all materials are interpenetrated by rhythm” (Dewey 
1958: 170). This transforms the subject matter, creates novelty in the familiar, and provides a “sense 
of an inner revelation” (Dewey 1958: 170). 
Art is the “realization of intent” (Dewey 1958: 85). An experience is aesthetic only when the rhythms 
are internalized (Dewey 1958: 162). This does not occur by happenstance, but though choice and 
effort. Understanding art as a product of intent and effort expands the notion of art beyond that of 
the art object to include the creative process of producing art as well as the experience and 
appreciation of art. The artist intends to produce a work of art that expresses a particular feeling or 
emotion. Emotion is so central to art that there can be no art without emotion (Dewey 1958: 69). 
The artist embarks on an active process of molding and shaping the work until she achieves the 
correct aesthetic balance (Dewey 1958: 87). This process modifies and transforms the original 
emotion, and channels into something positive and fulfilling (Dewey 1958: 78). An identical process 
of intent and effort is required to receive and appreciate art (Dewey 1958: 177). Perceiving art 
requires active engagement. The viewer must work to create her own experience (Dewey 1958: 55). 
She will not receive the same emotion the artist put in, because the work of art “is recreated every 
time it is esthetically experienced” (Dewey 1958: 108). The act of recreation enlivens the 
consciousness. This is experienced as an “inner commotion” (Dewey 1958: 53) in the sense that the 
perceived object becomes emotionally charged. This emotion is impersonal as it is not based on 
personal fortune (Dewey 1958: 186). 
Because art expresses, it communicates (Dewey 1958: 104). Communication entails participating in 
the sharing and creation of vivid meaning (Dewey 1958: 104). Art is “the most effective mode of 
communication” (Dewey 1958: 286) as it does not rely on words or concepts. This allows art to 
transcend the barriers that usually divide us (Dewey 1958: 244). Since art communicates without 
words it can convey a range of meanings and experiences (Dewey 1958: 133). Granted it may lose 
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particularity and precision, but it gains broadness and depth. Since any mode of communication not 
only needs to be spoken but also heard in order to exist, we should be trained to listen. If we cannot 
hear what art is communicating, then art cannot be fully heard, and transformation cannot take 
place.  
Transformation is intimately and necessarily connected to art (Dewey 1958: 62). Two simultaneous 
transformations occur through the production of art: there is an outer transformation in the 
materials that the artist uses; and there is an inner transformation as the images, memories and 
emotions are modified and reformed (Dewey 1958: 74). Rodriguez (2012: 27) argues that this inner 
transformation can change the way we orientate ourselves to the world, and improve our quality of 
life. Art can release us from conceptual entrenchments (Rodriguez 2012: 36). By expressing a wider 
range of existential possibilities it brings us “into a more intimate relationship with the world … 
making us more attuned to the pre-reflective ground of our existence” (Rodriguez 2012: 37). It can 
also provide us with “a felt sense of underlying purposiveness” (Rodriguez 2012: 34), and cultivate “a 
sense of harmonious comfort in regards to our phenomenal existence” (Rodriguez 2012: 35). In light 
of this, he claims that art performs an “ameliorative task” (2012: 31) that can offer “some release 
from the deep anxieties of life (Rodriguez 2012: 31).This ameliorative effect is evident in Dewey’s 
method of inquiry that is directed at solving problems. 
While Dewey’s method of inquiry may seem to be a narrowly intellectualized approach, Luntley 
(2016: 3) argues that aesthetics is “the driver, vehicle and consummation of inquiry”. Inquiry does 
not begin with questions or knowledge, but at the aesthetic level of experience: our immediate and 
pre-reflective sense of things that things either belong or do not belong. It is through “a sense of 
unease” (Luntley 2016: 3), unsettledness or indeterminacy (Dewey 1938: 107) that we become 
aware that a situation is problematic. We similarly sense when a problem is resolved. When balance 
is restored we get a “sense of fit” (Luntley 2016: 3), and a “sense of closure” (Luntley 2016: 14).  
Aesthetic experience is intimately implicated in the problem solving process. While Dewey highlights 
the cognitive processes involved in solving a problem, Luntley (2016: 4) argues that aesthetic 
experience, which is ‘non-cognitive’ (non-conceptual, non-intellectual and indeterminate), makes 
knowledge gathering possible. Problematic situations arise when our existing conceptual framework 
is insufficient to make sense of and resolve the situation. Our aesthetic sense of fit drives us to look 
for and grasp pre-conceptual patterns (Luntley 2016: 15).  
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Imagination is a useful aesthetic mechanism (Luntley 2016: 15-6)16. Dewey (1958: 267) describes 
imagination as “a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation. It is a 
way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole”. It is imagination that blends 
the old and familiar into new experience. Experience becomes conscious only when meaning is 
assigned to it. This operation relies solely on imagination. It is “the only gateway through which … 
meanings can find their way into present interaction” (Dewey 1958: 272). It is through imagination 
and experimentation, a trial and error process, that we can arrive at an adequate formulation of the 
problem (Luntley 2016: 17).  
Other aesthetic mechanisms include: receptiveness, surrender, and a temporal orientation to the 
present. Receptive perception is “open and flexible to the ever-changing dynamics of experience” 
(Rodriguez 2012: 32). Surrender entails giving up preconceived notions, labels, concepts, desires, 
needs, existing schema (Dewey 1958: 53) so that we can receive a direct, unreasoned impression. A 
temporal orientation that is firmly located in the present allows the senses to be fully attuned to the 
world, and the mind to have singleness in focus. This permits “active and alert commerce with the 
world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events” 
(Dewey 1958: 19). More than an aesthetic mechanisms it appears to be a preferable existential 
stance: “only when the past ceases to trouble and anticipations of the future are not perturbing is a 
being fully united with his environment and therefore fully alive” (Dewey 1958: 18). 
I argue that the aesthetics of Kant and Dewey are divergent. But there are conceptual points of 
agreement. Both regard an aesthetic experience as: unified and harmonious; non-cognitive and pre-
conceptual; and as something that causing delight or happiness. In addition, both implicate the 
imagination in the aesthetic process. However, there are significant differences between them. Kant 
draws a distinction between the aesthetic judgement needed to have an aesthetic experience and 
the experience itself, while Dewey does not. A more prominent difference pertains to what they 
recognize as possessing aesthetic significance. Kant limits his focus to beauty found in works of art, 
and experiences of the sublime in nature. Dewey extends the concept of art to all forms of 
                                                          
16 Other aesthetic mechanisms include: receptiveness, surrender, and a temporal orientation to the present. 
Receptive perception is “open and flexible to the ever-changing dynamics of experience” (Rodriguez 2012: 32). 
Surrender entails giving up preconceived notions, labels, concepts, desires, needs, existing schema (Dewey 
1958: 53) so that we can receive a direct, unreasoned impression. A temporal orientation that is firmly located 
in the present allows the senses to be fully attuned to the world, and the mind to have singleness in focus. This 
permits “active and alert commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self 
and the world of objects and events” (Dewey 1958: 19). More than an aesthetic mechanisms it appears to be a 
preferable existential stance: “only when the past ceases to trouble and anticipations of the future are not 
perturbing is a being fully united with his environment and therefore fully alive” (Dewey 1958: 18). 
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intelligent conduct, including scientific inquiry and democratic living. Finally, both advocate 
fundamentally different perceptual stances in order to have an aesthetic experience: Kant endorses 
the necessity of passively perceiving art; while Dewey promotes the need for active engagement and 
recreation.  
Explicating the aesthetic element in the philosophies of Kant and Dewey is relevant to philosophical 
practice in three ways. Firstly, it contributes to understanding their respective philosophical systems. 
Secondly, the aesthetic dimension is a unique contribution that introduces aesthetic values and 
modalities into the philosophical way of life. Thirdly, it introduces aesthetic perception to 
philosophical practice. If it is the case that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is preeminent in 
philosophical practice, and such an approach is discursive, then the introduction of aesthetics might 
interject a non-discursive aspect into the practice. Since an aesthetic experience is perceptual and 
pre-conceptual, it is something that has to be experienced, not merely discussed. Since having an 
aesthetic experience requires assuming a particular stance – this would require training and 
experience. Practitioners could offer both to the participant.  
I argue that aesthetics makes an additional, though more particular, contribution. While Aristotle 
endorses the importance of developing one’s sensitivities in the Nicomachean Ethics (section 1.4), 
he fails to provide any indication of how this might be achieved. Having an aesthetic experience is 
one way to achieve this. Admittedly, this would only develop the participant’s aesthetic sensitivities. 
However, given that aesthetic feeling is independent of one’s personal interests and desire, and 
Aristotle would encourage us to work away from personal preferences, it is likely that Aristotle 
would endorse this.      
One might object that philosophy is nothing other than critical conceptual engagement, and thus 
any move away from critical discursive activity is effectively a move away from philosophy. I reply 
that this is a narrow and overly intellectualized understanding of philosophy that is at odds with the 
conception of philosophy as a way of life.   
4.10 Conclusion  
In this chapter I explored the contributions Kant and Dewey might make to philosophical practice. I 
argued that they offer philosophical ways of life. Since a philosophical way of life is a self-contained 
and coherent system, I contend that explicating their ethics, metaphysics, epistemologies and 
aesthetics is essential to understanding their respective philosophical systems. Having a rich and 
detailed understanding of the philosophical system is essential to not only understanding, but also 
living, the way of life each philosopher advocates.  
115 
 
I argued that the ethical ways of life offered by these philosophers are practically relevant to 
philosophical practice. I argued that Kant and Dewey endorse the transformative aspiration to be 
good: living in accordance with the intellect, and acting in accordance with an ethical principle. Kant 
promotes autonomy as the Good and advocates living in accordance with the moral law. Dewey 
promotes growth as the Good, and considers outcomes that positively affect the general welfare as 
morally significant. I argued that these aspirations could be practically relevant to philosophical 
practice as they serve as moral directives to the respective philosophical ways of life. 
I explored the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey. Kant promotes the project of cultivating 
one’s spirit, which entails developing our intellect (reason), while controlling our inclinations and 
subduing our affect and passions. Dewey promotes the project of self-reconstruction, which entails 
the realization of personal potential by harnessing our capacities and dispositions, with the view to 
making ourselves better. I argued that the transformative projects of Kant and Dewey could be 
relevant to philosophical practice.  
I explored the social element implicated in the philosophies of Kant and Dewey. Both philosophers 
advocate active social engagement in the attainment of their respective transformative projects. I 
argued that this social dimension could introduce a novel political element into philosophical 
practice.  
I showed that educating others is a necessary component of Kant and Dewey’s transformative 
projects. Educating others is a manifestation of Kant’s duty of beneficence. Dewey promotes 
education as a necessary component in reconstructing self and society. I argued that this educative 
element could change the way philosophical practice is offered, i.e. to groups rather than restricted 
to the single participant.  
I explored the practices Kant and Dewey advocate as means to their respective transformative 
projects. Kant suggests a range of practices that aim to increase our capacity to understand, think 
and act in accordance with moral law. These include: catechism, the moral exemplar, critical 
reasoning and contemplation. I argued that, since these transformative tools are already 
documented in the philosophical practice literature, they offer nothing new. I argued that Kant’s 
practice of aesthetic perception would be a new addition to philosophical practice. I argued that 
Dewey’s ‘method of inquiry’ might offer something new to philosophical practice.  
I examined the roles Kant and Dewey might assign to the philosopher. I regard the roles of 
philosopher as moral prophet and friend as new contributions to philosophical practice. I 
acknowledged the moral prophet requires an existential commitment from the practitioner that 
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many may not be willing to make. The role of philosopher as friend is less demanding as it only 
requires a personal commitment from the practitioner. I argued that this role is a fundamentally 
different to that of the Socratic gadfly, which requires nothing more from the practitioner than a 
neutral, disinterested intellectual investment.  
I argued that the metaphysics of Kant and Dewey are relevant to philosophical practice. Not only 
does understanding their metaphysics contribute to the general understanding of their respective 
philosophical systems, since their metaphysical stances are intimately implicated in their respective 
transformative agendas, they are integral to their respective philosophical ways of life.  
I argued that the epistemologies of Kant and Dewey are relevant to philosophical practice. Kant’s 
epistemology is an integral component of his philosophical way of life as it underpins and informs his 
view that man possesses a dual nature, and that man’s true dignity lies in living in accordance with 
reason. Accordingly, anyone living a Kantian philosophical way of life should have a clear 
understanding of his epistemology. Dewey’s method of inquiry, which I argued might offer a new 
methodological approach to philosophical practice, is a practical expression of his epistemic outlook.      
I argued that the aesthetics of Kant and Dewey are relevant to philosophical practice in a number of 
ways. Their aesthetics: contribute to the understanding their respective philosophical systems; 
introduce aesthetic values and modalities into their respective philosophical ways of life; and 
introduce aesthetic perception to philosophical practice. The significance of the latter contribution is 
that it interjects a non-discursive aspect into philosophical practice.   
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Chapter Five  
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
Let me summarise. The purpose of this dissertation, as frequently reiterated in this discussion, is to 
develop and enrich philosophical practice. An examination of the philosophical practice literature 
revealed a domain constituted by an array of approaches that posit a diversity of ends and 
surprisingly few means. In an attempt to unify the field I argued for a singular vision of philosophical 
practice as phronetic: practical wisdom that brings about / increases well-being. Moreover, I argued 
that a Socratic vision of philosophizing, the pre-eminent method in philosophical practice, is 
insufficient to attain phronetic ends. I associated philosophical practice with the conception of 
philosophy as a way of life; and, by extension, assume that any philosophy that accords with such a 
conception could be relevant to philosophical practice. In this chapter I will explore the contributions 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might make to philosophical practice.   
Shuster (1999: 31) identifies Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as offering philosophical ways of life. I 
confirm this by arguing that they satisfy the five criteria of a philosophical way of life. I argue that 
they satisfy the first criterion as they endorse a transformative aspiration to become authentic 
(section 5.1). I argue that they satisfy the second criterion as they each endorse the transformative 
project to invent a pattern of existence. I will show that Kierkegaard follows a religious pattern of 
existence, and that Nietzsche describes an aesthetically inspired pattern of existence (section 5.2). I 
argue that they satisfy the third criterion as they endorse a vision of philosophizing that is holistic 
and personally invested since they promote the importance of passion and affect in philosophizing 
(section 5.3). I argue that they satisfy the fourth criterion as they endorse a range of transformative 
tools (section 5.4). I argue that they satisfy the fifth criterion as they provide self-contained and 
coherent philosophical systems. Their respective ethical ways of life are underwritten by 
metaphysics that posit change as the fundamental nature of material reality (section 5.6); and 
epistemologies that recognise the individual as the locus of truth (section 5.7).  
There are good reasons for pairing these particular philosophers: they endorse the transformative 
aspiration to ‘become authentic’; they have a distinctive orientation toward the individual; they 
appear to endorse a-social ways of life; they express an aesthetic-ontological element; yet despite 
these commonalities, they offer divergent philosophical ways of life.   
Firstly, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche endorse the transformative aspiration to become authentic. 
Becoming authentic means to emerge from and stand out from the crowd. Becoming authentic for 
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Kierkegaard is an act of concretization, which entails becoming a subject; while for Nietzsche it is an 
act of self-creation. 
Secondly, the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have a distinctive orientation toward the 
individual. The philosophical ways of life they circumscribe are highly individualistic to the degree 
that they are designed specifically for themselves, and themselves alone. They would not encourage 
others to follow their pattern of existence, for to follow another’s path is synonymous with living an 
inauthentic life. Inauthentic living is the very thing they were attempting to move away from. This 
does not render their respective philosophies irrelevant to philosophical practice, as they offered 
their writings with the intention of enticing others to develop their own unique patterns of 
existence, and in so doing, circumscribe their own path to becoming authentic. 
Thirdly, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche appear to endorse a-social ways of life since their patterns of 
existence result in the individual contravening society’s moral laws. For Kierkegaard (2004b: 9) the 
religious individual’s duty to God supersedes all ethical considerations. He proclaims that “the single 
individual is higher than the universal”.  While such an individual does not reject society’s norms and 
values (Kierkegaard 2004b: 34), he does not necessarily live in accordance with them. This is evident, 
in Fear and Trembling (2004b), where Abraham is prepared to kill his son Isaac to prove his love to 
God. It is a misconception to assume that Kierkegaard refuses society’s values. The knight of faith 
does not dismiss the ethical (universal values), as he “knows that it is glorious to belong to the 
universal” (Kierkegaard 2004b: 34), and wishes nothing more than to remain in the universal. The 
very thing that causes fear and trembling in Abraham is that he has incorporated the ethical into his 
being. He acknowledges the duty that he has to his son, and knows that killing him is wrong. If he did 
not, then Isaac’s sacrifice would be insignificant. As an individual in an absolute relationship with 
God, the knight of faith acts in accordance with the dictates of God. In contrast, Nietzsche 
encourages the revaluation of society’s norms and values. He is particularly critical of utilitarianism, 
the predominant social morality at the time, which is concerned with “the preservation of the 
community” (Nietzsche 1967b: 123). He refers to utilitarianism as a herd morality and as the 
morality of the lower man (Nietzsche 1967a: 537), and encourages the individual on the path of 
becoming to develop her own moral values. While Nietzsche (1994: 50) rejects social norms and 
values, he does not reject social arrangements. He affirms the centrality of community to power and 
authenticity. Society provides the framework within which the individual can create themselves. This 
presents a paradox, as authenticity cannot be realized without society, yet, for Nietzsche, it cannot 
be lived within the prevailing moral domain. It is such that Nietzsche (1994: 50) promotes the need 
for a community of equally powerful individuals. 
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Fourthly, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche express an aesthetic element that has a distinctive ontological 
application, i.e. art is promoted as a way of being. Kierkegaard presents three patterns of existence: 
aesthetic, ethical and religious. The aesthetic mode of existence is concerned with the pursuit of 
pleasure. He regards this as the lowest form of existence. In contrast, Nietzsche’s notion of 
becoming and his three patterns of existence can be understood as a complex aesthetic 
phenomenon. He enjoins us to live aesthetically, and create ourselves as we would a work of art.   
Finally, there is significant tension between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I will argue that Kierkegaard 
offers a transcendent philosophical way of live, and I will argue that Nietzsche offers an immanent 
philosophical way of life.   
This chapter will be dedicated to exploring and unpacking their respective philosophies with a view 
to establishing the particular contributions that they could make to phronetic philosophical practice. 
I will begin by exploring their ethical ways of life, which include their transformative aspirations, 
projects and practices. I will then explore their respective metaphysics and epistemologies.   
In section 5.1 I will explore the transformative aspiration to become authentic. The call to ‘become 
authentic’ rests on the recognition that our common state of being is inauthentic. I will show that 
becoming for Kierkegaard is an act of concretization; while for Nietzsche it is an act of self-creation. 
In section 5.2 I will explore the transformative projects of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche – their 
respective ‘patterns of existence’.   
In section 5.3 I will explore the primacy Kierkegaard and Nietzsche award to passion, affect and 
feeling in their modes of philosophizing. I will show that Kierkegaard promotes the centrality of 
passion and denies the role of reason. Moreover, he recognizes that existential feelings, such as 
despair, serve an integral instrumental role in the process of becoming. I will show that Nietzsche 
promotes affect over reason, though, unlike Kierkegaard, he does not deny reason. 
In section 5.4 I will explore the transformative practices Kierkegaard and Nietzsche promote, which 
are particular to their respective philosophical ways of life. Kierkegaard advocates silence, irony, self-
vigilance, contemplation of one’s death, self-reflection, and ‘the leap’. Nietzsche advocates self-
overcoming, self-disclosure, aesthetic distance, revaluating values, and the test of eternal 
recurrence. I will argue that his use of masks can function as a transformative tool.  
In section 5.5 I will then explore the roles Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might assign to the 
philosopher. Kierkegaard indicates that the philosopher could be a ‘physician of the soul’. Nietzsche 
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advocates a series of roles to the ‘new philosopher’ that include: free-spirit, social critic, re-valuator 
of values, legislator and leader.  
In section 5.6 I will enunciate the metaphysics of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. This is crucial to 
understanding their philosophical ways of life as their metaphysics underpin and inform their 
respective ethical ways of life. While both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche recognize change as the 
fundamental ground of material reality, they hold contrary metaphysical visions. I will show that 
Kierkegaard offers a dualistic metaphysic that recognizes God as infinite and the world as finite. I will 
show that Nietzsche provides a naturalistic metaphysic / ontology that places ‘the will to power’ at 
the centre of life.   
In section 5.7 I will enunciate the epistemologies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Both develop their 
epistemologies in reaction to prevailing objectivist notions. Kierkegaard sets his notion of subjective 
truth in contrast to the objective truth posited by idealists. Nietzsche offers the idea that truth is 
only ever a matter of perspective. As a result, he re-conceives objective truth as the capacity to 
simultaneously entertain multiple perspectives.   
5.1 Transformative Aspiration: ‘become authentic’ 
In this section I will discuss the transformative aspirations of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: to ‘become 
authentic’. I will show that Kierkegaard understands becoming as an act of concretization; while 
Nietzsche understands it as an act of self-creation. I will argue that the transformative aspiration to 
become authentic is practically relevant to philosophical practice.  
The call to ‘become authentic’ rests on the recognition that the common state of being is 
inauthentic. The existent17 is inauthentic when she fails to seek out and express her own subjectivity. 
This occurs when she unconsciously adopt modes of living and self-understanding that comply with 
the norms and standards of society (Frede 1993: 57). She surrenders herself to everyday life and 
public opinion. She allows herself to dissolve into the ‘they’, and become an indefinite part of her 
age (Kierkegaard 1992: 355). She takes comfort in being part of the great herd (Kierkegaard 1992: 
356). This is a negative state of being, which Nietzsche (1994: 12) describes as: “low-minded, 
common, plebeian”; as well as weak, sickly and fearful (Nietzsche 1967a: 502). This is the most 
common form of existence (Heidegger 1962: 219-20). Since we live in the world among others this is 
not only understandable, it is to be expected. The problem with this is that we permit ourselves to 
                                                          
17 Terms such as ‘I’, ‘we, ‘man’ and ‘human’ are generally avoided by existential authors as they “are loaded 
with unwelcomed empirical and metaphysical connotations” (Cooper 1999: 67). Hence, Kierkegaard’s ‘the 
existing individual’, Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’, Sartre’s ‘in-itself, for-itself’, and in this chapter, the use of ‘existent’.  
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be shaped by external forces and influences. This is undesirable in that it renders us “castrated” 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 207) impenitent, irresponsible, and reduces us to mediocrity (Nietzsche 1967a: 
502). Moreover, it prevents us from realizing our full potential.  
The idea that the self is a potential to be realized rests on the notion that self is non-essential. 
According to this self is indeterminate, and comes into being through the process of living. Situations 
and circumstances play a significant part in shaping the self, as do our conceptions of who we are, 
and the way we relate ourselves to the experiences we have and the world in which we find 
ourselves. Kierkegaard (2004a: 41) defines self in relational terms: as “a relation that relates itself to 
itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation”. Hannay (1998: 335) describes 
Kierkegaard’s notion of self as a “definite product” and a “diversely determined concretion” that is 
constituted by one’s identity, particular aptitudes, tendencies, instincts and passions. Nietzsche 
would agree that the self is non-essential. He proclaims that there is no true and essential being 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 305). Golomb (1995: 69) describes Nietzsche’s notion of self as nothing more than 
“a bundle of conflicting desires and an array of contradictory possibilities”, while Nehamas (1983: 
389) describes Nietzsche’s self as nothing more than a function of its own creation, a fiction added 
to action. Nietzsche (1967a: 369) appears to posit a contradictory position. On the one hand he 
denies an essential being, while on the other he affirms the essence of being when he states that the 
will to power is “the innermost essence of being”. Understanding Nietzsche’s notion of the will to 
power (section 4.6) will reveal that there is no contradiction. He recognizes that the world, and 
everything in it, is not fixed and determinate but in a permanent state of flux. The idea of the will to 
power is his understanding of that transformative potential. 
Becoming authentic is synonymous with the emergence of one’s being. One emerges from the world 
when one stands outside and separate from the group (Kierkegaard 1992: 356), and resists being 
absorbed back into it. Becoming authentic requires the existent to exert influence on, take 
possession of, choose, and mould herself.  There are varied stances regarding the degree to which 
one can realize and change oneself. Some maintain that the individual possesses the freedom and 
power to completely transcend and shape herself, while for others there are limits to the existent’s 
transformative potential (Macquarrie 1973: 189). 
Becoming authentic, for Kierkegaard, is an act of concretization. Becoming concrete is the process of 
becoming a subject (Kierkegaard 2004a: 59). One has to become subjective in order to become a 
subject (Kierkegaard 1992: 131). This requires the existent to understand herself as an existing being 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 351), develop a life-view and become absorbed in it (Kierkegaard 1992: 352). The 
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existent must be interested in existing. Being interested in existing is the actuality of the existing 
individual (Kierkegaard 1992: 314).  
Kierkegaard makes a distinction between actuality and possibility. Possibility is a result of abstraction 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 315). Since all knowledge is an abstraction, it is merely possibility (Kierkegaard 
1992: 316). Possibility is nothing more than disinterestedness, which is “the expression for 
indifference to actuality” (Kierkegaard 1992: 318). Actuality arises out of interestedness, and is lived. 
Actuality is “interiority infinitely interested in existing” (Kierkegaard 1992: 325), and occurs when the 
individual chooses to identify herself with a thought and exist in that thought (Kierkegaard 1992: 
339). The ‘actuality’ of the individual refers to the intersection between “thinking and being” 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 314). It is the point of correspondence, or inner harmony, between our emotions 
and our actions (Golomb 1995: 47). This is synonymous with the unification of consciousness, and is 
the only way for the existent to become whole (Earnshaw 2006: 114-5).  
It is the task of the existent “to transform himself into an instrument that clearly and definitely 
expresses in existence the essentially human” (Kierkegaard 1992: 356). Humans are unique in that 
they are “a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and 
necessity” (Kierkegaard 2004a: 42). To truly exist as a human one has to develop both aspects of 
one’s being: one has to “to permeate one’s existence with consciousness, simultaneously to be 
eternal, far beyond it … and nevertheless present in it and nevertheless in a process of becoming” 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 308). To exist in this manner is the fullest realization of what it means to be 
human (Kierkegaard 1992: 313).  
Becoming authentic for Nietzsche (1967a: 331) is an act of self-creation that includes “invention, 
willing, self-denial, overcoming of oneself”. Nietzsche (1967a: 270) hypothesizes that the subject is 
not a unified whole, but instead is a multiplicity of character traits, actions and desires, a plurality of 
fragments in tension. Self-creation entails grouping some of the multiplicities together into a unity 
(Nehamas 1983: 399). The point of this is not to create a stable and predictable character, rather it is 
to develop the flexibility to be able to combine the multiplicities together in different patterns, 
resulting in different unities. This is an ongoing process that is synonymous with growth, 
improvement and enhancement (Schacht 1983: 249); but is devoid of final intentions and never 
reaches a state of finality or rest (Nehamas 1983: 385). The stronger one becomes, the greater 
number of multiplicities one can have. According to Nietzsche (1967a: 507) the “highest man would 
have the highest multiplicity of drives”.  
Becoming authentic, for both philosophers, is an unattainable aspiration. It is continually strived for 
and yet never fully achieved, since the existent is always unfinished and is in a constant state of 
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emergence (Cooper 1999: 3). In this respect becoming authentic is without end. An end would imply 
a finality to one’s existence, and this only comes with death (Kierkegaard 1992: 158). To think that 
the process of becoming could ever be complete is dangerous as the existent is likely to cease her 
efforts.  
I contend that the transformative aspiration to become authentic could be practically relevant to 
philosophical practice that is inspired by Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical ways of life. It 
would serves as a directive to guide the participant on her own transformative project. Cooper 
(1999: 177) refers to ‘authenticity’, and associated notions such as ‘authentic living’ and ‘existential 
freedom’, as super-directives. Grene (1952: 268) regards authenticity as a virtue. It is important to 
note that the above conceptions of becoming authentic apply restrictively to these philosophers. To 
adopt Kierkegaard’s or Nietzsche’s particular understanding would be tantamount to being 
inauthentic. In order to be true to the notion of authentic becoming, the participant would have to 
work out what it means for herself.  
5.2 Transformative Project: invent a pattern of existence  
‘Becoming authentic’, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, requires that one invent a pattern of existence 
to live by. In this section I will show that Kierkegaard outlines three patterns of existence: the 
aesthetic; the ethical; the religious. He regards the religious way of life as the highest pattern of 
existence. Such a way of life requires the existent to relinquish her finitude, to sacrifice herself to 
God. I will show that Nietzsche presents three interconnected patterns of existence: the escape 
from; the embrace of; and the transformation of ordinary consciousness. Nietzsche advocates 
affirming oneself by grouping as many fragmented character traits, habits, desires and actions 
together as possible into a range of unities.   
 Since becoming authentic is the ongoing process of concretization and self-creation, there is no 
blueprint, no universal pattern to conform to. Instead, the existent is required to invent and live in 
accordance with her own pattern of existence.  
Kierkegaard’s intention was to create a pattern of existence that would be true for him and allow 
him to be true to himself. He wanted a truth that he was prepared to live and die for. The truth 
Kierkegaard took on was God’s existence, and his existential vocation was devoted to becoming a 
Christian. This religious ‘pattern of existence’ is one of three. The other two are the’ aesthetic’ and 
the ‘ethical’ (Kierkegaard 1992: 501). These are portrayals of possible modes of existing, each of 
which possess a distinctive value set. It is likely that we occupy more than one of these realms 
simultaneously, and as a result we hold contradictory values. The point, for Kierkegaard (1992: 436), 
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was to separate them and only occupy one at a time, thereby brining unity to our existence (thought 
and feeling, desire and action).  
The ‘aesthetic’ mode of existence, defined as “pleasure-perdition” (Kierkegaard 1992: 294), is the 
lowest, most inferior, form of existence. It is characterized by self-absorption, governed by the 
pursuit of the sensual and the erotic, and the satisfaction of desire. It is evident that Kierkegaard’s 
use of the term, which indicates a life of indulging in the senses, is fundamentally different to the 
ways that Kant and Dewey use the term. The basis of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic is that the individual is 
within himself undialectical (Kierkegaard 1992: 537). The personality of the aesthetic individual is 
fragmented - she lacks inner continuity and cohesion. It is a mode of existence that is characterised 
by ‘closedness’ and isolation, as the existent fails to connect existentially with others. As a 
consequent, it is a mode of existence that is likely to be filled with despair and loneliness. Moreover, 
since there is no aspiration to virtue, corruption is an ever present possibility.  
The ‘ethical’ mode of existence is defined as “action-victory” (Kierkegaard 1992: 292). It is a higher 
mode of existence that is governed by the intellect, and represents a shift from the unexplored 
possibility of the ‘aesthetic’ toward the actual. It is characterized by ‘openness’ as it satisfies the 
requirement of existence “to join together” (Kierkegaard 1992: 531). The move from the aesthetic to 
the ethical is a matter of choice; of choosing oneself (Kierkegaard 1992: 254, 258). The ethical 
individual commits to upholding social norms and values.   
The ‘religious’ mode of existence is defined as “suffering” (Kierkegaard 1992: 292). Kierkegaard 
(1992: 426) promotes eternal happiness, having a relationship with God, as the absolute Good. 
Accordingly, he regards the religious mode of existence as the highest and only true form of 
existence (Kierkegaard 1992: 292). Suffering is the sign that one is having a relationship with God: 
the greater the suffering, the greater the religious experience, and by extension, the more suffering 
there is. If one is not suffering, one is not existing religiously (Kierkegaard 1992: 288). Suffering is the 
expression of religious uncertainty (Kierkegaard 1992: 458). The existent risks everything for 
something that cannot be demonstrated and cannot be known for certain (Kierkegaard 1992: 427). 
The existent suffers as she wants nothing more than to have an absolute relationship with God, and 
yet achieving this is an impossibility as she is absolutely and inescapably relative and finite. 
In order to become what she is (Kierkegaard 1992: 489), and attain eternal happiness, the existent 
has to self-annihilate (Kierkegaard 1992: 461). She must die to immediacy (Kierkegaard 1992: 463). 
This requires the existent to surrender the finite elements of her being (Kierkegaard 1992: 391) and 
give up all relative ends and worldly pursuits (Kierkegaard 1992: 404). This is not a command to live 
an ascetic or monastic life. The existent remains located in the physical world of earthly concerns 
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while simultaneously being occupied with spiritual matters. The existent would not appear to be any 
different (Kierkegaard 1992: 414). It would be doubly difficult to know that the existent was on such 
a path as she safeguards her relationship with God from others by keeping silent. In resignation, the 
existent undergoes a conversion that Kierkegaard (1936: 23) describes as a birth. She receives a 
“new interiority” (Kierkegaard 2004b: 26) and becomes “a new creature” (Kierkegaard 1936: 23).  
Love is the source of this transformation. God moves not from need but from love (Kierkegaard 
1936: 30). God seeks nothing more than the love of the disciple (Kierkegaard 1936: 70); and in loving 
God the lover is transformed (Kierkegaard 1936: 48). 
Nietzsche’s notion of becoming can be understood as a complex aesthetic phenomenon that 
presents as three interconnected patterns of existing: the escape from; the embrace of; and the 
transformation of ordinary consciousness. These patterns of existence represent the continuous 
unfolding of his thought that corresponds to three periods in his writing career: early, middle and 
late.  
In the early period, Nietzsche (1999) develops the ontological symbols of Apollo and Dionysius. The 
Apollonian archetype represents subjective or individual consciousness, governed by the principle of 
individuation. The Dionysian archetype represents a higher, non-individuated consciousness, 
governed by the principle of disruption and the destruction of dichotomies. Nietzsche regards all art 
to arise as a result of the interaction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian principles.  
Nietzsche promotes the Attic Tragedy as a means to attain ontological freedom. It provides the 
necessary experience of frenzy, rapture and ecstasy of Dionysian intoxication through which we can 
temporarily escape the chains of Apollonian individuation and access the ‘primordial unity’. This 
provides a means to thrive in the face of existential suffering, for “it is only as aesthetic phenomenon 
that existence and the world are eternally justified” (Nietzsche 1999: 33). The sublime experience of 
an altered and higher existence is a salve that stimulates, purifies and discharges our feelings of 
unease, distress and nausea (Nietzsche 1999: 99). This provides a form of “metaphysical solace” that 
makes life “indestructibly mighty and pleasurable” (Nietzsche 1999: 39). Since art can offer 
inspiration and guidance through which we can train ourselves for life, Nietzsche (1999: 40) lauds art 
as “a saving sorceress with the power to heal”.  
In the middle period Nietzsche refines his goal of ontological freedom to one of self-determination. 
He repudiates his former metaphysical focus on the Dionysian, and affirms the Apollonian – ordinary 
consciousness. He finds that we are rational, relational and temporal; but also illogical and unfair, 
“grave and serious” and prone to “delusion and error” (Nietzsche 2001: 104). He names science as 
“the great liberator” (Nietzsche 2001: 181). In particular it is scientific method that provides the 
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means to: improve our capacities of reason and objectivity; “face our experiences … sternly” 
(Nietzsche 2001: 180); and shape ourselves. To this end, Nietzsche (2001: 180) enjoins us to become 
“our own experiments and guinea pigs”. This will allow us to refine our opinions and values, and 
create virtues of our own. In doing so, we will become unique human beings that make our own laws 
and create ourselves (Nietzsche 2001: 189).  
While science is regarded as the great liberator, it is art that makes the truths of existence offered by 
science bearable (Nietzsche 2001: 104). Accordingly, Nietzsche (2001: 170) enjoins us to live 
aesthetically, and become “the poets of our life”. Self is treated as an aesthetic phenomenon, a work 
of art to be imagined and created. We make ourselves beautiful by giving style to our character. This 
entails creating a unified personality constrained by “a single taste” (Nietzsche 2001: 164) that 
conforms to an artistic plan. It is this that allows us to realize a higher destiny (Young 1992: 45), to 
enrich everything, to transform everything, until it reflects one’s own power and one’s perfection 
(Nietzsche 2005: 196).  
In his late period Nietzsche denounces science, and reaffirms the importance of art to the project of 
self-determination, the freedom of self to ‘become who you are’. This encapsulates the notion of 
becoming an authentic self, ridding ourselves of the deceptions and fabrications commonly 
employed in Apollonian self-creation (Young 1992: 103). We become free spirits capable of fully 
determining ourselves, and joyfully accepting everything that we are. This can be understood as a 
movement back to the Dionysian, while not rejecting the Apollonian.    
In order to ‘become who you are’, one has to rise above the herd and embrace one’s higher self; one 
has to become “the quantum of power you are” (Nietzsche 1967a: 547). To this end Nietzsche 
develops the Ubermensch as his noble ideal, an exemplar of higher man. Higher man represents 
“higher brighter humanity” (Nietzsche 1967a: 517). She is a “sovereign individual” (Nietzsche 1994: 
40) who constantly strives for greater heights (Nietzsche 1967a: 502). She possesses the courage to 
approach life differently. She also possesses great self-discipline: she is master of herself (mind, body 
and soul) and the circumstances in which she finds herself (Nietzsche 1994: 40). This allows her to 
not only create herself anew, but also transform “the landscape of human existence” (Schacht 1983: 
333).  
I argue that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer divergent ethical visions. Kierkegaard identifies eternal 
happiness as the absolute Good, and promotes the religious life, in which one lives according to the 
dictates of God, as the highest mode of existence. Such a life requires that the individual relinquish 
her finitude and renounce herself. In light of this I read Kierkegaard’s ethical vision as transcendent. 
Nietzsche denies the existence of absolute values, and develops his own. He endorses ‘health’ as his 
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ultimate end (Nietzsche 2007: 67), and offers the will to power as the ultimate “objective measure of 
value” (Nietzsche 1967a: 356). This is an attempt to naturalize value (Nietzsche 1967a: 255) by 
grounding it in the fundamental character of life (Nietzsche 1967a: 191). Such a value would 
simultaneously affirm existence (Nietzsche 1967a: 536), provide a new path to live by (Schacht 1983: 
342) and serve as a basis for evaluative judgments (Schacht 1983: 342-7). He encourages us to make 
ourselves in our own image. This entails embracing and developing the multiple facets of our being. 
In accordance with the above, I read Nietzsche as offering an immanent ethical vision. 
I contend that the above transformative projects are relevant to philosophical practice. Admittedly, 
these patterns of existence were developed by and for the philosophers themselves, and were not 
intended for others to follow. To follow another’s pattern of existence would be synonymous with 
living an inauthentic life – the very thing these philosophers were opposed to. This does not render 
their particular patterns of existence useless as they were offered as a means to entice others to 
develop their own authentic ways of living. To this end the participant would have to determine her 
own pattern of existence. She would have to discover and embrace her own truth and articulate the 
conditions of living that are necessary to attain her truth (Cooper 1999: 177).  
Admittedly, a transformative project of becoming authentic might have limited appeal. Firstly, the 
participant would have to discover her own truth for herself. Many may not be interested in 
embarking on such an undefined and indefinite process. Secondly, the path of emergence is not an 
easy one. The sorts of changes that the existent might undergo include altering her values and 
beliefs, her way of life, even her personality, and as a consequent the way she relates to others. This 
is likely to create inner discomfort and may result in her being perceived and treated as an outsider 
by others. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would likely agree that the path of becoming is for a limited 
few. While it would not appeal to everyone, it may appeal to those: discontented with life, who feel 
that there is more to existence; that question the status quo; and who want to achieve a sense of 
greatness though the ways in which they lived their lives.   
5.3 Passion, Affect and Feeling  
In this section I will explore the forms of philosophizing advocated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I 
will show that Kierkegaard promotes the centrality of passion in discovering his subjective truth, and 
denies the role of reason. I will show that Nietzsche promotes affect, though contrary to 
Kierkegaard, he would not deny that reason has a role to play. I will also show that feelings, such as 
despair and guilt serve an integral instrumental role in Kierkegaard’s project of becoming. I will 
argue that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche endorse visions of philosophizing that are holistic and 
personally invested. 
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Kierkegaard (1992: 350) promotes the importance of “imagination, feeling, and dialectics” in the 
attainment of subjectivity. Kierkegaard (1992: 351) likens the act of concretization to producing a 
work of art: “To exist is an art”. Not only can subjectivity not be won through reason (Kierkegaard 
1936: 77), reason has to be set aside (Kierkegaard 1936: 79) as it cannot access the paradox – God 
the eternal, who exists in finitude as an ordinary man. The paradox of thought occurs when it 
attempts to discover that which cannot be thought by transcending itself (Kierkegaard 1936: 46) in 
order to grasp that which cannot be known – God (Kierkegaard 1936: 49). Since God lies beyond the 
realm of reason, it can neither be proved or disproved (Kierkegaard 1936: 49), nor can it be 
understood (Kierkegaard 1936: 72). To explain the paradox is to clarify it, and in so doing the 
paradox is removed (Kierkegaard 1992: 219). This is undesirable as “the paradox is necessary for 
faith” (Kierkegaard 1992: 219). 
For Kierkegaard subjective truth is grasped through religious experience. He names faith as the 
condition for accessing subjective truth (Kierkegaard 1936: l). Faith is the discovery of one’s 
relationship with God (Kierkegaard 1992: 65), though which one attains eternal happiness 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 426). Kierkegaard (1936: 73) describes faith as the ‘happy passion’; and as 
‘impassioned interestedness’ (Kierkegaard 1992: 29). In faith one is passionately interested in his 
relationship with God (Kierkegaard 1992: 21). It is in passion that the existent is “infinitized in the 
eternity of the imagination and yet is also most definitely himself” (Kierkegaard 1992: 197). Passion 
plays such a pivotal role that if there is no passion, then there is no faith (Kierkegaard 1992: 29).  
Nietzsche promotes affect over reason. This is in response to the prevailing view, at the time, that 
deemed it necessary that we liberate ourselves from affect in order to gain objective knowledge – 
that we may see “the essence of things” (Nietzsche 1967a: 329). Nietzsche proclaims that we have 
to “win back … the right to great affects!” (Nietzsche 1967a: 329) that we have “to feel ourselves 
more” (Nietzsche 1967a: 329). More than simply pushing back against objectivist notions of 
philosophy, feeling is directly associated with the central element of Nietzsche’s philosophy – the 
will to power (see section 4.6). Nietzsche regards the will to power as “the primitive form of affect” 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 366), out of which all others feelings develop.  
Feeling serve an integral instrumental role in Kierkegaard’s project of becoming. Despair and guilt 
are uncomfortable states of being that are a direct result of the ontological freedom that typifies 
human existence (Cooper 1999: 144). These uncomfortable feelings represent the inner call to 
become authentic (Golomb 1995: 103-4). 
Kierkegaard identifies despair as the primary existential feeling. He regards despair as “a sickness of 
the spirit” (Kierkegaard 2004a: 53) as it denotes a state of disconnect from our true nature as spirit. 
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We despair over our self because we do not create our self (Kierkegaard 2004a: 42), and we cannot 
be rid of the self that we are (Kierkegaard 2004a: 49). We are all in despair, including those who 
claim not to be in despair – ignorance of despair is itself a form of despair. Kierkegaard (2004a: 43) 
regards despair as a negative state of being, as “the worst misfortune and misery” and “ruination”. 
He also calls despair an ‘excellence’ and ‘an infinite advantage’. It is an excellence as it is proof of the 
eternal in man (Kierkegaard 2004a: 50). It is an infinite advantage as it intensifies consciousness, and 
this serves those on the path of authentic becoming (Kierkegaard 2004b: 20). It inspires the existent 
to begin on her path, and encourages those already on the path to continue. 
Kierkegaard (1992: 528) describes guilt as “the most concrete expression of existence”. Kierkegaard 
(1992: 527) claims that we experience the agony of guilt over the time lost for not yet having begun 
our becoming. The more we immerse ourselves in inauthentic pursuits, the greater the guilt 
becomes. Stepping onto the path of authentic becoming does nothing to diminish the guilt, as you 
realize how important the task is, and how far you are from it. It is not a bad thing that guilt is not 
diminished. To not have guilt means you are lost to yourself (Kierkegaard 1992: 528).  
Nietzsche would disagree. He calls guilt a “dismal thing” (Nietzsche 1994: 39). It arises when we lose 
touch with our instincts – our “regulating impulses” – and are forced to think, calculate and infer in 
order to act (Nietzsche 1994: 57). Since guilt is “the main moral concept” (Nietzsche 1994: 39), it 
represents an external imposition that has reduced us and castrated us. Since morality makes us 
mediocre, in that it constrains us and prevents us from attaining greater heights, Nietzsche would 
encourage us to overcome it. In overcoming morality we might overcome guilt.   
Since these feelings are experientially disturbing the common response is to avoid them. The allure 
of inauthentic existence is that in allowing ourselves to be determined and defined by others, we are 
not only unburdened of the responsibility of determining ourselves, but also the unsettling feelings 
that accompany it (Hall 1993: 138). While it is possible to live in ignorance of these feelings, since 
they function in the service of authentic becoming, they need to be uncovered and fostered if one 
desires to set out on the path of authentic becoming. It is such that Kierkegaard promotes the need 
for “a physician of the soul” (Kierkegaard 2004a: 53).  
I argue that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche endorse visions of philosophizing that are holistic and 
personally invested. It is evident that Kierkegaard promotes a form of philosophizing that prioritise 
passion; while Nietzsche advocates for affect. Moreover, Kierkegaard endorses the role of feeling in 
philosophizing. In accordance with this, they have been described as ways of philosophizing that one 
does “not with reason only, but with the will, with the feelings … with the whole soul and with the 
whole body” (Macquarrie 1973: 15).  
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I contend that these notions of philosophizing might introduce a significantly new element to 
philosophical practice. I argued that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is preeminent in philosophical 
practice. Such a vision of philosophizing typically promotes the use of critical reason and is, to my 
knowledge, devoid of the language of feeling. Accordingly, introducing the sorts of philosophizing 
advocated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would likely alter the way philosophy is practiced. Given 
that their modes of philosophizing are particular to their own particular transformative projects, it is 
impossible to say, in advance, how this might manifest in philosophical practice. More to the point, it 
would likely manifest differently in each philosophical participant. 
5.4 Transformational Tools  
In this section I will explore the practices Kierkegaard and Nietzsche promote that are particular to 
their respective philosophical ways of life. Kierkegaard’s practices include silence, irony, self-
vigilance, contemplation of one’s death, self-reflection, and ‘the leap’. Nietzsche advocates self-
overcoming, self-disclosure, aesthetic distance, revaluating values, and the test of eternal 
recurrence. I will argue that his use of masks presents as an additional transformative tool.    
Kierkegaard encourages the existent on the path to becoming authentic to maintain silence. This 
serves an important function. If the religious individual has to die to immediacy, and talkativeness 
perpetuates common views, daily trappings and deceptions (Kierkegaard 1992: 169), then silence is 
a means for the existent to separate herself from her finitude and self. As one dies to immediacy, 
God is discovered. It is such that Kierkegaard (1992: 548) regards silence before God to be a 
necessity as well as a blessing. 
Kierkegaard (1965: 338) promotes irony as necessary to becoming authentic. Irony is one of the 
most powerful and widely used literary forms of enticement for helping the existent to embark on 
her search for subjective truth. It is particularly effective for enticing the existent to transcend her 
prevailing value system. Since values are so deeply internalized, a direct attack on a person’s value 
system is likely to be received as a personal attack. In applying irony the author / speaker affirms the 
value that they wish to reject as her own, and then go on to cast doubt on it by reducing it to an 
absurdity, or by revealing unforeseen problematic consequences (Golomb 1995: 26-7). This permits 
the reader / listener to distance herself from the value system, abandon her commitment to 
passively acquired values, and encourages her to actively participate in a process of searching for, or 
developing a new value system. At the very least it creates an atmosphere in which one is ready for 
change. Golomb (1995: 30) acknowledges that irony will not work on everyone. He states that it will 
be effective on the courageous few that can bear the uncertainty and frustration of the search for 
authentic becoming.  
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Kierkegaard (1992: 169) advocates the practice of self-vigilance. This requires that we pay attention 
to ourselves at each moment. We learn how to live by experiencing ourselves, by understanding 
ourselves (Kierkegaard 1992: 146-7). This is a continuous process that we must not rush to complete. 
Self-vigilance helps me to recognize and hold onto the uncertainties of life, which become ever more 
penetrating the longer I live. One such unavoidable uncertainty is one’s own death.  
We are encouraged to contemplate our death. It is my death that I consider and not death in 
general. It is not the fact that I will die that is of significance, but the fact that I do not know when I 
will die. It is important that I consider my death at each moment of my life as I can never be sure 
when I will die (Kierkegaard 1992: 167). Being aware of my death, in every moment, not only helps 
to vanquish the uncertainty of it (Kierkegaard 1992: 167), but is also helps me to prepare for it. 
Kierkegaard (1992: 168) regards the practice of contemplating one’s death as transformative in 
itself, as something that “must change a person’s whole life”.  
Kierkegaard endorses the practice of self-reflection. He promotes two different kinds of self-
reflection. The first is an evaluative, introspective form of self-reflection, in which the existent 
examines herself fully to ascertain if she possesses the necessary capacities, virtues and strengths 
(Kierkegaard 2004b: 30). This form of self-reflection is a preliminary step, and not crucial to 
Kierkegaard’s path to become authentic, which depends upon faith. Authentic selfhood entails the 
realization that one’s self is a combination of the finite and infinite, and arises by annulling one’s self 
and giving in to the infinity of the absolute (Kierkegaard 2004b: 27). Far from excluding self-
reflection, this demands a different, deeper form of reflection. According to Kierkegaard (2004a: 55) 
having a relationship with the absolute “requires extraordinary reflection” as we commune with the 
infinite within. This sort of reflection manifests as a type inner discourse, a dialectic that is in 
relationship with the absolute. This dialectic heightens and concentrates the passion (Kierkegaard 
1992: 385). 
The practice associated with faith is encapsulated in the notion of the ‘leap’, which Kierkegaard 
deems vital to making the perceptual shift from one pattern of existence to another. The leap is 
connected to the idea of letting go (Ferreira 1998: 209). While it can be regarded as a category of 
decision making, it is not intentional, purposive or a deliberate act of will whereby the existent 
makes a choice from a variety of options (Ferreira 1998: 214). Instead, it is something that we do 
after we have explored the options (Ferreira 1998: 214). Making the leap does not entail making a 
choice, it is the antithesis of the logical process. The leap can be understood paradoxically as being 
simultaneously active and passive (Ferreira 1998: 210). In action we reach out for something in 
interest. In passivity, we let go in disinterest. The leap is an embodiment of this tension between 
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active and passive – it is disinterested interestedness (Ferreira 1998: 226). A key requirement to 
making the ‘leap’ is the imagination, for it is the imagination which can transport the mind beyond 
itself. It is the imagination that permits us to hold contradictions in place, to accept the seemingly 
impossible and incommensurable (Ferreira 1998: 231).    
Nietzsche advocates the practice of self-overcoming. This is the central meaning of Nietzsche’s 
notion of the will to power: the will to cast off superfluous elements – unwanted character traits, 
social norms and values; and the will to create oneself. This is done by conducting campaigns against 
ourselves (Nietzsche 1997: 196): examining ourselves, questioning ourselves, challenging our own 
points of view. One takes control of one’s self, understands and fashions it within its particular 
constraints. This is by no means an easy task. Difficulty is a requirement. For one’s truth to be 
meaningful, it must be opposed, there must be a struggle (Nietzsche 1997: 206). 
Self-overcoming requires truthfulness.  This is an act of self-disclosure, whereby I tell the truth of 
myself to myself. I have to be honest with myself and “‘bear witness’ to myself” (Nietzsche 2007: 3). 
Self-disclosure helps me to become conscious of my experiences: what is happening inside and 
around me (Nietzsche 2001: 179); to acknowledge my strengths and weaknesses, my feelings, 
enthusiasms and conscience, as well as my prejudices (Nietzsche 1967b: 10). Self-disclosure helps 
me to overcome errors of self-deception. Such deceptions include: fictitious attributes we assign to 
ourselves; the false rank we assign to ourselves in relation to other life forms; and notions of 
absolute and eternal values (Nietzsche 2001: 114). Being honest with oneself is a necessary feature 
of becoming authentic (Nietzsche 2007: 4), as it is through self-disclosure that one becomes who 
one is.  
Being honest with oneself requires aesthetic distance, i.e. looking at things from a greater distance. 
Aesthetic distance permits us to see things differently; to add in the detail; frame things in ways that 
exclude the superfluous; or look at things in ways which conceal or alter perspectives (Nietzsche 
2001: 169-70). This allows us to see ourselves in a new light, and gives us “a rest from ourselves” 
(Nietzsche 2001: 104). Distance ensures that we don’t not take ourselves too seriously, and allows us 
to discover the hero and the fool in ourselves. It is aesthetic distance that allows us to create for 
ourselves anew, as an “exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish and blissful … freedom above 
things” (Nietzsche 2001: 104). 
Overcoming oneself requires revaluating (devaluing and reconstructing) values. Revaluating values is 
the process of shaking ourselves free from the yoke of imposed values. Because Nietzsche regards 
social norms and values as impediments to becoming authentic, toppling idols – ideals, values, and 
norms (Nietzsche 2007: 3) – is a central activity of his. One of the great ideals he seek to topple is 
133 
 
God. Realizing the non-existence of God provides the space for us to create new laws for ourselves 
(Nietzsche 1997: 190). This is achieved by taking a critical stance on prevailing ideals, dissecting them 
to expose them for what they are. To this end Nietzsche undertakes a genealogy of morality. This is 
an alternative technique used to destabilize social norms and values. It is a form of historical 
hermeneutical analysis (anti-realist and anti-dialectical) that seeks to test ideas and practices with a 
view to establishing new pathways of thought. This interpretive process permits him to show that 
the values we assume to be universal and absolute are nothing more than the subverted values from 
previous civilizations. This shows how historically contingent and arbitrary norms and values are. 
This helps to free us from the hold that prevailing norms and values have on us.   
Devaluation of contemporary values provides the necessary space to undertake a re-orientation of 
human aspirations. Freed from social mores, the existent can embark on the task of creating her 
own ideals and values (Nietzsche 2001: 189). Nietzsche admits to adopting Dionysius as his ideal 
(Nietzsche 2007: 3). Moreover, he appears to favour the virtues promoted by the ancient Greek 
philosophers. These include the virtues of self-sufficiency, nobility, self-control, courage and vitality. 
He also endorses the “ability to accept contradiction” and values “the lack of bad conscience” 
(Golomb 1995: 76). Expressing these virtues and values is merely an act of truthfulness on his part, 
and not an attempt to advocate which virtues and values the existent should follow. His instruction 
is clear: “do not follow me – but yourself. Yourself!” (Nietzsche 2001: 98). To this end he promotes: 
“Independence of soul” (Nietzsche 2001: 93), that each one of us should determine ourselves and 
invent our own moral values.  
Nietzsche offers eternal recurrence as a test of one’s strength of becoming (Nietzsche 1967a: 545). It 
is a test of one’s willingness to joyfully accept responsibility for everything one has done, everything 
that one is, “without subtraction, exception, or selection” (Nietzsche 1967a: 536). This serves as a 
final mark of integration, the total acceptance of oneself as a unified whole. It is also a test of one’s 
strength to affirm everything in existence, exactly as it is. The world alternates recurrently (Nietzsche 
1967a: 550) between the extremes of stable simple forms that transform into more complex forms 
of ‘higher potency’, but which may be more fragile and unstable, which then dissolve or are 
destroyed, in an endless cycle of order and disorder (Nietzsche 1967a: 340-1). Saying yes to 
existence, in all its joys and sorrow, its wonders and horrors, is a sign of one’s capacity to love life. 
Such a “Dionysian relationship to existence” (Nietzsche 1967a: 536) is the highest state that one can 
attain. 
I argue that the mask can function as a transformative tool. Nietzsche wears many masks, as an 
author and as literary personas. These include: the immoralist, the antichrist, Dionysus, Zarathustra 
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and the Ubermensch. Nietzsche’s masks permit him to speak duplicitously, in his own voice and in 
the voice of a fictionalized character (Fisher 1995: 516). But masks are more than a literary devise, 
they also function to conceal and reveal aspects of the wearer’s identity (Fisher 1995: 523). Since 
Nietzsche regards self, and identity, to be nothing more than a fiction, his use of masks could 
understood as a mechanism of self-creation. I argue that the mask, for Nietzsche, is a necessary 
transformative tool, as he proclaims that “Every profound spirit needs a mask” (Nietzsche 1967b: 
56). For example, if becoming authentic is an aspiration to greatness and strength, then a mask of 
strength and greatness need to be worn as a means to become authentic. Perhaps it is incorrect to 
call the mask a transformative tool, and that it is more appropriate to refer to the mask as the 
transformation itself. After all, Nietzsche (1967b: 54) states that “around every profound spirit there 
constantly grows a mask”. In this respect the mask is an identity the existent creates for herself. It is 
what she becomes. Nietzsche would advocate the wearing of many masks. Admittedly, the term 
‘profound’ is ambiguous. It could refer to wisdom and great understanding, or it could refer to 
intense emotions. In the latter sense the mask permits the wearer to express or conceal intense 
inner emotions.  
If it is the case that the philosophical ways of life advocated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are 
relevant to philosophical practice, then the above practices might be relevant to philosophical 
practice. However, given that the ways of life Kierkegaard and Nietzsche develop are specifically for 
themselves, and are not intended for others to follow, it follows that we should not be overly hasty 
to accept and apply any of these practices. This is not to say that they could not be utilized in 
philosophical practice; however, since each way of life would have to be worked out in situ, there is 
no way to know, in advance, which particular practices would be appropriate. It is possible that new 
practices would have to be developed to suit the particular way of life developed by the participant.  
5.5 Role of the Philosopher 
In this section I will enunciate the roles Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might assign to the philosopher. 
Kierkegaard advocates the roles of the Socratic gadfly and ‘physician of the soul’. I read Nietzsche as   
advocating to the philosopher the roles of the free-spirit, social critic, re-valuator of values, legislator 
and leader.   
While Kierkegaard recognizes that the philosopher has a role to play as Socratic gadfly in the pursuit 
of objective truth, it is evident that she has no role to play what so ever in the pursuit of subjective 
truth. This, because the journey to becoming a Christian, to having an absolute relationship with 
God, is utterly and irrevocably personal. It depends on faith and not reason, cannot be spoken 
about, let alone taught, or guided. While the path toward subjective truth requires a teacher, for 
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Kierkegaard that teacher is God (Kierkegaard 1936: 68). The teacher is of primary significance. The 
teacher provides the truth and the essential condition for understanding the truth (Kierkegaard 
1936: 18). In discovering the teacher the pupil “forgets himself” (Kierkegaard 1936: 24), yet the pupil 
will never forget the teacher. To do so means he forgets the Truth. The disciple cannot cast the 
teacher aside, as faith is the condition of access (Kierkegaard 1936: 77). 
The one role Kierkegaard does assign to the philosopher is that of the ‘physician of the soul’. The 
sole purpose of the philosopher in this role is to uncover and foster those uncomfortable and 
unsettling feelings, such as despair and guilt, which are instrumental to becoming authentic. This is 
in direct contrast the role of the Hellenistic doctor of the soul who sought to remove disturbances of 
the soul. Problematically, Kierkegaard merely names the role and says nothing regarding how and 
when such an activity would be undertaken.  
Nietzsche assigns a range of roles to the ‘new philosopher’. Nietzsche (1967b: 1-3) offers the notion 
of the ‘new philosopher’, the ‘philosopher of the future’, in contrast to philosophers, past and 
present. He regards philosophers – as intellectuals, sceptics, critics, worshipers of concepts, 
despisers of desire, and promoters of publically sanctioned truths – with mistrust and disdain. The 
roles he assigns to the ‘new philosopher’ include being a free-spirit, social critic, re-valuator of 
values, legislator and leader. The philosopher, as a ‘free spirit’, strives to overcome herself, revaluate 
values, love fate and herself (Nietzsche 1967b: 58-61). She extricates herself from social mores, and 
is free from comfortable prejudices and preferences.  
The philosopher will be a social critic. She must be sceptical of everything that is accepted (Nietzsche 
1967b: 49). She must stand in opposition to the dominant forms of life – social, religious, scientific, 
even the philosophical – and subject them to critical scrutiny (Schacht 1983:15). She must challenge 
their principles, values, accepted visions and practices (Nietzsche 1967b: 153). Though mistrustful of 
the prevailing dogma, she is not a sceptic, for she must affirm her truth. She is not a critic, though 
she be required to exercise critical discipline to ensure that every habit leads to purity and greatness 
of spirit (Nietzsche 1967b: 150). 
The philosopher must revaluate values: she must interpret and transform values (Nietzsche 1967b: 
129), she must create new values (Nietzsche 1967b: 152). She will have to introduce new meanings 
and goals for living (Schacht 1983:16). This will require that she go beyond established concepts 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 221) and create new concepts (Nietzsche 1967a: 220). She must speak from 
experience (Nietzsche 1967b: 133). To this end she must be an experimenter (Nietzsche 1967b: 57) 
who proposes risky hypotheses, and performs joyful, dangerous, painful experiments (Nietzsche 
1967b: 149-51). She should not only question the existence of truth, but instead acknowledge 
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untruth as a condition of life (Nietzsche 1967b: 9). While she should resist the truth, she must 
practice truthfulness (Nietzsche 1967b: 9). This requires her to admit that faith, and not reason, 
underlies her philosophy. The will to knowledge is more basic, more primal, than reason. It is 
nothing more than the will to power! In this respect, philosophy is “the most spiritual Will to Power” 
(Nietzsche 1967b: 14). She must also recognize that her truth is not for everyone, and so she should 
avoid seeking majority agreement (Nietzsche 1967b: 57), but instead she should choose solitude 
(Nietzsche 1967b: 37). She must aspire for greatness, be the master of herself and her virtues, and 
possess a “superabundance of will” (Nietzsche 1967b: 155). The philosopher not only aspires for 
greatness, but strives to inspire others to do the same.  
The philosopher will be a commander (Nietzsche 1967b: 129) that cultivates and directs history. She 
will tie knots in the present that will “fix the constraints and fasten the knots which will compel 
millenniums to take new paths” (Nietzsche 1967b: 129).  
The philosopher will be a legislator: she will use everything at her disposal, as a means to alter 
human life with a view to enhancing it (Nietzsche 1967b: 153-5). The philosopher must transcend 
her age to become a ‘citizen of the future’. This will require her to be at odds with her today – an 
enemy of contemporary ideals, and the bad conscience of her time (Nietzsche 1967b: 153). 
If it is the case that the ‘new philosopher’ refers to the individual who is embarking on her own 
particular path of becoming authentic, then the above roles would be relevant to the philosophical 
practitioner as well as the participant. Assuming that the practitioner began her path of becoming 
before the participant, she could be an existential exemplar to the participant, a trail-blazer and a 
leader. She might also be an antagonist, someone who forces the participant to challenge her 
established notions, beliefs and values, and who helps the participant to overcome herself. 
Admittedly Nietzsche sets an incredibly high standard for the philosopher. She will be “something 
more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different” (Nietzsche 1967b: 58). It is an open question 
whether anyone would want to, or could, attain such a position.    
5.6 Metaphysics: transcendent; naturalist  
 
In this section I will enunciate the metaphysics of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. This is crucial to 
understanding their philosophical ways of life as their metaphysics underpin and inform their 
respective ethical ways of life. While both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche recognize change as the 
fundamental ground of material reality, they hold contrary metaphysical visions. I will show that 
Kierkegaard offers a dualistic metaphysic that recognizes God as infinite and the world as finite. I will 
show that Nietzsche provides a naturalistic metaphysic / ontology that recognizes the will to power 
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as the fundamental ground of reality. I will argue that Kierkegaard offers a transcendent 
philosophical way of life and Nietzsche offers an immanent philosophical way of life.  
 
Kierkegaard presents a dualistic vision of reality made up of the infinite and the finite (Kierkegaard 
1992: 391). Kierkegaard presumes, rather than tries to prove existence. He takes existence as given, 
as a matter of faith, and therefore does not attempt to prove it (Kierkegaard 1936: 50). He 
recognizes the difficulty in explaining God as a concept, and claims that we can only really know God 
by immersing ourselves in him (Kierkegaard 1992: 220). He describes God as eternal and unchanging, 
essential and non-existing (Kierkegaard 1992: 332).  
The finite refers to material reality. The finite realm is characterized by change. All things that exist 
are historical – they come into existence, and go out of existence. The coming into existence of a 
thing is not regarded as change, as prior to existing it was nothing. Rather, it is possibility becoming 
actuality (Kierkegaard 1936: 91). The going out of existence is regarded as an aspect of change 
(Kierkegaard 1936: 90). Existence is characterized by change to such a degree that Kierkegaard 
proclaims: “existence is motion” (Kierkegaard 1992: 312). It is always moving, in process or 
progression, in a state of becoming. This idea of motion, of becoming, applies to all existing entities 
including the existent. 
It is this dualistic vision of reality that underpins Kierkegaard’s vision of the existent as “a synthesis 
of the infinite and the finite” (Kierkegaard 2004a: 42). She is “composed of the eternal and the 
temporal situated in existence” (Kierkegaard 1992: 301). Since the finite realm is characterized by 
change, and the existent is constituted, in part, by finitude, ensures that the existent is in a constant 
state of becoming.  
In contrast Nietzsche (2005: 168) offers a naturalistic metaphysic that only recognizes the apparent 
world. While the apparent world is all that there is, he recognizes that the human “perspective ... 
decides the character of the ‘appearance’” (Nietzsche 1967a: 305). In accordance with this, the 
world is understood and organized according to the value of utility, for the purpose and 
enhancement of power (Nietzsche 1967a: 305). This does not reduce reality to the level of mind-
dependence, as the world we are conscious of is “a surface – and sign – world” (Nietzsche 2001: 
213). Reality is much more than the phenomena that we are conscious of. Consciousness itself arises 
as a result of our interactions with the world (Schacht 1983: 190). It is conditioned by the practical 
requirements of our existence.   
Nietzsche (1967a: 332) aligns himself with the prevailing interpretation of the world, which 
recognizes that the fundamental fact of reality is that the world is in a constant state of change, 
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multiplicity, opposition, contradiction and war (Nietzsche 1967a: 315). In accordance with this, he 
describes the world and all things in it, as in a permanent process of becoming. There is nothing else 
besides this (Nietzsche 1967a: 13). The idea of becoming is devoid of reason, intention, purpose or 
end (Nietzsche 1967a: 377). It “aims at nothing and achieves nothing” (Nietzsche 1967a: 12). 
Becoming is understood as struggle: “a determination of degrees and relations of force” (Nietzsche 
1967a: 299). 
Nietzsche (1967a: 364) refers to the “ultimate ground and character of all change” as the ‘will to 
power’. The will to power is what remains when all reductive concepts (such as number, subject, 
causality, motion and force) have been eliminated (Nietzsche 1967a: 339). The will to power is 
variously described as: the fundamental nature of the world as “seen from within” (Nietzsche 1967b: 
52); “a creative drive” (Nietzsche 1967a: 333); “the shaping force” (Nietzsche 1967a: 349) that 
transforms itself through creating and destroying itself; the root from which all becoming emerges 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 339); and a voracious desire to manifest and exercise power (Nietzsche 1967a: 
333). According to Schacht (1983: 207-8) Nietzsche uses ‘will’ metaphorically to designate “the 
general disposition of one sort of dynamic reality or another” 
Nietzsche (1967a: 550) proclaims that “This world is the will to power – and nothing besides!”, since 
the world is in a constant state of change and the will to power is the ‘creative drive’. Will to power 
permeates all spheres, and applies to all things: it underlies all organic functions (Nietzsche 1967a: 
333), and is present in all events (Nietzsche 1967a: 356). Viewed in this light, the world is not 
comprised of discrete parts. It is nothing more than a totality of dynamic forces, a totality of 
relations all in tension (Nietzsche 1967a: 339-40).  
Since man is an inseparable part of the world, we too are will to power and nothing else (Nietzsche 
1967a: 550). Nietzsche does not impose the general concept of the will to power onto man, instead 
he derives the will to power in nature analogously from man (Nietzsche 1967a: 333). Will to power is 
a basic feature of human experience. It is the will to power that underlies all human thought, feeling, 
ends and purposes (Nietzsche 1967a: 347, 356). We see a conscious expression of the will to power 
in man through the desire to appropriate, dominate, and increase in strength (Nietzsche 1967a: 367-
8).  
Will to power is not only present in man – it is the fundamental character of life. All life strives, not 
to preserve itself, but “to become more” (Nietzsche 1967a: 367). It is such that Nietzsche (1967a: 
148) proclaims that “Life is will to power”.  
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Change occurs when one will to power encroaches upon another. Such activity presupposes 
accumulation: a striving for more power (Nietzsche 1967a: 367); and the expenditure or discharge of 
force (Nietzsche 1967a: 344); and relations (albeit temporarily) of dominance and struggle 
(Nietzsche 1967b: 226). These can arise simply through competition rather than restrictively through 
possession or direct control. The net effect of these forces in relation is one of transformation 
(Schacht 1983: 225-8). Since the will to power only manifests itself in struggle and resistance, it 
continually seeks out that which resists it (Nietzsche 1967a: 346). This ensures that the world is in a 
perpetual state of flux (Nietzsche 1967a: 281). 
It is apparent that these two philosophers offer divergent metaphysics. Kierkegaard posits a dualistic 
conception of reality: God as infinite, absolute, necessary and free from change; and material 
existence as finite, temporal, causal and subject to change. I read this as transcendent. In contrast, 
Nietzsche endorses a naturalistic metaphysic, which posits a vision of reality comprised of a single 
realm, and posits that the fundamental fact of existence is change. The creative shaping force that 
underlies this change – the will to power – is the same transformative principle that drives ‘man’. I 
read this as immanent. Given that metaphysics inform ethics, it is evident why Kierkegaard offers a 
transcendent ethics and Nietzsche offers an immanent ethic. In light of the above I read Kierkegaard 
as offering a transcendent philosophical way of life and Nietzsche as offering an immanent 
philosophical way of life.  
If it is the case that metaphysics informs ethics, then does that mean the participant has to accept 
the metaphysics of the particular philosopher before she can live the ethical way of life they 
describe? Given that these philosophers are not prescribing their particular philosophical ways of life 
to anyone, the participant would not be required to accept their metaphysic or their ethical way of 
life. However, given that their ethical ways of life are underpinned and informed by their respective 
metaphysics the participant’s understanding would benefit from being exposed to them. 
Understanding them would not entail accepting them. Having said that, I do not think that these 
metaphysical views are that esoteric or obscure so as to make it impossible to accept them. While 
they do not account for all possible metaphysical views, but they do provide variations of two major 
contemporary views: Christian and naturalistic.        
5.7 Epistemologies: subjectivism; perspectivism  
 
Since a philosophical way of life is a coherent and self-contained philosophical system, its 
epistemology is intimately implicated in that way of life. Understanding that way of life requires that 
we understand its respective epistemology. In this section I will explore the epistemologies of 
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Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, which they developed in opposition to the prevailing view of truth as 
objective (absolute, universal, rational, certain, systemic). Promoting non-objective visions of truth is 
integral to validating their respective philosophical ways of life. I will show that Kierkegaard offers a 
subjective account of truth that is determined by how the existent lives. I will show that Nietzsche 
endorses the view that truth is nothing more than a perspective made from a particular context of 
life.  
 
Kierkegaard recognizes two forms of truth: philosophical (objective) and religious (subjective). Since 
his concern was with what it meant to be a Christian, which is a subjective issue, he favoured 
subjective truth over objective truth. Subjective truth does not amount to positing a narrow 
relativism. Kierkegaard (1992: 17) maintains while the issue of my faith “pertains to me alone … if 
properly presented, it will pertain to everyone in the same way”. While both forms profess to posit 
the same degree of truth, as eternal and universally valid, Kierkegaard regards them to be 
fundamentally different with respect to the location and form of that truth and the means to access 
it.  
‘Philosophical truth’ is a direct reference to philosophical idealism. This includes Greek (Socratic and 
Platonic) and German idealism. Greek idealism locates truth within each person (Kierkegaard 1936: 
11, 15). Since truth is internal the existent has an immediate relationship with the ideal / divine 
(Kierkegaard 1936: lxxxiv). Accessing this truth requires an application of the Socratic Method. The 
teacher of objective truth assumes the role of the Socratic gadfly. While they facilitate accessing this 
truth, they do not provide “positive content” (Kierkegaard 1936: 12), but instead help the process of 
recollection by removing extraneous material (Kierkegaard 1936: 13). While Kierkegaard regards the 
Socratic relationship as the highest and truest between man and man (Kierkegaard 1936: 68), it only 
serves a pragmatic purpose such that once the pupil has accessed the truth the teacher is no longer 
needed. Moreover, he maintains that the teacher could be anyone, and given that the truth lies 
within, the truth could be accessed at any time (Kierkegaard 1936: 15). The fundamental difference 
between Greek and German idealism, for Kierkegaard (1936: lvi), was with respect to method. While 
Plato advocated recollection, Hegel advocated dialectical method. 
Kierkegaard presents a second, more scientific, reading of ‘objective truth’ as external to and 
independent of the subject (Kierkegaard 1992: 204). This has a direct impact on the manner in which 
one accesses the truth. The seeker of truth is required to be dedicated, enthusiastic, objective, and 
disinterested (Kierkegaard 1992: 21-2). She approaches truth free of assumptions or expectations 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 50). In contrast to the earlier presentation, this understanding negates or 
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discards the particular subject (Kierkegaard 1992: 192), thereby turning “existence into an 
indifferent, vanishing something” (Kierkegaard 1992: 193). 
While Kierkegaard affirms the value of objective knowledge, he does recognize that it has 
limitations. Firstly, it is inadequate to grasp existence. We strive to gain certain knowledge 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 29) through the use of reason and logic. Problematically, “all logical thinking is an 
abstraction” (Kierkegaard 1992: 308) that categorizes and finalizes the world. Abstracting the world 
in this way fixes existence down in a manner that effectively annuls it by removing motion and 
change (Kierkegaard 1992: 308). Secondly, it is inapplicable in matters of faith (Kierkegaard 1992: 
351). The pursuit of objective truth cannot grasp the truth of Christianity, which is synonymous with 
“spirit”, “inwardness”, “subjectivity”, and “an infinite, personally interested passion for one’s eternal 
happiness” (Kierkegaard 1992: 33). In addition, an objective stance is antithetical to faith. In order to 
be objective one has to relinquish the subjective stance (Kierkegaard 1992: 27). In so doing, one 
necessarily loses faith (Kierkegaard 1992: 29).  
Kierkegaard aligns subjective truth with Christian catechism. Since the truth is God, truth is deemed 
to be external. Kierkegaard refers to ‘God’ and ‘the God’. The former represents the Eternal, out of 
time; while the latter the Historical, God incarnate (Kierkegaard 1992: 211). These contradictory 
notions of God – the eternal manifesting as the finite (Kierkegaard 1992: 210) – are united in the 
Paradox, in which the historical is made eternal and the eternal is made historical (Kierkegaard 1936: 
76). Kierkegaard does not attempt to resolve this paradox as subjective truth transcends reason, i.e. 
it lies outside the categories of human thought (Kierkegaard 1936: lxxv). It is impossible to explain 
the eternal, as one is unable to enter into the eternal state of being (Kierkegaard 1992: 192). 
Moreover, since truth lies outside the categories of thought it cannot be communicated 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 221).  
While the truth is external, he characterizes subjective truth by inwardness (Kierkegaard 1992: 218). 
The point of subjectivity is to immerse oneself in one’s truth (Kierkegaard 1992: 192). Here the 
emphasis is placed not on knowledge, which Kierkegaard describes as possibility, but instead on 
living – on actuality (Kierkegaard 1992: 316). The relation of the person to what she claims to be the 
truth is of primary significance. It is how she lives her truth that constitutes the truth (Kierkegaard 
1992: 323). Subjective truth is not something to be discovered, but it is rather something to be 
appropriated by the individual (Kierkegaard 1992: 21). It affirms the individual in that it is a search 
for her own truth, her own ethical actuality, and no one else’s (Kierkegaard 1992: 323). It is though 
inwardness that we genuinely exist (Kierkegaard 1992: 249). Kierkegaard regards a subjective 
relationship with God as the highest form of existence: it is what “makes a human being a human 
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being” (Kierkegaard 1992: 244). While Kierkegaard regards subjectivity as inwardness at its 
maximum as Christianity, “the passion of the infinite” (Kierkegaard 1992: 203), he does acknowledge 
that “it is possible to exist with inwardness … outside Christianity” (Kierkegaard 1992: 279) but 
regards such a case as a rarity. 
God is subjectively true in that God exists only in relation to the particular individual (Kierkegaard 
1992: 200). God has no objective existence. Kierkegaard (1992: 243) rejects any notion of God in 
nature as a form of paganism. That God exists only though a relationship of subjectivity makes God 
illusive (Kierkegaard 1992: 243). Paradoxically, it is the finite subject relating to the eternal 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 206) that brings the eternal and infinite into the realm of the finite and temporal 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 208). The God-relationship permits the existing individual to momentarily 
transcend existence by being in “a unity of the finite and the infinite” (Kierkegaard 1992: 197). When 
this occurs the existent is the Truth (Kierkegaard 1936: 73). Since the existing individual is not in any 
way fixed, truth sought in relation to oneself is never fixed and determinate (Kierkegaard 1992: 196). 
In contrast, Nietzsche presents a naturalistic account of knowledge and truth. He understands 
knowledge as a consequent of a particular mode and condition of existence (Nietzsche 1967a: 273) 
that arises in relation to the environment, and for the purpose of preserving a particular kind of life 
(Nietzsche 1967b: 8-9)18. This makes knowledge an instrument of power that allows us to possess 
things and use them (Nietzsche 1967a: 274). At a more fundamental level, it serves to maintain and 
increase our power (Nietzsche 1967a: 266). Knowledge allows us to become masters of the world, to 
shape and reform the world into a world of our own design (Nietzsche 1967a: 272).  
Knowledge is nothing more than a matter of perspective, a way of seeing things (Nietzsche 1994: 
92). All knowledge, whether philosophical, religious or scientific knowledge is nothing more than 
interpretation, i.e. it amounts to the act of introducing meaning (Nietzsche 1967a: 327). Even facts 
are regarded as a matter of interpretation rather than existing in and by themselves (Nietzsche 
1967a: 267). Since all knowledge is a matter of interpretation, there are no limits to interpretations 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 326). This does not mean that all interpretations have the same epistemic worth. 
Nietzsche acknowledges that some misinterpretations can be worth retaining, that even lies, 
fictions, illusions and errors can serve the enhancement of life (Schacht 1983: 97); while others could 
be ‘true’ but harmful and dangerous (Nietzsche 1967b: 53). Nietzsche proclaims that the biggest lie 
                                                          
18 Nietzsche (1967a: 273) even understands our intellect as a product of the conditions of existence – if we 
didn’t need it, we wouldn’t have it. He similarly understands consciousness to have evolved in relation to the 
outside world (Nietzsche 1967a: 284), as a matter of utility in service of preservation and growth (Nietzsche 
1967a: 275). 
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is the notion of absolute knowledge (Nietzsche 1967a: 301). Since knowing always entails placing 
oneself into a conditional relation to something, (Nietzsche 1967a: 301), it is impossible to know 
unconditioned things such as the Kantian thing in itself. It follows that the thing in itself is 
“nonsensical” (Nietzsche 1967a: 302). He regards the subject-object distinction as a fabrication 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 294), and proclaims the ‘true’ world to be a “mere fiction” (Nietzsche 1967a: 306). 
Other fictions include: subject, spirit, reason, thinking, consciousness, soul, will, truth and causality. 
None of these exist (Nietzsche 1967a: 266; 295-7). The inner world of the subject is also regarded as 
a deception (Nietzsche 1967a: 264), which provides an “erroneous starting point” (Nietzsche 1967a: 
293) to understanding the world. 
That all knowledge is interpretation does not mean that it cannot be objective. Nietzsche rejects the 
notion of knowledge from an ‘objective’ point of view, because there is no such thing as a pure 
spectator. We are immersed in and conditioned by our circumstances and it is impossible to step 
outside of this (Schacht 1983: 100). Moreover, he denounces the idea of disinterested knowledge 
(Nietzsche 1994: 92) – our needs, our drives and affect interpret the world (Nietzsche 1967a: 148). 
This, however, does not mean that we have a restricted interpretive capacity. We have multiple 
drives and affects and not all of them are rudimentary drives directed towards self-preservation. 
Man can assume many standpoints (Nietzsche 1967a: 149-50). This does not however occur with 
necessity, but requires wanting and learning to see differently (Nietzsche 1994: 92). Wanting to see 
differently helps to modify and refine basic or rudimentary drives and affect, it spiritualizes them 
(Schacht 1983: 104). We need to learn how best to direct resources to attain objective knowledge. 
Attaining objective knowledge requires that we control our judgment so that we may employ a 
variety of interpretations and perspectives (Nietzsche 1994: 92). The more perspectives we employ, 
“the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be” (Nietzsche 1994: 92).  
While the commitment to knowledge serves the enhancement of life, it serves another purpose – 
the pursuit of truth. Nietzsche denies the existence of an absolute truth. He regards the idea of truth 
as fixed and changeless as a great error (Nietzsche 1967a: 315). Moreover, he rejects the idea of 
truth corresponding to reality, but he affirms the notion of truth that corresponds to reality as it is 
experienced. Like knowledge, truth is always relative to a particular perspective or vantage point. 
Given that “there are many kinds of eyes ... there are many kinds of ‘truths’, and consequently there 
is no truth” (Nietzsche 1967a: 291). Since truth is perceptual, it is not something that we discover, 
but something we create (Nietzsche 1967a: 298). This means that even errors and fantasies have the 
potential to become truths.  
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While truths, like knowledge, serve the purpose of preserving a particular life, Nietzsche warns us 
against holding truth in too high a regard. Truth can ossify us (Nietzsche 1967a: 291). As a remedy he 
reminds us that the production of truth is a never ending process of active determination; and that 
the will to truth is nothing more than an expression of the will to power (Nietzsche 1967a: 298). In 
light of this, he enjoins us to “value more than truth the force that forms, simplifies, shapes, invents” 
(Nietzsche 1967a: 326) – the will to power.  
I argue that understanding the epistemologies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is integral to 
understanding their philosophical ways of life, since a philosophical way of life is a self-contained 
and coherent system. This makes them at the very least intellectually relevant to philosophical 
practice. Given that no individual should be encouraged to follow the particular ways of life 
endorsed by these philosophers, to do so would be inauthentic, no one is required to accept what 
these philosophers are saying.       
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored the contributions Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might make to philosophical 
practice. I argued that they offer philosophical ways of life. Since a philosophical way of life is a 
contained and coherent system, explicating the primary parts (ethics, metaphysics and 
epistemologies) is necessary to obtain a rich understanding of their respective philosophical systems. 
I argue that exposing the participant to the entire philosophical system would not only help her to 
appreciate the complexity and coherency of a philosophical system, ideally it would inspire her to 
develop her own complex and coherent philosophical way of life.  
I argued that that the ethical ways of life offered by these philosophers are practically relevant to 
philosophical practice. The transformative aspiration to become authentic could serve as a directive 
to guide the participant on her transformative project. Admittedly, this is not a clear directive as the 
participant would have to develop her own understanding of what ‘becoming authentic’ means. 
While the transformative projects of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche could not be adopted in 
philosophical practice, they could serve to inspire the participant to develop her own unique pattern 
of existence.  
While these philosophers offer a range of practices these are particular to their philosophical ways 
of life, and as such there is no guarantee that any of them would be applicable to any other 
philosophical way of life inspired by these philosophers. As a consequent, any philosophical practice 
that is inspired by these, or any other existential philosophy, would be necessarily experimental.  
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I argued that understanding the metaphysics and epistemologies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are 
intellectually relevant to philosophical practice. Given that their respective metaphysics and 
epistemologies underpin and inform their respective ethical ways of life, understanding them is 
crucial to understanding their philosophical ways of life. Given that these philosophers do not 
prescribe their particular philosophical ways of life to others, the participant would not be required 
to accept their particular metaphysics and epistemologies.  
Philosophical practice that is informed by these philosophers is likely to make contributions that 
could change the face of philosophical practice. That the path of becoming authentic is particular to 
the individual almost assures that the practitioner would engage with the participant on a one-to-
one basis. I regard this one-on-one approach as the only common element that would exist between 
current philosophical practice and a practice inspired by these philosophers. 
I argue that a Socratic vision of philosophizing, the predominant mode of philosophizing in 
philosophical practice, is unsuitable for a philosophical way of life inspired by these philosophers on 
three counts: it emphasizes reason as preeminent in philosophizing; it has an express focus on self-
knowledge; and the philosopher adopts the role of the gadfly.    
Firstly, a Socratic vision of philosophizing prioritizes the role of reason. It is through the process of 
critical reasoning that the participant assesses her worldview. The philosophers reviewed above de-
emphasize the role of reason in philosophizing. For Kierkegaard passion is preeminent in 
philosophizing, and reason has no part to play. Nietzsche promotes the need for affect, though 
unlike Kierkegaard he would claim that reason has an instrumental role to play. Both Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche advocate that faith plays a role in philosophizing. I content that de-emphasizing the 
role of reason and promoting the role of passion, affect and faith would likely change the face of 
philosophical practice. Firstly, there might be less critical engagement with ideas, and more 
encouragement to heighten passion and affect. Secondly, the elevation of faith over reason might 
have the following possible implication: while the practitioner could help the participant to clarify 
and deepen her pattern of existence, even help her to see potential consequences of it, she would 
not be able to evaluate it or demand a reasoned defence of it. Thirdly, if, like Kierkegaard, the 
practitioner recognized that existential feelings, such as despair and guilt play a positive role in the 
process of becoming authentic, she might strive to make the participant aware of these feelings and 
find ways to intensify them. Exactly how this would be achieved is something to be discovered in 
practice.   
Secondly, I argue that the transformative aspiration to become authentic, to create one’s self, is 
fundamentally different to, and at odds with the Socratic search for self-knowledge. Since 
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Kierkegaard and Nietzsche regard self as something to be determined and not discovered, self-
knowledge is iirrelevant for the task. One argument in support of this is that self-knowledge and self-
creation have different temporal orientations. Self-knowledge is directed toward the past and 
present, to consider that which I know or believe or value to be true; while self-creation is oriented 
toward the future, to what I am becoming. Another argument is that since self is indeterminate, it 
cannot be known in a way that entities can be. The danger in pursuing self-knowledge is that in 
doing so one subscribes to a concept of self that contributes to the “hypostatization of a human 
substances” (Cooper 1999: 101). This is antithetical to the project of becoming.  
Finally, it is evident that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche assign roles to the philosopher that extend 
beyond that of the Socratic gadfly, a disinterested interlocutor and teacher of critical reasoning. 
Kierkegaard endorses the role of ‘physician of the soul’ while Nietzsche advocates a conglomerate of 
roles that include the free spirit, social critic, legislator and leader. I would not be so bold as to 
suggest that the practitioner adopt these roles. However, at the very least, the practitioner should 
be committed to her own aspiration to become authentic and a particular pattern of existence. 
Failure to do this would be tantamount to being inauthentic, and would thus be contradictory to the 
fundamental aspiration to become authentic. Being committed to her own path of becoming would 
allow the practitioner to be an existential exemplar for the participant, a model to inspire her to 
discover her own path of becoming and truth to live by.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
This project began with an interest in philosophical counselling. I found the idea of combining 
philosophy with psychological counselling, the abstract and general with the practical and applied, 
appealing. I argued that while ‘philosophical counselling’ may be conceptually useful for the 
uninitiated, it runs the risk of creating misconceptions and false expectations. In an effort to avoid 
any confusion I opted to make use of ‘philosophical practice’ as it dissociates the practice from 
psychology, psychological counselling or psychotherapy. I regard philosophical practice to be 
distinctive in at least four ways: it is firmly grounded in philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology and 
ethics); it is orientated toward the pursuit of philosophical ends; it makes use of philosophically 
advocated practices in order to realize the ends; and the philosopher plays an integral role.   
An examination of the philosophical practice literature revealed that practitioners endorse a diverse 
range of ends. These include instrumental ends, such as problem-solving and therapy; and intrinsic 
ends, such as scepticism, self-knowledge, wisdom and virtue. While all of these ends are 
philosophically advocated, I showed that there is significant disagreement amongst the practitioners 
with respect to which ends are suitable for philosophical practice. 
This broad array of ends could create the view that philosophical practice is diverse and 
differentiated. Contrary to this I argued that all the approaches to philosophical practice can be 
understood as facets of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic, i.e. as practical wisdom that 
brings about / increases well-being. Such a vision not only accounts for the relationship of each 
approach to the phronetic whole; it provides an understanding of the relationship between 
approaches; and it offers a charitable explanation for instances when practitioners advocate more 
than one end. 
I explored the means advocated by philosophical practitioners to attain their ends. I showed that 
some practitioners endorse methodological eclecticism – the view that the practitioner has the 
freedom to utilize whatever philosophical ideas and methods she deems appropriate. I cautioned 
against using such a methodology. My concern was that the uncritical application of philosophies 
with contradictory metaphysical and ethical commitments, and their associated methods, may result 
in inconsistencies in the participant.  
I argued that the Socratic vision of philosophizing is predominant in philosophical practice. I showed 
that philosophical practitioners typically focus on the participant’s worldview, with a view to helping 
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the participant access, assess and modify her worldview. In this respect, philosophical practice is 
largely concerned with a Socratic search for self-knowledge. Such practice requires that the 
philosophical practitioner assume the role of the Socratic gadfly, a critical dialogical partner that asks 
questions and demands reasons to support the answers, and as teacher of critical thinking. The 
participant is required to assume the role of student of the Socratic Method and critical assessor of 
her own worldview.  
A Socratic vision of philosophizing is one way to address the concern raised against methodological 
eclecticism. Firstly, it is devoid of metaphysical and ethical views. The only injunction is that one 
‘know thyself’. Secondly, achieving self-knowledge does not require that the participant be exposed 
to other philosophical views. An application of the Socratic Method simply requires the participant 
to access and critically assess her own worldview. I argued that a Socratic vision of philosophizing 
preserves and enhances participant autonomy. That philosophical practitioners value participant 
autonomy might explain why the Socratic vision of philosophizing is predominant.   
I argued that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is insufficient to achieve the phronetic ends (wisdom 
and well-being). I argued that self-knowledge is insufficient to attain wisdom. While all philosophers 
may regard self-knowledge as a virtue, not all regard it as a gateway virtue. Epicurus names 
prudence as the gateway virtue, while Aristotle names practical wisdom. As such, the attainment of 
this virtue is unlikely to result in the attainment of other virtues. If it is the case that wisdom is 
synonymous with the achievement of a host of virtues, then the singular pursuit of self-knowledge 
will be insufficient to attain wisdom. The early Lahav promotes the pursuit of self-knowledge as the 
end of philosophical practice, and acknowledges that it possesses the potential to bring about well-
being. Problematically, he does not define well-being at all. He later rejects self-knowledge as an end 
for philosophical practice and argues that the pursuit of self-knowledge is antithetical to attaining 
wisdom. In light of the above, and in agreement with Lahav, I maintained that alternative visions of 
philosophizing are required for philosophical practice.   
I examined Lahav’s rendition of a Platonic vision of philosophizing. I argued that while his rendition is 
philosophically suggestive, it is void of actual content. I also argued that his account is 
methodologically vague.  
I explored an Aristotelian vision of philosophizing. I argued that it possesses a high phronetic degree 
as the virtue of practical wisdom and well-being are central features of it. I maintained that it 
presents as a genuine possibility for philosophical practice as it articulates a methodology and 
specifies roles for the practitioner that have not been expressed in the philosophical practice 
literature.  
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In order to expand and develop philosophical practice I associated it with the conception of 
philosophy as a way of life. I generated five criteria of a philosophical way of life: 1. it promotes a 
transformative aspiration; 2. it endorses a transformative project; 3. it provides a vision of 
philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; 4. it provides practices to effect the 
transformation; 5. it constitutes a self-contained and coherent philosophical system. I offered these 
five criteria as means to identify / corroborate additional philosophies as constituting philosophical 
ways of life.   
I argued that philosophical practice that possesses a high phronetic degree, such as offered by 
Tukiainen, Lahav and Tuedio, satisfy the first four criteria, but fail to satisfy the fifth criterion. I 
concluded that they cannot count as philosophical ways of life.  
Six philosophies were identified as offering a philosophical way of life: the Stoics, Epicureans, Kant, 
Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I corroborated their status as philosophical ways of life by 
applying the above five criteria. I presented these six philosophical ways of life in pairs, on the basis 
of two criteria: shared transformative aspiration; and divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies.  
I paired the Stoics and the Epicureans as they endorse the transformative aspiration to ‘be happy’. 
They define happiness as a peaceful and tranquil life. They associate tranquillity with self-sufficiency 
– freedom from inner turmoil and external contingencies.  
I argued that the Stoics offer a transcendent philosophical way of life, since their metaphysics and 
ethics are transcendent. They recognize God (reason) as the organizing principle in all things, and as 
such understand all things and events as ordered by divine providence. They advocate a 
transformative project of self-mastery: perfecting one’s capacity to reason, while simultaneously 
negating the dictates of the body and the vital spirit.  
I argued that the Epicureans offer an immanent philosophical way of life as their metaphysics and 
ethics are immanent. They endorse an atomistic view of the world; dismiss the idea of a 
transcendent being, or at least deny God’s involvement in the world; and understand life to be 
random and deterministic. I read their ethic as immanent since they regard pleasure and the 
absence of pain as the Good.  
I paired Kant and Dewey as they share the transformative aspiration to ‘be good’. Their aspiration to 
‘be good’ entails developing and living in accordance with the intellect, and acting in accordance 
with an ethical principle.  
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I argued that Kant provides a transcendent philosophical way of life as his metaphysic and ethic are 
transcendent. Kant presents a bifurcated vision of the world as phenomenal and noumenal; offers a 
view man as possessing a dual nature, as sensible (determinate) and intelligent (indeterminate); and 
he endorses belief in God and the soul as necessary moral postulates. Like the Stoics, Kant advocates 
a transformative project of self-mastery which requires that we develop reason and deny inclination 
and feeling.  
I argued that Dewey’s philosophical way of life is immanent as his metaphysic and ethic are 
immanent. Dewey provides an understanding of existence as a combination of nature and 
experience. He recognizes that the natural world as the sole plane of existence, characterized as 
being in a constant state of evolution and emergence. He understands experience as the individual 
interacting with, and being acted on by, the environment. I read Dewey’s ethic as immanent because 
he posits a naturalistic vision of man as socially immersed and emergent, and a creature of habit. His 
project of self-reconstruction requires that we change habits and harness our capacities and 
dispositions.  
I paired Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as they endorse the transformative aspiration to ‘become 
authentic’. Becoming authentic means to emerge or stand out from the rest of human existence. For 
Kierkegaard this entails creating one’s subjectivity; while for Nietzsche it entails creating one’s self.  
I argued that Kierkegaard offers a transcendent philosophical way of live since his metaphysic and 
ethic are transcendent. Kierkegaard posits a bifurcated conception of reality: God as infinite, 
absolute, necessary and free from change; and material existence as finite, temporal, causal and 
subject to change. Since Kierkegaard endorses eternal happiness as the absolute Good, he promotes 
the religious life, living according to the dictates of God, as the highest mode of existence. His 
transformative project requires that the individual relinquish her finitude and renounce herself.  
I argued that Nietzsche offers an immanent philosophical way of life as he endorses an immanent 
metaphysic and ethic. Nietzsche posits a monist conception of reality characterised by change. He 
names the will to power as the creative force that underlies reality and the character of all change. 
Nietzsche denies the existence of absolute values, and offers the will to power as the objective 
measure of value. His transformative project requires the individual to create herself in her own 
image. This entails embracing and developing the multiple facets of her being.  
I made the case that each philosophical way of life was relevant to philosophical practice in a myriad 
of ways. I argued that the particular transformative aspirations, projects and practices of each 
philosophical way of life could serve as ends and means of philosophical practice. I also argued that 
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the roles each assign to the philosopher provide additional roles to the philosophical practitioner. I 
argued that the empirical epistemologies endorsed by some philosophers might introduce an 
experimental element that might significantly change the content and context of philosophical 
practice.   
It is apparent that the six philosophical ways of life under review share a range of commitments. In 
each chapter I highlighted common ground shared between the paired philosophies. I contend that 
some of this common ground is shared across the pairs. These commonalities include: a focus on 
education; an emphasis on community and social development; the role of aesthetics and the 
importance of having an aesthetic perception; and the non-essential nature of the self.  
Education is promoted by the Stoics, Kant and Dewey. The Stoics were preoccupied with education, 
and aimed at training people to be capable of dealing with life’s challenges and able to heal 
themselves. Given their metaphysics – that God (universal reason) is in all things, and that perfecting 
our reason, and the reason in others, honours the divine that is in us – they committed themselves 
to educating as many people as possible. Education arises as a matter of duty for Kant. The duty of 
beneficence requires that we help others achieve their freely chosen ends. One of the ways to do 
this is by educating them. By assisting others to develop the appropriate natural talents and 
dispositions, they are better able to develop themselves. Education is a central concern for Dewey. 
Education fosters freedom, helps us to think better, observe more clearly, and judge more 
adequately. This not only allows us to realize our full potential, it equips us to be better citizens. 
Given that democracy was an ideal for Dewey he strongly endorsed education.  
There are several possible consequences for philosophical practice were it to prioritize education. 
Firstly, philosophical practitioners would likely focus on providing the participant with the requisite 
skills, tools, perceptual experiences, and the like, so that she can think more clearly, make better 
choices, and become a better individual. This would enhance her capacity to deal more effectively 
with life, as well as potential problems and issues that may arise. Many practitioners would likely 
agree that this is what they already do. Secondly, if education was a primary focus of philosophical 
practice it might change the form in which philosophical practice was offered. Currently, 
philosophical practitioners appear to offer one-on-one talk sessions. While this form might be 
appropriate for practice that endorses private ends, such as therapy, problem-solving, and self-
knowledge, it is not necessary for practice that has an explicit focus on education. Of course a focus 
on education does not negate one-on-one sessions, but it could open the domain of practice up to 
groups by offerings skills training workshops. Thirdly, philosophical practice that is orientated to 
education might not be governed by economic gain. This is inspired by the Stoic’s and Kant’s notions 
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that we have duty to educate. Since the idea of duty is at odds with self-serving notions, a duty to 
educate others might mean that philosophical practice could be offered free of charge. This rallies 
against contemporary notions of philosophical practice as a means of employment and a potential 
career path. While some may regard this proposal to be impracticable, I think it is entirely possible 
for tenured philosophers to offer outreach programmes at community centres. This accords with 
Stoic practice and intones Dewey’s ‘spirit of service’. The merit of such a proposal is that it would 
overcome several problems associated with accepting payment for services rendered. One is that 
charging for philosophical practice might make it elitist since only those who could afford it would 
benefit from it. The Stoics, Kant and Dewey would all endorse the idea of extending education to all, 
without restriction. Secondly, payment could alter the practitioner-participant relationship. 
Accepting fees for services rendered “might generate expectations and feelings of obligation in the 
clients and their counsellors … (such that) a paying client may expect not to have his views on life to 
be called into question” (Web 2). Thirdly, economic gain could significantly alter what is offered, as 
only that which is deemed to be profitable would be promoted.  
Community is recognised as an essential component of the philosophical way of life by all the 
philosophers, except Kierkegaard. The ideal of community is central to both Epicurean and Stoic 
ways of life, as both implicate the importance of the community in achieving their vision of the good 
life. The Epicurean ‘Garden’ provided a space of seclusion in which acolytes could interact with 
others who shared the same outlook and values. The Stoics, by contrast, promote participation in 
the outside world. They regard it as their duty to create a society that was just and humane, that 
recognized and respected the dignity of all human beings. Nietzsche affirms the centrality of 
community to power and authenticity. Since we cannot become who we are within the social and 
moral framework of the herd, Nietzsche promotes the need for a community of equally powerful 
individuals. Kant and Dewey implicate social engagement in their respective transformative projects. 
Kant regards political freedom – the freedom to use one’s reason publically, to think for ourselves 
and to share those thoughts with others – as necessary for the enlightenment of human beings. 
Kant’s duty to beneficence could manifest in a number of ways. These might include donating a 
portion of our salaries to socially orientated charities or involving ourselves in a social movement 
that strives to effect changes in society. Dewey’s transformative project is intimately connected to 
social-reconstruction. Since self is a social product, we have to actively reconstruct society to bring 
about a transformation of self. This is likely to manifest in active political involvement with the aim 
of solving social problems and developing and refining social values. 
I contend that this community orientation would introduce a novel, unexpressed and unexplored 
political dimension to philosophical practice that appears to be highly individualistic. Philosophical 
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practitioners have tended to model their mode of practice off “the helping profession model of 
client engagement” (Tuedio 2003). As a result, they tend to adopt the traditional psychotherapeutic 
framework of one-hour, one on one, talking sessions, repeated weekly. Not all practitioners adopt 
such a restrictive framework. Lahav (2008), for instance, recognizes the legitimacy of other 
frameworks, such as workshops, retreats and even coffee shop conversations as being more 
conducive to the practice of philosophy. While these practices are a step in the right direction, I do 
not think that they constitute a community in any meaning sense of the word, nor do they aim at 
fostering community.  
 In contrast, and in accordance with this idea of community, I envisage philosophical practice as 
something that would necessarily occur in groups. Assuming that asymmetrical power relations are 
more likely to occur in one-on-one session, and that asymmetrical power relations are antithetical to 
developing participant autonomy, it is hoped that group practice would serve to safe guard against 
asymmetrical relations developing between the practitioner and participant. More than this, group 
sessions would help to draw together people pursuing the same transformative goals, and create a 
focused philosophical community. Such a community would serve to motivate and offer support to 
its members. In addition to this, community orientated projects could be inculcated into the 
transformative project. For example, participants might be required to involve themselves in: charity 
work that uplifts the poor; community based educative programmes; and political movements to 
bring about social change.    
Aesthetics is central to the philosophical ways of life endorsed by Kant, Dewey and Nietzsche. I 
argued that the aesthetics of Kant and Dewey have an epistemic application in their respective 
philosophical ways of life, i.e. aesthetic perception provides a way of knowing how to live. For Kant 
aesthetic perception provides the means to develop moral feeling, which inspires us to hold duty 
sacred and act in accordance with the moral law. Dewey’s notion of an aesthetic experience 
provides an account of a unified, problem-free experience. Moreover, aesthetic experience is 
implicated in his problem-solving process, and hence is central to the reconstructive process. I 
argued that Nietzsche’s aesthetic has an ontological application, i.e. art is promoted as a way of 
being. Nietzsche enjoins us to live aesthetically, and create ourselves as works of art.  
Incorporating aesthetics and the development of aesthetic perception into philosophical practice 
would likely introduce a novel non-cognitive element that would expand what happens in the 
philosophical encounter. If it is the case that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is preeminent in 
philosophical practice, and that such an approach is discursive, then the introduction of aesthetics 
might interject a non-discursive aspect into the practice. Since an aesthetic experience is perceptual 
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and pre-conceptual, it is something that has to be experienced, not merely discussed. Since having 
an aesthetic experience requires assuming a particular stance – this would require training and 
experience. Exactly what this would entail is open to conjecture. It might entail looking at beautiful 
works of art. Either the practitioner would select beautiful objects for the participant to practice her 
aesthetic perception on; or the practitioner and participant could make such a selection together. 
Practicing aesthetic perception could be done by visiting a museum of art or an art gallery. Having an 
aesthetic experience is not limited to viewing works of art. It could also include listening to selected 
pieces of music or even dancing.  
One may object that the philosophical practitioner is unqualified to offer training in aesthetic 
perception, as this is beyond what a training in philosophy provides. I do not read this as an 
indictment against offering aesthetic perception in philosophical practice. Instead, it highlights the 
fact the philosophical practitioner may require more training than what academic philosophy has to 
offer.   
All six philosophical ways of life share a common commitment to the view that self is not fixed and 
determinate, i.e. it is non-essential. A non-essential view posits that self is indeterminate, and comes 
into being through the process of living. Situations and circumstances play a significant part in 
shaping the self, as do our conceptions of who we are, and the way we relate ourselves to the 
experiences we have and the world in which we find ourselves. This mostly occurs unconsciously, or 
at the very least unreflectively. While the self forms as a matter of course, it is something that we 
can actively shape and mould in line with a particular vision. Actively shaping and moulding one’s 
self is nothing other than the act of self-cultivation.  
While each philosophical way of life postulates a particular transformative aspiration (to be happy, 
to be good, or to become authentic) it is evident that the transformative projects of self-cultivation 
that the philosophers promote fall rather neatly onto either side of the transcendent / immanent 
divide. Transcendent philosophies tend to promote a project of self-mastery. This entails exercising 
control over oneself, and relinquishing certain aspects of the self. Kant and the Stoics promote a 
project of self-mastery as living in accordance with reason. They demand different degrees of 
relinquishing. The Stoics endorse the whole-scale rejection of emotions. While Kant advocates 
jettisoning animalistic elements, such as desire, he does recognize the importance of moral feeling. 
Kierkegaard advocates a radical project of self-mastery that requires the total sacrifice of one’s 
finitude – ego and desires. Immanent philosophies tend to promote a project of self-recreation. Both 
Nietzsche and Dewey advocate the remaking of oneself. Nietzsche promotes overcoming oneself 
and social constraints, and creating oneself in the image of one’s own design. Dewey advocates self-
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reconstruction. This entails developing and refining meaning, ideas, judgments, dispositions and 
behaviours. 
I argue that incorporating self-cultivation into philosophical practice could alter the Socratic 
emphasis that is placed on the attainment of self-knowledge. If self is non-essential then it is not 
something that can ever be known in a determinate sense. One could argue that the idea of self-
knowledge suggests that self can be known in a determinate sense; and in this respect, the idea the 
idea of self-knowledge is at odds with the idea of self-cultivation. In accordance with this, 
practitioners who endorse philosophy as a way of life would not promote self-knowledge as an end 
of philosophical practice. On the other hand one could argue self-knowledge is fundamental to any 
project of self-cultivation. If we understand the self as a regulative ideal, and that any project of self-
cultivation necessarily depends upon having insights into who we are - in the sense that we are 
required to be honest with ourselves about the person we are, then self-knowledge is of the utmost 
importance. In either instance use of the Socratic Method would serve as a valuable tool in 
philosophical practice. It is evident that some philosophers who promote philosophical ways of life 
endorse the activity of self-examination. The Socratic Method is specifically designed to access and 
assess the interlocutor’s worldview. Accordingly, philosophical practitioners that advocate self-
cultivation could continue to make use of the Socratic Method.    
One might object that the existence of these shared commitments challenges my claim that 
philosophical ways of life are distinctly different. I disagree. It is evident that each philosophical way 
of life offers a particular ethics that is underpinned and informed by a particular metaphysic and 
epistemology. It is these that makes each philosophical way of life unique, and not their 
commitments. Even if two philosophical ways of life propose highly similar philosophical views, that 
they endorse unique aspects ensures that they are distinct and different. For example, Dewey and 
Nietzsche endorse naturalistic metaphysical views. While both agree that the fundamental nature of 
the world is change, they provide fundamentally different accounts of the mechanism of change. 
Dewey would likely endorse an evolutionary view of change as adaptation. Such a view emphasizes 
the responsiveness of the organism that falls out of step with and then recovers balance with the 
changing environment. In contrast, Nietzsche describes the underlying feature of reality, and 
change, as the will to power. This account emphasizes constant tension and continual struggle 
between opposing forces. A second point of coincidence is that both promote naturalistic ethics. 
They deny the existence of absolute values and derive their ethical principles directly from their 
respective metaphysics. As a result of this they offer different ethical values: Dewey promotes the 
value of growth, which applies simultaneously to the individual as well as society (the common 
wealth); while Nietzsche promotes the will to power as the ultimate ethical principle. A third point of 
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coincidence pertains to their transformative projects. While both endorse transformative projects of 
self-recreation, their projects are fundamentally different. Dewey’s project of self-reconstruction is 
intimately connected to social reconstruction, such that one necessarily has to effect social changes 
in order to effect changes in one’s self. In accordance with this Dewey would hold democracy as a 
political ideal worth aspiring towards. In contrast, Nietzsche’s project of self-creation is a highly 
individualistic and aesthetic project whereby one gives style to one’s life. To this end he develops the 
Ubermensch as his existential ideal. 
It is evident that these commitments are attached to and arise out of the various philosophical ways 
of life. It is likely that they would become underlying commitments in philosophical practice were 
practitioners to endorse philosophical ways of life. While some, such as education, are arguably 
already a part of philosophical practice, others, such as community, aesthetics and the non-essential 
nature of self are not. I have argued that including these commitments into philosophical practice 
could fundamentally alter what it is and how it is practiced.  
In addition to the above common commitments, it is apparent that many of the practices that are 
advocated as means in the various transformative projects are also shared. Shared practices include: 
self-examination, confession, developing one’s reasoning capacity, scientific inquiry, revaluation and 
reconstruction, contemplation, doctrinal instruction, the moral exemplar, aesthetic perception and 
stilling the mind.   
Self-examination is advocated by the Epicureans, Stoics, Kant and Nietzsche; though to different 
ends. The Epicureans endorse self-examination as a means to access one’s beliefs and desires. The 
Stoics promote self-examination as a normative rather than a descriptive exercise. The pupil is 
required to consider what sort of person she wants to become, what sort of life she wants to live. 
Kant promotes self-examination as a means to scrutinize the purity of one’s intentions. This serves 
the pursuit of moral perfection. For Nietzsche self-examination reveals our strengths and 
weaknesses and allows us to discover errors of deception. This is a necessary step in overcoming 
oneself. While Kierkegaard does not explicitly promote self-examination, he does endorse self-
vigilance and self-reflection. The practice of self-examination accords, to varying degrees, with an 
application of the Socratic Method. Since I argued that a Socratic vision of philosophizing is 
predominant in philosophical practice, the practice of self-examination is not new to philosophical 
practice. However the ends these philosophers apply self-examination to may be novel applications 
for philosophical practice.        
Confession is advocated by the Epicureans and Nietzsche. Recognizing that self-examination could 
be marred by misconception and self-deception, the Epicureans advocate that the pupil confess 
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their inner-most thoughts, feelings, desires and actions to the master. Nietzsche endorses the 
confession, though contrary to Epicurean practice, his brand of confession is an act of self-disclosure. 
While the act of truth-telling may well be something that is expected and encouraged in 
psychological therapies, it is not something that philosophical practitioners overtly promote. Either 
they assume that the participant is going to offer the truth, or that the truth is unimportant. I highly 
doubt that is it is later, given philosophers general positive stance toward truth, and I think it is a 
mistake to assume the former. In this respect telling the truth is something that needs to be 
emphasized and promoted if it is to be practiced. Admittedly, if disclosing the truth is something we 
are only likely to do in a relationship of trust, then this would be something that the philosophical 
practitioner should foster and cultivate. Curiously, I have not encountered any reference in the 
philosophical practice literature to the importance of truth-telling, trust, or what constitutes and 
how to develop trusting relationships. This is something that deserves attention.       
Developing one’s capacity for reason is advocated by the Epicureans, the Stoics and Kant. The 
Epicureans regard rationality as the means to eject false beliefs, thereby eliminating unwanted 
desires. For the Stoics it is the means to extirpate the passions. Kant promotes the use of reason as 
the means to develop moral law, and to subdue affect and control passion. While the Epicureans 
endorse the use of reason, contrary to the Stoics and Kant, they do not encourage critical 
independent thinking in the pupil. It would be fair to assume that philosophical practitioners would 
endorse developing the reasoning capacity of the participant. Assuming that the philosophical 
practitioner has had training in philosophy, it would follow that she would be well versed in skills of 
argumentation. Moreover, these skills would be transferred to the participant. This is bound to 
happen with an application of the Socratic Method, as the participant would be encouraged to 
evaluate her worldview and its associated concepts, beliefs and values.    
Not all philosophical practice is restricted to critical self-examination, reflection, dialogical 
engagement, and the development of one’s argumentative capacities. Nietzsche and Dewey both 
promote scientific method and inquiry, respectively. This entails critical observation and 
experimentation. Nietzsche endorses creating experiments of ourselves with a view to improve our 
lives, while Dewey’s application is directed at solving problems. Such practice would likely introduce 
an experimental dimension to philosophical practice that would shift focus away from a purely 
intellectual engagement with ideas, and as a result would move it outside of the confines of the 
office and into the world. I argued that the empiricist epistemologies of the Stoic and Epicureans 
would likely have the same impact of philosophical practice.       
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Nietzsche and Dewey also advocate revaluation and reconstruction respectively. In both instances 
this entails an examination of values, beliefs and actions. Those that are regarded to be positive – 
that make us stronger, permit growth – are to be retained, while those regarded as superfluous – 
‘weak’, unproductive – are cast off. This also entails adopting new values, ideas and behaviours. 
While the process is similar for these two, the focus is different. Nietzsche’s practice is 
fundamentally individualistic in that it is directed at creating oneself. Dewey’s focus, on the other, is 
directed towards reconstructing society. In this respect, it includes effecting intellectual as well as 
institutional changes.  
Contemplation is another shared practice. Kant advocates the practice of metaphysical 
contemplation, however, he cautions that too much metaphysical contemplation would make the 
pupil into a philosopher, and that was not his intention. The Epicureans, Stoics and Kierkegaard 
promote the contemplation of one’s own death. For the Hellenistic philosophers this serves the 
purpose of eradicating irrational fear. For Kierkegaard it helps us to face the uncertainty of death, 
and in doing so prepare for it. I encountered no evidence in the philosophical practice literature to 
suggest that practitioners apply contemplating one’s death as a transformative tool. This is curious 
given that contemplating one’s death is promoted as a transformative practice by a host of 
philosophers.  
Not all philosophical practice requires active engagement on the part of the pupil. The Epicureans, 
the Stoics, Kant and Kierkegaard all promote doctrinal instruction as a mode of practice. For the 
Stoics and Kant this entails basic instruction in philosophy, while for Kierkegaard it amounted to 
religious instruction. Such instruction does not require active involvement from the pupil. She was 
are not required to formulate her own views, or even understand the complexity of the 
philosophical systems. A passive openness is all that is required. In line with this Epicurus, the Stoics 
and Kant all endorse repetition and memorization to ensure retention. In philosophical practice this 
could manifest as basic instruction in the main elements of a philosophical way of life (ethics, 
metaphysics, and epistemology). Since a philosophical way of life is a self-contained and coherent 
system, the participant’s understanding of such a way of life would be enriched through exposure to 
its primary elements. This is not to say that they would have to uncritically accept them, as in the 
case of the Epicureans.     
The moral exemplar is a philosophical practice advocated by the Epicureans, the Stoics, Kant and 
Nietzsche. The Epicureans and Stoics made use of the moral exemplar – the ‘ethical witness’ and the 
‘perfect living creature’ respectively – as a means to determine what constitutes ‘the Good’. Kant 
regards the moral exemplar as a mechanism to understand the dignity of duty. However, he did not 
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regard it too highly since it entails learning through imitation rather than the active exercise of 
reason. Nietzsche constructs the Ubermensch as a noble ideal, an existential exemplar of the higher 
man. Admittedly, the Ubermensch is Nietzsche’s ideal and not intended to be a model for others to 
follow. Instead, he would encourage the participant to formulate and aspire to her own existential 
ideals. It is evident that some philosophical practitioners, such as Lahav, Tukiainen and Tuedio, 
advocate use of the exemplar. In this respect this transformative tool offers nothing new to 
philosophical practice.    
A number of philosophers advocate assuming a particular perceptual stance that permits us to 
experience the world in a certain way. The Epicureans endorse taking delight in simple pleasures. 
This requires one to be fully present in the moment, with all attention and thought directed on the 
pleasurable activity. This permits one to have a full and unadulterated experience. There is accord 
between this perceptual stance and aesthetic perception advocated by Kant, Dewey and Nietzsche. 
Kant regards aesthetic perception as a form of non-cognitive perception, while Dewey describes it as 
an immediate and pre-reflective sense. Kant maintains that in order to see beauty we need to 
dissociate ourselves from what we are seeing. To this end he advocates ‘disinterested interest’. This 
permits us to experience the phenomena as it is, on its own terms. While Nietzsche does not think 
beauty exists in the world, he does endorse the practice of aesthetic ‘distance’ when looking at 
ourselves. Given that current philosophical practitioners appear to restrictively endorse the 
intellectual engagement of ideas, the practice of aesthetic perception could introduce a novel 
practice to philosophical practice.   
An associated practice of stilling the mind is endorsed by Kierkegaard and the Stoics. This entails 
silencing the ego – one’s likes and dislikes, and the accompanying judgments. Kierkegaard endorses 
practicing inner silence as a means to come to terms with one’s finitude and commune with God. 
The Stoics would advocate practicing inner silence, as they endorse the importance of listening in 
order to have a genuine conversation. It is likely that philosophical practitioners would similarly 
endorse the importance of silence. It is the case that a host of philosophical practitioners endorse 
the importance of listening. These include Norman (1995), Lahav (2006), Achenbach (Web 1), and 
Raabe (2001). 
In chapter one I argued that a Socratic vision of philosophizing, which emphasizes rational discourse 
and a critical engagement with one’s worldview, is predominant in philosophical practice. It is 
apparent that the philosophers studied in this dissertation promote a significantly wider range of 
practices that extend beyond critical rational dialogue. I regard all the practices examined in this 
body of work as being relevant to philosophical practice. The exact selection and combination of 
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practices would be determined by the practitioner, dependent upon the particular transformative 
aspiration and project that the participant embarks upon.   
One might object that the occurrence of shared practices calls my intuition regarding 
methodological eclecticism into question. The concern was that the uncritical application of 
philosophies contradictory metaphysical and ethical commitments, and their associated methods, 
might create underlying internal contradictions in the participant. One could argue that if a range of 
philosophers who endorse divergent metaphysical and ethical views advocate the same practices, 
then it can’t be the case that exposure to these practices would create internal contradictions. If this 
is the case, then the intuition is wrong.  
I concede that my intuition was imprecise, but not wrong. It is not the practices that we should be 
concerned with. Means are neutral, tools to be applied to a particular end. It is the ends that direct 
the application of the means. This explains why the same practice can be advocated by distinctly 
different philosophical ways of life. In accordance with this, I amend my charge against 
methodological eclecticism. I contend that logical inconsistencies might arise as a result of 
advocating different philosophies, i.e. which have divergent metaphysical and ethical commitments.  
I argue that divergent philosophies are logical contraries. For example, one cannot both affirm an 
immanent metaphysic that recognizes one plane of existence, while simultaneously affirming a 
transcendent metaphysic that recognizes two planes of existence. Similarly, one cannot practice self-
mastery and the associated relinquishing of undesirable aspects of one’s being, and simultaneously 
practice self-recreation and the affirmation of one’s being. Internal contradictions might arise in the 
participant if she uncritically accepts contradictory philosophical ideas. In this respect, practitioners 
need to exercise caution when promoting divergent philosophies, and ensure that the participant is 
aware of any logically contradictory positions. 
One might argue that the application of a philosophical way of life in philosophical practice 
represents another way to address the concern raised against methodological eclecticism. Each way 
of life is a self-contained and coherent philosophical system that comprises of a particular ethical 
way of life, which is underpinned by a metaphysic and an epistemology. Living a philosophical way of 
life is fundamentally different to an exercise in philosophical discourse. The latter entails nothing 
more than an intellectual interest in and a critical exploration of a myriad of philosophical positions 
and outlooks, without the need to commit to any of them. In contrast, living a philosophical way of 
life requires the adherent to commit to the ethical, metaphysical and epistemic presuppositions of 
that way of life. In a philosophical practice scenario this would ensure that the participant is not 
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exposed to contradictory metaphysical and ethical views, thereby mitigating the concern raised 
against methodological eclecticism. 
Few practitioners would agree with exposing the participant to a single philosophical outlook. 
Schuster and Lahav endorse broad-scale exposure to any and all philosophical views. Schuster 
promotes a vision of philosophical practice that is necessarily open to all kinds of questions and 
answers, and free to explore any and all philosophical views. She regards the exclusive use of any 
philosophical outlook and associated method as something which would “prevent both clients and 
practitioners from having an authentic encounter with all that philosophy can offer” (Schuster 1995: 
101). Accordingly, she regards it as the philosophical practitioner’s job to expose the participant to 
an array of philosophical views. Since Lahav regards wisdom to be synonymous with a broadening of 
one’s intellectual horizons, he would similarly endorse exposing the participant to a diverse array of 
philosophies. Admittedly, neither Schuster nor Lahav offer philosophical ways of life. 
Some philosophical ways of life do not advocate exposure to a range of philosophical views, and 
some do. I argued that Epicurus would likely endorse the study of his philosophy alone. In this 
respect he would agree that the participant should be exposed to a single philosophical outlook and 
way of life. In contrast, the Stoics openly encouraged their pupils to study their own and other 
philosophies. Accordingly they would endorse that the participant be exposed to divergent 
philosophical positions.  
I would not even go so far as to say that the participant should only be exposed to a single 
philosophical outlook. I think that there is merit in exposing the participant to different philosophies, 
but only up to a point. Firstly, broad scale exposure could help the participant understand the 
philosophical terrain. It is possible that there are some pertinent philosophical concepts that she has 
never contemplated, for example wisdom and virtue. Alternatively, the participant may have a 
limited conceptual understanding of a relevant notion. For example her understanding of ‘the good 
life’ could be narrowly defined in terms of material possessions. In such instances, exposure to a 
range of philosophical views might serve to highlight previously unconsidered areas, various 
definitions and standpoints that one could assume. Secondly, exposure to a wide range of 
philosophical views might help to clarify her position which may be unclear and logically confused. 
Since many of our views are unconsciously and uncritically received and formed it is possible for the 
participant to hold contradictory metaphysical and ethical views. Exposure to a range of 
philosophical ideas could help the participant establish a clear and enlightened position. Such 
exposure could also serve to illustrate the philosophical depths of any logical contradictions. Thirdly, 
given that living a philosophical way of life is principally concerned with cultivating the self, exposure 
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to a range of philosophical ideas could help the practitioner and participant determine which path of 
self-cultivation is the most appropriate, i.e. which philosophical way of life best accords with the 
participant’s philosophical standpoint. Once the participant has gained clarity of her transformative 
aspiration and project I see no further reason to continue such exposure. Continuing to do so could 
derail the transformative project as it would impede the participant from committing to a particular 
philosophical way of life.   
It is evident that the philosophical ways of life reviewed in this dissertation advocate a range of roles 
to the philosopher. Much of what is required to help the participant to develop a clear and coherent 
worldview is covered in the range of roles espoused by philosophical practitioners in chapter one. 
These roles include the Socratic gadfly, the curator of ideas and translator. We have encountered a 
significantly wider range of roles in the philosophical ways of life explored in the body of this 
dissertation. I organize the full range of roles that are available to the philosophical practitioner into 
three categories of investment: intellectual, personal, and existential.  
The first category demands an intellectual investment from the philosophical practitioner. Intellect, 
reason and objectivity are highly valued, while subjective views, feelings and experiences are not. An 
intellectual investment is prevalent in the roles of philosopher as Socratic gadfly, teacher of critical 
reasoning, curator of ideas, social critic, trainer of aesthetic perception, and doctor of the soul. As a 
Socratic gadfly the practitioner’s task is to draw out the participant’s worldview, to discover where 
her metaphysical and ethical sentiments lie, and to detect any logical inconsistencies she may have. 
The practitioner as teacher of critical reasoning guides the participant to critically engage with her 
own worldview. Through this process it is hoped that she will acquire argumentative and reasoning 
skills necessary to continue this process on her own. As a curator of ideas the practitioner introduces 
the participant to various philosophical views and ideas. In this respect the practitioner must have 
broad and deep philosophical knowledge. The practitioner as social critic challenges accepted values, 
ideas and beliefs. Much like the sceptic and the cynic the practitioner would not be required to 
replace the ideas she has torn down. As a trainer of aesthetic perception the task of the practitioner 
would be to provide the participant with the necessary information and experience to develop her 
aesthetic perception. The practitioner’s role could be to select objects of beauty, or to negotiate 
with the participant as to what constitutes beautiful objects. Secondly she would provide instruction 
in the correct manner in which to view such objects, together with opportunities to practice having 
an aesthetic perception. The Kantian aesthetic stance of ‘disinterested-interest’, and Nietzsche’s 
‘distance’ mirror the practitioner’s investment with the participant. They are required to offer 
nothing of themselves, no personal views or experiences. Both Hellenistic schools of philosophy as 
well as Kierkegaard promote the role of the ‘doctor of the soul’, though the purpose they assign to 
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such a role is fundamentally different. The Hellenistic ‘doctor of the soul’ delivers purgative and 
therapeutic arguments, with the express intention of removing false beliefs and eradicating 
irrational feelings. In direct contrast to this, Kierkegaard’s ‘doctor of the soul’ aims to uncover 
hidden existential feelings, such as anxiety, dread, guilt, nausea. The purpose of which is not to 
dispel these feelings but to bring them to the surface, to foreground and amplify them. These propel 
the participant on her path of authentic becoming.  
The second category demands a personal investment on the part of the practitioner. Personal 
investment values friendship and subjective input. Both Hellenistic schools of philosophy endorse 
the ideal of friendship. In accordance with this the practitioner would enter into an altruistic, 
symmetrical, open, honest, caring relationship with the participant. Engaging in intimate 
conversation requires close personal knowledge of each other’s lives, thoughts, feelings and 
experiences. Kant regards friendship as an ideal relationship of mutual love, respect, sympathetic 
participation, reciprocity, tolerance, and open and honest disclosure. Since he regards friendship as 
a duty, this is a role he would advocate to all and not just between practitioner and participant.  
The third category entails an existential investment. This investment places a premium on living a 
philosophical way of life. The philosopher is seen to distance herself from conventional patterns of 
living. The Epicureans and Stoics promote the vision of the sage as free from ordinary opinion, 
separated from everyday life. The sage lives outside of the bounds of accepted social norms and 
perspectives. This accords with Nietzsche’s vision of the philosopher as a ‘free spirit’ – free from 
social mores, free from comfortable prejudices and preferences. Such an individual opposes 
everything that is accepted, and in its place offers new meanings and values. This is no mere 
intellectual exercise. Nietzsche enjoins the philosopher to make an experiment of her life so that she 
may speak from experience. She is to be brutally honest about herself, not holding back for fear of 
reprisal, condemnation or rejection. She is to make achieving greatness her goal, and inspire others 
to similarly seek their own greatness. He sees the philosopher as leader and legislator of the future. 
This vision of the philosopher accords with Dewey’s ‘moral prophet’. Such an individual is a visionary 
and non-conformist, and is a key element in the reconstruction of society. 
I argue that the role that the philosophical practitioner adopts imposes degrees of restraint on what 
she can offer and how she can offer it. The philosophical practitioner that assumes an intellectually 
invested role has no restrictions. Much like the academic philosopher who can objectively consider 
any position and teach a course on any subject matter regardless of his own personal position, the 
philosophical practitioner who is only intellectually invested is capable of considering any, and, all 
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truths. Since the truths that she considers need not accord with or take account of the participant’s 
personal commitments, such an approach can be agonistic.  
The philosophical practitioner that adopts a personal investment role enters into a relationship of 
mutual love, respect, sympathetic participation, reciprocity, tolerance, open and honest disclosure 
with the participant. While such a relationship may or may not place restrictions on what is 
discussed, it is likely there would be restrictions on the manner of approach. If the first category of 
investment is agonistic, the second category of investment might be described as empathetic – 
much more considerate of the feelings, views and personality of the participant.  
The philosophical practitioner in an existentially invested role would have greater restrictions on 
what she can offer. More than simply promoting a philosophical way of life and directing the 
participant along a path of self-cultivation, the philosophical practitioner would necessarily be on her 
own path of self-cultivation. Not only would she be committed to her particular path of self-
cultivation, by extension she would be committed to the philosophical truths that underlie that path. 
This would place restrictions on what she can offer, as surely she could only guide those who share 
the same truths. By extension, given that each philosophical way of life is distinct and different, the 
practitioner could arguably only offer a single philosophical way of life to the participant.  
I contend that the philosophical practitioner who endorses a philosophical way of life should adopt 
roles in all three categories of investment. Firstly, I argue that she should make an existential 
investment. A philosophical way of life is fundamentally concerned with the cultivation of self. This 
entails transforming one’s whole being, and is something to be lived every day. In as much as the 
participant is required to commit to the philosophical way of life, the practitioner similarly should 
have a vested interest in her own self-cultivation and be committed to her own transformative 
project. This requires that the practitioner necessarily make an existential commitment. Secondly, I 
argue that the practitioner should make an intellectual investment. Self-knowledge is widely 
recognized as an essential element in the process of self-cultivation. Helping the participant to self-
examine likely requires the practitioner to assume the role of the Socratic gadfly. This requires 
making an intellectual investment. Thirdly, I argue that the practitioner should make a personal 
investment. It is apparent that at least three of the philosophical ways of life explored in this 
dissertation endorse friendship. If the ideal of friendship is defined as a caring relationship of love, 
respect, sympathetic participation, reciprocity, tolerance, open and honest disclosure, and such a 
relationship is symmetrical, then a friendship necessarily requires all parties in such a relationship to 
make a personal investment. Admittedly there are degrees of friendship, which depend upon a host 
of factors, which include but are not confined to personal connection, shared interests and 
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experiences, and time. Accordingly, the level of closeness, confidence and mutual sharing would 
depend upon the particular relationship between practitioner and participant.  
I regard Lahav’s (2001) notion of the practitioner as ‘fellow traveller’ to be indicative of the 
practitioner assuming all three levels of investment. In such a role the practitioner is on her own 
path of self-cultivation. This allows her to be a kindred spirit for the participant, a philosophical 
companion who shares philosophical ideas and personal experiences. Given that the practitioner 
likely began her journey long before the participant, she can serve as an existential exemplar. She 
could act as a guide for the participant, be a source of inspiration and a repository of experience.  
This does not mean that the practitioner cannot present a range of different views. It may be the 
case that the participant is unclear on her own philosophical standpoints and does not know which 
philosophical way of life best suits her. This may be because she is ignorant of which philosophical 
ways of life are available, and what their underlying metaphysical and ethical commitments are, or 
because she has contradictory and competing philosophical standpoints. In such an instance the 
philosophical practitioner would help the participant discover and clarify her underlying 
metaphysical and ethical commitments, and the way of life that best accords with her vision of the 
world, and her place in it. If it was discovered that the participant’s underlying metaphysical and 
ethical views were contrary to those of the philosophical practitioner and the philosophical way of 
life that was being offered, the practitioner should refer the participant to a more suitable 
practitioner.  
I have achieved much in this dissertation. In chapter one I argued that a Socratic vision of 
philosophizing is predominant in philosophical practice. In this respect, the focus of philosophical 
practice is on the acquisition of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is obtained through the application 
of the Socratic Method. Such an application requires the practitioner to assume the role of the 
Socratic gadfly. I associated philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. 
In exploring different philosophical ways of life I have shown that alternative visions of 
philosophizing are available. These shift the focus of philosophical practice away from a narrow 
search for self-knowledge, and instead promote transformative aspirations and projects. In addition, 
they significantly expand the range of methods, and increase the roles available to the philosophical 
practitioner.  
There is still much theoretical and practical work to be done. The philosophical ways of life 
encountered here represent only a portion of what is available. Schuster (1999a: 31) also identifies 
Schopenhauer, Montaigne, Rousseau, Goethe, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Foucault as 
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offering philosophical ways of living. These philosophers undoubtedly have unique contributions to 
make to philosophical practice. Closer examination of them is, therefore, recommended.  
I acknowledge that Schuster’s list of philosophical ways of life is likely incomplete, and that there are 
other philosophical ways of life. Identifying these might be of further service to the development 
and enrichment of philosophical practice. I contend that this body of work could facilitate that 
process in two ways. Firstly, conceiving of philosophical practice as constitutive of a philosophical 
way of life provides a definitive set of criteria that could be used to identify other possible 
candidates.  
Secondly, the philosophers that have been explored here are commonly recognized as belonging to 
intellectual traditions: the Stoics and Epicureans belong to the Hellenistic philosophical tradition; 
Kant is a German idealist; Dewey is a pragmatist; I made the case that Kant and Dewey also belong 
to the Aesthetic tradition; Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are recognized to belong to the Existential 
tradition. These associations with philosophical traditions can be exploited as a mechanism to 
identify other prospective candidates. I contend that it is highly likely that philosophies from within 
these, and associated, traditions would be relevant to philosophical practice. This is somewhat 
confirmed. Achenbach and Schuster endorse a strong sceptical commitment. The Sceptics are 
recognized to belong to the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. Schuster mentions Sartre as offering a 
philosophical way of life. Sartre is commonly recognized as belonging to the Existential tradition. 
Finally, Shuster lists Schopenhauer as offering a philosophical way of life. Schopenhauer is 
recognized as belonging to the Aesthetic tradition. Endorsing these traditions should in no way be 
taken as a signal of exclusivity. It is entirely possible for potential relevant philosophies to be located 
outside of these intellectual domains, both within and without the Western philosophical tradition.  
There is much practical work to be done. While I have explored a range of philosophies there is no 
guarantee that any of them would be applicable. There is no way to know this in advance, as 
applicability would be determined in the particular instance, in accordance with the interests and 
views of the participant. Given the likelihood of participants holding a wider range of understandings 
and truths than have been explored here, there is good reason to continue to explore more 
philosophies. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that any of the philosophies explored here, or the 
methods that they advocate, will actually achieve the ends they espouse. We cannot “presume a 
priori the utility of philosophical practice” (Tuedio 2003). The efficacy of philosophical practice, in 
general, needs to be ascertained. Problematically, there is a lack of empirical evidence that 
philosophical practice, of any variant, actually works. This is something that must be remedied if 
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philosophical practice is to gain professional and public recognition. I intend this to be my next 
undertaking.  
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